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Cumulative Effects Analysis in U.S. Forest Service Decision-Making
Committee Chair: Dr. Martin Nie
This dissertation investigates the U.S. Forest Service’s (USFS) implementation of the
cumulative effects analysis (CEA) requirement under the National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA). The CEA regulation requires federal agencies to provide an analysis of
environmental effects, with consideration of past, present, and foreseeable future actions
by both public and private parties, often on broad geographic scales. Studies in the late
1990’s found that compliance with CEA requirement was highly variable across
agencies. Of late, judicial enforcement of the CEA requirement has been on the rise with
the USFS the focal agency in the majority of decisions.
This study investigates USFS implementation of the CEA requirement, with a focus
on wildlife, and uses the Idaho Panhandle National Forest (IPNF) as a case study. Case
law and NEPA document analysis, along with semi-structured interviews, are used to
investigate: legal standards for CEA and wildlife analysis, the current state of CEA
practice, impediments to implementation, and opportunities for improvement.
The case law analysis reveals that plaintiffs have successfully challenged the agency
for failure to consider other relevant projects in a CEA, lack of rationale for findings,
reliance on stale data, and failure to include CEA at the appropriate junctures in the
planning process. Findings from the IPNF case study indicate that landscape-level
analysis and the inclusion of past actions in CEA continue to be major challenges in
implementing the requirement. Confusion over the nature of the requirement, limited
monitoring data, and lack of time and funding impede the agency’s ability to effectively
conduct CEA.
Cumulative impacts to wildlife are measured in terms of changes to suitable habitat.
No clear picture is provided of changes to habitat availability or population status over
time. The efficacy of using habitat as a proxy for species presence is questionable, as is
the scientific foundation of some tools used by the IPNF to support its wildlife CEA.
Recommendations, such as improved monitoring, better understanding of species-habitat
relationships, and options for increasing the scientific credibility of agency decisions, are
discussed herein as ways to improve wildlife planning and CEA on USFS lands.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH DESIGN

1.1 An Introduction to Cumulative Effects Analysis
Cumulative effects analysis (CEA) under the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA) requires agencies to consider the effects of their actions when seen in concert
with other actions over long temporal and broad spatial scales. In this way, it requires
federal agencies to look beyond the incremental impacts of a single decision, which may
be individually insignificant but may cumulatively contribute to significant
environmental change. Thus, CEA at its best has the potential to prevent what has been
called the “tyranny of small decisions” (Odum, 1982). This project investigates several
questions related to the current status of CEA, focusing specifically on how the U.S.
Forest Service conducts CEA for wildlife.
CEA is a requirement under NEPA, this nation's overarching articulation of a
national policy for environmental protection. The primary action-forcing mechanism of
NEPA is the requirement that agencies perform environmental impact analysis (EIA).
According to this process, before a project is implemented, federal agencies must
explore and document alternative approaches to the project and describe the potential
environmental effects of each alternative. The broad purposes of NEPA are to force
agencies to consider the environmental effects of their actions and to provide a means to
involve and inform the public in federal agency decision-making.
The focus of this research is the requirement under NEPA that, as part of EIA,
agencies analyze the cumulative effects of their proposed actions. NEPA regulations,
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which were originally promulgated by the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) in
1978, define cumulative effects as:
[T]he impact on the environment which results from the incremental impact of
the action when added to other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future
actions regardless of what agency (Federal or non-Federal) or person undertakes
such other actions.1

According to this regulation, agencies are required to look at the cumulative
effects of their proposed project combined with the effects of all relevant past, present
and future actions, regardless of jurisdiction or resource ownership. One author writes
that cumulative effects analysis "is one of the most difficult tasks a NEPA practitioner
faces when preparing an Environmental Assessment or Environmental Impact
Statement", and, "[i]f one examines what is being required…it is apparent that this is a
nearly impossible demand--at least, to do so comprehensively and perfectly" (Smith,
2006, p. 228). Indeed, the potential scope of a CEA can be enormous. For example,
CEQ's own guidance document on cumulative effects analysis estimates that "one mile
of the delta of the San Francisco Bay may be affected by the decisions of more than 400
agencies (federal, state, and local)" (CEQ, 1997a, p. 1).
While CEA may be a seemingly unwieldy requirement, it is the primary aspect
of a NEPA analysis that requires agencies to take a synergistic and sweeping view of the
ecosystem-level effects of their projects. Legal scholar Terence Thatcher (1990) argues
that CEA is an essential part of NEPA analysis, which was meant to move the federal
government beyond crisis management and incremental decision-making and towards
"the early identification of environmental consequences of government action and the

1

40 C.F.R. §1508.7 (2008). CEQ regulations define cumulative effects and cumulative impacts
synonymously and the terms are used interchangeably throughout this research (40 C.F.R.
§1508.8 (2008)).

2

understanding of government proposals in a larger environmental context" (Thatcher,
1990, p. 612). He goes on to say, "[T]he most complete analysis of cumulative impacts,
while potentially daunting in scope, represents the best hope to achieve NEPA's mandate
to 'deal[] with environmental problems on a preventive and an anticipatory
basis'"(Thatcher, 1990, p. 612-613, quoting Senator Jackson, NEPA's primary proponent
in Congress).
Legislative history and common law prior to 1978 indicate that CEA always has
been understood to be fundamental to the implementation of NEPA.2 The CEA
regulation was not formally promulgated until 1978, but cumulative effects analysis had
been emphasized in CEQ guidelines as early as 1973 (Thatcher, 1990).3 As for the
writing of the formal regulations, these were developed as part of a thorough and
responsive dialogue between CEQ, federal agencies, and other interested parties, and
have remained relatively unchanged since they were written (Caldwell, 1998).4
Therefore, when the cumulative effects requirement was officially written into
administrative law in 1978 it was nothing new or surprising to the agencies, and it is
here to stay as long as NEPA remains law.
To date, the CEA requirement has yet to be implemented to its full potential, for
numerous reasons, including the lack of monitoring data, funding, and adequate training
for performing CEA (Burris & Canter, 1997b; Smith, 2006). Agency compliance with
the CEA requirement in the past has been limited. For example, studies during the
1990s that looked at cumulative impacts analysis in samples of environmental
2

This background is discussed in detail in chapter two.
CEQ guidelines for completing EIA were announced in 38 Fed. Reg. 20550 (August 1, 1973).
4
The original NEPA implementation regulations, found at 40 C.F.R. §1500-1508, were issued
by CEQ in 1978 and became effective in 1979. The NEPA regulations are found at 40 C.F.R.
§1500-1508 (2008).
3
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assessments (EAs) found that less than half of the federal agency EAs reviewed even
mentioned cumulative impacts (Burris & Canter, 1997a; McCold & Holman, 1995).
The majority of the EAs that included cumulative effects analysis often presented
limited support for their conclusions or failed to include important aspects of the
analysis. A study on CEA in environmental impact statements (EISs) from the 1990s
determined that “inconsistencies and inadequacies still exist” in the analyses and that
there is a “lack of adequate documentation of the CEA process (or lack of adequate CEA
procedures in general)” (Cooper & Canter, 1997, pp. 385, 405). These findings beg the
question of why CEA is (or was) mediocre or absent in so many EAs and suboptimal or
occasionally absent in many EISs. It is possible that prior to 1997, when CEQ issued
their guidance document on CEA, the agencies did not have clear guidance as to how to
comply with the cumulative effects requirement (Smith, 2006). Furthermore, in terms of
the CEA requirement, the agencies had not faced a great deal of litigation and judicial
review on the issue prior to the late 1990s.
Whatever the explanation, the tide seems to be turning with regard to judicial
enforcement of the CEA requirement. Smith (2006) reports that cumulative effects
challenges in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals have increased in recent years, and in
the majority of cases tried between 1995-2004 agency CEAs were ruled inadequate.
The Forest Service (USFS) faced the majority of these challenges, losing 69% of the
cases overall and 87% of the cases brought with regard to the adequacy of their analysis
of past, present and foreseeable future impacts (Smith, 2006). It should be
acknowledged that Smith (2006) considered only published cases, which might have led
to underestimations of the Forest Service’s success rate in court (Keele et al., 2006).
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Nonetheless, the USFS’s record for cumulative effects litigation stands in contrast to
findings that between 1989-2002 the USFS won 73% of all cases decided in court
(Keele et al., 2006). Given the recent litigation on this topic, one would expect that the
USFS is under increased pressure to perform CEA adequately. A regional NEPA
planner with the USFS stated, for example, that in response to the considerable amount
of litigation on this topic, Region 1 now includes CEA in 100% of its NEPA documents
and has prepared a thorough training on the legal requirements and best practices for
completing CEA in EAs and EISs.5
Since 1997, almost nothing has been published about the state of agency
compliance with the CEA requirement, and no study has looked specifically at how the
USFS deals with the requirement. Numerous questions remain unanswered, including
whether the USFS includes CEA in all of their EAs and EISs, how they actually perform
CEA and define the scope of the analysis, how the case law has affected agency
compliance and how it varies across federal circuit courts, and whether the current
practice of CEA by the USFS effectively captures important broad scale environmental
effects. This research aims to fill in some of the gaps in our knowledge of how the
USFS is doing CEA.
Many of these questions get at the most complex and contentious issues around
CEA and EIA in general. For example, there is significant debate over the appropriate
scale for CEA. Spalding and Smit (1993) write, “One approach views CEA as an
extension of the analytical component of EIA…, while the other regards it as a correlate

5

Joan Dickerson, Region 1 NEPA specialist, personal communication (October 10, 2006).
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of regional or comprehensive planning” (p. 588). These conflicting views involve
debate about both appropriate scale and overall intent of CEA.
It is also unclear how to perform CEA for projects that might affect something
like global climate change, clearly a cumulatively significant effect, when an individual
project has only minor contributions. It is not realistic to prepare an EIS for every
project that contributes CO2 to the atmosphere, but the question remains of when to
analyze the combined effect of many small actions. In other words, when do agencies
look at the bigger picture? McCold and Saulsbury (1996) explain that in such cases
programmatic assessment of cumulative impacts would be appropriate, allowing for
serious deliberation about social values around appropriate resource use. In reality,
though, agencies often reserve CEA for project-level analysis when the details of on-theground activities are clearer. Moreover, if the 2008 USFS planning regulations remain
in place and forest plans no longer are accompanied by EISs, the heavy lifting of CEA
for numerous resources will have to be done at the project level.6 However, preparers of
EAs and project proponents often do not see the need to address such complicated issues
because they view their project as having relatively minor impacts (McCold and
Saulsbury, 1996). These questions of scale and when to report incrementally minor but
cumulatively significant impacts are some of the fundamental challenges and
conundrums of CEA.
Despite the challenges, the CEA regulation is a critical piece of U.S. public land
law and reflects principles of ecosystem management by requiring federal agencies to
take a large-scale look at the environmental effects of their actions (Phillips &
6

The Forest Service planning regulations were announced at 73 Fed. Reg. 21468 (April 21,
2008) and can be found at 36 C.F.R. §219 (2008).
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Randolph, 2000). It cuts right to the heart of NEPA and its intent, making it an
important area for further research. Numerous factors of considerable importance, such
as private land development, the use of scientific information in EIA, and the need for
ecological monitoring systems, are part and parcel of the CEA issue. Furthermore, CEA
reflects some of the most important issues currently at the center of debate regarding
NEPA and forest planning. The significance of the regulation, its relationship to
important issues in forest planning, the increase in case law and renewed focus on CEA,
and the relative dearth of literature on the topic make this subject ripe for study.

1.2 Theoretical Context of the Study
Research on CEA provides an excellent opportunity to explore applied and
theoretical aspects of public land policy and planning. In addition to being a topical
question of relevance to USFS personnel, environmental advocates, NEPA practitioners,
and others, it is also a vehicle to explore several broader and more theoretical issues: 1)
the efficacy of the synoptic or rational planning model under NEPA and its effect on
agency decision-making; 2) the incorporation of scientific information and the role of
scientific uncertainty in public lands policy and decision-making; and 3) the interplay of
political institutions and other interest groups in public land law and policy. Included
below is a discussion of these theoretical frameworks, which served to guide the design
of this inquiry.

7

CEA as Part of the Synoptic Planning Paradigm
This project provides a lens for examining the broader purpose and paradigm of
NEPA. Law professor Bradley Karkkainen explains, "NEPA seeks to improve
environmental outcomes by forcing comprehensive disclosure of expected consequences
of agency actions” (2002, p. 903). However, the Act does not require agencies to
choose a more environmentally benign course of action nor does it specify how agencies
should respond to environmental risk. Instead, by requiring analysis and disclosure of
environmental consequences, NEPA is meant to lead to more rational and
environmentally sound courses of action. In this way NEPA exemplifies a faith in
rational planning and synoptic analysis and is often portrayed as a classic representation
of this planning paradigm (Rasband et al., 2004).
There is significant debate over the synoptic planning model as to whether it is
feasible within the context of U.S. bureaucratic decision-making and whether it affects
agency decision-making as it is meant to. In an early critique of the paradigm, Sally
Fairfax (1978) explains that the intent of NEPA is to support and encourage rational
decision-making but that this is something agencies are not capable of doing, due to both
the influence of politics and the way bureaucracies operate. If this is accurate, one
might conclude that NEPA rests on a shaky foundation.
However, it would be false to characterize NEPA as having a single, clear intent.
Dreyfus and Ingram (1976) describe the search for Congressional intent behind NEPA
as “about as scientific as the voodoo practice of reading the future in a random pile of
chicken bones” (p. 254). They explain, “There were many House and Senate
participants in the legislative process, and each had diverse interests and perspectives; it
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would be impossible to unravel their separate intentions” (Dreyfus & Ingram, 1976, p.
254). Echoing this, Professor Paul Culhane (1990) argues that, rather than being
representative of a single intent, NEPA is a package of intents. He explains that the
passage of NEPA can be understood as the result of a "'garbage can' model of
organizational choice" where the influence of policy entrepreneurs, creative problem
definitions, and policy windows of opportunity coincide in unpredictable ways during
the writing and passage of a statute. The result is that the Act combines the goals of
advocates for clearer synoptic planning procedures, ecologists and others promoting
ecosystem-level analysis, members of Congress interested in the presentation of
alternatives alongside project proposals, proponents of increased judicial oversight of
authority delegated to executive agencies, and advocates of public participation.
Therefore, it would be an oversimplification to argue that NEPA was meant to work in a
single way or towards one particular goal.
There is also considerable debate as to the effects of NEPA and whether it leads
to more environmentally benign choices, given that it does nothing more than force
agencies to consider and document environmental effects. It is likely that agencies are
guided primarily by their enabling statutes, over which NEPA has no overriding
authority, and by factors such as agency capture and budgetary incentives (Fairfax
1978). Professor Fairfax (1978) writes, "The general opinion is that NEPA has
improved agency decision-making processes by altering internal agency deliberations
and by opening them to public scrutiny and participation” (p. 743). However, she
argues that NEPA has not actually accomplished these goals but instead has drawn
attention away from the more important task of reforming agency mandates. On the
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other hand, others have argued that NEPA serves as a clearinghouse for environmental
information and works to promote environmentally benign choices by discouraging
projects that would be revealed by the NEPA process to be environmentally egregious
(Rasband et al., 2004). Rasband et al. (2004) also write, “NEPA has provided constant
pressure on agencies to broaden their missions to consider and adopt environmental
values. And it has spurred agencies to modify proposals and mitigate adverse impacts”
(p. 283).
The investigation of CEA and its effects on decision-making provide a vehicle
for contributing to and informing the debate around the rational-synoptic planning
paradigm. This research was designed to lend insight, based primarily on the case study
examined herein, into how NEPA analysis affects the decision-making process.
Through consideration of these issues, this project contributes to the ongoing evaluation
of this planning paradigm and provides a look forward towards the inevitable next
iteration of public land law. Indeed, as we will see, federal land agencies such as the
USFS are reconsidering the synoptic planning model and adopting approaches that are
meant to be more flexible and adaptable.7

Scientific Information and Uncertainty in CEA
Another central area of inquiry in this study is the role of empirical information
in CEA. Survey respondents in a 1997 study indicated a large role for professional
judgment in CEA decision-making (Burris & Canter, 1997b). McCaffrey and Graham
(2007) explain that the interdisciplinary (ID) teams that prepare NEPA documents often
7

See for example the new USFS planning regulations announced in 73 Fed. Reg. 21468 (April
21, 2008) and found at 36 C.F.R. §219 (2008).
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lack members with the appropriate expertise to analyze certain resources, training for
interpreting new findings, easy access to relevant information, and strategies for
responding to uncertainties in the data. There also tends to be a continuum of
approaches for CEA from qualitative methods that are less complex and sometimes
unvalidated, but easier to use, to more quantitative methods developed by researchers,
but which require expert operators (MacDonald, 2000). This project provides insight
into how ID teams utilize empirical information and apply it in their CEA. For instance,
I consider how ID teams integrate scientific information into wildlife CEA and whether
monitoring data is available to support CEA.
A key aspect of the way science is used in CEA is how the agency responds to
scientific uncertainty. Sample (1991) writes that a lack of scientific information,
uncertainty about the appropriate scale of analysis, problems with monitoring,
uncertainty about private land activities, and a lack of knowledge of how activities will
act synergistically, all have been barriers to completing CEA for the USFS. Assuming
these issues persist, how do agency personnel respond to these challenges and complete
CEA despite the numerous and critical gaps in their knowledge? This research allows
for investigation into the role scientific uncertainty plays in USFS decision-making,
insight into how the agency plans in the face of vast uncertainty, and a look at the ways
that various interest groups portray scientific uncertainty. Additionally, the case law
review provides an opportunity to consider the role of the courts in this matter and
understand how they have ruled in cases involving both data and methodological
uncertainty.

11

The challenge of dealing with uncertainty or knowledge gaps, which affect a
number of aspects of CEA, is one of the most prominent and recurrent themes in natural
resource management.8 When we ask how the USFS deals with the effects of past
actions, we run into the problem of whether the information on the effects of past
management actions is even available. Similarly, knowledge gaps are the central
challenge in doing wildlife viability analysis. There is a need for more information with
regard to species/habitat relationships, species distribution and abundance, and the
effects of management actions on individuals or populations. Knowledge is also limited
in more mundane areas, such as whether timber sales proceed as planned or whether
certain management practices are implemented as promised in a NEPA analysis.
The presence of data gaps and scientific uncertainty is widely regarded as the
central challenge in natural resource management (see for example, Doremus, 2008, on
data gaps in natural resource management; Glicksman, 2008, on data gaps in USFS
wildlife management; and Schultz, 2008, on the challenges of scientific uncertainty in
forest planning). Although the challenges posed by the ubiquitous presence of scientific
uncertainty have been discussed for years, of late more attention has been drawn to other
factors that lead to data gaps. In a recent article, Doremus (2008) emphasizes that
uncertainty is a result of more than a simple lack of data or knowledge, and she
introduces a more complex conceptualization of data or knowledge gaps, suggesting that
information supply in natural resource management is analogous to the complex process
8

There is a distinction to be made between data and knowledge gaps. In forest management,
data gaps often have to do with a lack of monitoring or inventorying data. For instance, the
question of how much old-growth exists on a forest or how many goshawk nests are present in
an area would be considered data gaps. A knowledge gap has to do with a broader conceptual
understanding of a system. Doremus (2008) makes a similar distinction between the quest for
knowledge of complex systems versus routine data collection over time. The two are certainly
related but are different enough that it is useful to draw a distinction between them.
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of the supplying oil, with steps for exploration and extraction to refinement and
consumption.
As Doremus (2008) explains, “Despite wide recognition that natural resource
management decisions are heavily dependent on the supply of scientific information,
little attention has been paid to the processes by which that information is supplied”
(Doremus, 2008, p. 407). There may be information that has been collected but has not
been refined or delivered efficiently, in the sense that it has not been organized or
interpreted in a way that is useful to managers, not collected in a strategic or consistent
manner, or not made available to the people who need it. Shortages in the supply of
knowledge can result from various “leaks along the pipeline,” as Doremus (2008) puts
it, and what seems from the outside like a simple lack of information often, in fact, is the
result of a far more complex problem of information supply and delivery. In summary,
Doremus (2008) explains:
There certainly are problems of limited scientific effort, but there are also
problems of limited communication, of information that is not well-matched to
the management problem, and of institutions not capable of responding to
information…. Failure to get useful information to the right people can
undermine decisions just as surely as failure to generate information. The same
is true for failure to make effective use of available information (Doremus, 2008,
p. 413).

Also critical to CEA and dealing with uncertainty is the subject of environmental
monitoring by federal agencies. At present, agencies do very little to determine whether
their predictions and planned mitigation measures are accurate or effective. Dinah Bear
(2003), who served as General Counsel for CEQ, writes, "While neither an easy nor an
exclusive remedy, one significant step the government could take to improve the quality
of information would be to implement post-decisional NEPA monitoring and
mitigation" (p. 944). The lack of post-decisional monitoring and analysis, she argues,
13

"[Is] the dynamic that has made NEPA documents the one-shot deals that they usually
are, rather than the living libraries that they could become" (Bear, 2000, p. 945).
Karkkainen (2002) echoes this point, explaining that the predictions in any NEPA
document are always "inexact and contestable” and in fact are often inaccurate,
according to the few studies that have been undertaken. He goes on to say, “[B]ecause
NEPA does not require follow-up monitoring, actual impacts remain undisclosed and
there is no assurance that mitigated impacts remain below EIS-triggering thresholds”
(Karkkainen, 2002, p. 903). Monitoring and adaptive mitigation, Karkkainen (2002)
argues, are essential to fulfilling the goals of NEPA.
Without a commitment to monitoring and data collection it is difficult for
agencies to accurately assess cumulative effects either before or after a project has
begun. This research investigates the current and potential role of monitoring systems in
supporting CEA within the context of the case study. Early research on CEA found that
a lack of monitoring and coordination between agencies was a barrier to successful
analysis (Burris & Canter, 1997b). An important issue, then, is whether monitoring
systems in the National Forest system are improving and, if so, how such data
contributes to CEA. Investigation of these questions serves to reveal the role of
empirical information in decision-making and the importance or monitoring data both
for pre-decisional EIA and post-decisional evaluation.
The issue of responding to scientific uncertainty is also an excellent avenue for
exploring some of the complicated aspects of the science-policy interface. Ruhl (2004)
explains that in cases involving scientific uncertainty there is a spectrum of possible
responses from decision-makers, ranging from a precautionary response on the more
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risk-averse end to a “sound science” response on the more risk-prone end. At present,
most agencies respond to scientific uncertainty on a case-by-case basis according to their
professional judgment (Ruhl, 2004). This status quo may be problematic because in
cases involving scientific uncertainty, agency decisions necessarily entail value-based
choices that involve risk preferences. Failure to acknowledge this encourages and
allows decision-makers to disguise the inevitable value-based choices that are involved
in making the leap from science to policy. Thus, the issue of how agencies behave in
the face of scientific uncertainty involves important questions about how federal
agencies respond to risk of environmental harm, whether there should be a prescribed
response, and whether there is adequate transparency and opportunity for public
deliberation in such cases.
The issue also is part and parcel of a broader and widely-acknowledged problem
sometimes referred to as the “science charade”, in which science is used as justification
for decisions that are actually based on political or social preferences (Doremus, 1997;
Wagner, 1999). Such use of science capitalizes on the presence of scientific uncertainty
and can be a significant driver of political conflict. Various parties may frame scientific
information to suit their political goals while simultaneously making claims of
objectivity and disguising their preferences with selected scientific information. Many
players, including scientists, politicians, and managers, have incentives to frame
questions as if science can provide the answers and to justify their decisions based on
scientific information (Adelman, 2006; Ludwig et al., 2001; Wagner, 1999).
As part of the investigation into the use of scientific information, this project
looks specifically at how the IPNF conducts wildlife CEA, how it incorporates new
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methods and knowledge into that analysis, and how wildlife analysis should evolve in
the future. This topic has been an issue of considerable debate in forest management
and has been the subject of numerous lawsuits brought against the USFS. Planning for
species viability was one of the primary issues raised in Sierra Club v. Marita (1995),
Inland Empire Public Lands Council v. USFS (1996), Sierra Club v. Martin (1999), and
Lands Council v. Powell (2004), all important and contentious cases decided in the U.S.
Circuit Courts. Debates about biodiversity protection also of course were central to the
spotted-owl crisis in the Pacific Northwest in the 1990s (Hoberg, 2004). This research
investigates how strategies for wildlife analysis have changed over the years, and what
the agency could be doing differently, given the available scientific methods and
information.

The Role of Political Institutions and Interest Groups in CEA Implementation
Research on the implementation of the CEA regulation presents an opportunity
to investigate the interplay of the various political groups and institutions that affect
bureaucratic behavior and decision-making. One of the goals of this research is to
identify the numerous factors that affect how CEA is done by the IPNF and to highlight
how different players portray these factors when it comes to regulatory implementation.
For example, agency personnel might emphasize the role of training or budgets in
determining how they do CEA, while others might point to the powerful role of
environmental litigants, the media, political appointees, or the judiciary.
Also important are the ways that different political institutions affect agency
processes and outcomes. It is well-established that all of the major branches of
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government are involved in determining how a federal bureaucracy operates. Congress,
for example, acts through a number of different routes and primarily through the annual
budgeting process. It is responsible for setting the agency’s budget and determining
how much money the agency receives for different programs, such as, in the case of the
USFS, general administration, timber harvest, or soils management. Farnham (1995), in
a study of USFS budget requests and appropriations, found that Congress guides agency
priorities through this process and that USFS budget requests tend to follow the previous
year’s appropriations rather than vice versa.
Beyond budgeting, there are a number of other ways that Congress can influence
agency behavior. Jones and Callaway (1995) explain that Congress has become more
involved in agency decision-making over time through a variety of mechanisms,
including the annual budgeting process but also through oversight hearings, by putting
direct political pressure on decision-makers within the agency, and by passing
legislation, including appropriations riders. All of these factors affect and may even
impede agency change (Jones & Callaway, 1995; Jones & Mohai, 1995). Such actions
serve as strong signals of Congressional preferences to the agency, which is apt to avoid
conflict (Jones & Callaway, 1995). Jones and Callaway (1995) write, “The Forest
Service is receptive to external feedback, such as that from Congress and the public, and
responds proactively by adjusting its decision and actions to minimize the anticipated
conflict before it can occur” (p. 347). Wood and Waterman (1991) lend support to this
notion, arguing that agencies anticipate the political preferences of Congress and
respond accordingly.
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Factors within the agency can also affect how requirements like CEA are
implemented. Some have characterized the USFS as being slow to change because it is
a closed organization that adheres to strong central values and socializes its employees
to adhere to such values (Mohai, 1995). Wood and Waterman (1991) find in their
research that the level of centralization with an agency determines to some extent is
amenability to external control. They write, “The greater the centralization of agency
decision-making processes, the greater the executive control over bureaucratic outputs”
(Wood & Waterman, 1991, p. 822). Depending upon the level of agency
decentralization, activities might be affected to varying extents by outside political
influences and internal culture.
However, Wood and Waterman (1991) also identify a strong role for the
executive in controlling federal agencies through the appointment and removal of
higher-level agency personnel and the exertion of control over agencies through the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB). They explain that early theories of politicalbureaucratic relations argued that there was very little connection between executive
politics and agency behavior. Later theories emphasized agency capture and “iron
triangles”, whereby public interest groups and Congress had far more control over
agency behavior than the president (Wood & Waterman, 1991). However, in their
thorough study of agency behavior, they find that “political appointment—a shared tool
of the president and Congress—is very important” (p. 822). They also concur with other
researchers (cited therein) that organizational restructuring, OMB guidance and
oversight, and Congressional oversight and appropriations are all significant in affecting
agency behavior.
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The courts also have considerable power to define how a regulation is
implemented. Mortimer (2002) writes that Congress has numerous incentives to
delegate responsibilities to federal agencies, resulting in both significant administrative
discretion and the shifting of the policy-making venue both to the agency and to the
courts. Particularly when an agency’s mandate leaves room for vast administrative
discretion, as is the case with the USFS, political conflict shifts from Congress to the
agency and the courts (Nie, 2004). Congress uses various tools in its legislation to
control the extent of judicial review of a statute and can strategically shift policy-making
to the courts. Therefore, when we look to understand the role of the courts, we must be
aware that they not only interpret laws but also make policy to a significant extent.
In terms of the CEA regulation, the role of the courts in setting policy is
significant. Because the directive is so broad, it is left to the courts in large part to
determine what constitutes a reasonable application of the standard. Numerous
influential cases have been brought to court by environmental groups and have resulted
in decisions that have forced the agency to change how it complies with the requirement
(Smith, 2006). Indeed, when faced with a requirement as difficult to implement and
interpret as CEA, the courts and the agency inevitably engage in a kind of back-andforth. The agency takes a stab at implementing the requirement, the courts evaluate
whether the approach is adequate, and a sort of negotiation ensues until some set of
practices are adopted that are both practicable for the agency and acceptable to the
courts. However, it would be false to think of this process as having a clear stopping
point. The acceptability of an approach will change depending on the court, the
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availability of scientific information, the nature of complaints from the public, and the
specifics of a case or project.
In general, legal decisions have had substantial effects on National Forest
management. In their review of litigation and the USFS between 1971-1993, Jones and
Taylor (1995) find “a dramatic increase in the use of litigation as a tool to force change
within the agency, particularly in the Ninth Circuit” (p. 310). Court decisions, they
determine, have had a substantive effect on agency activities, and this has served as an
incentive to continue using litigation as a tool to challenge agency actions. Particularly,
they find that environmentalists have had greater success in court as compared to other
interest groups and are consequently motivated to continue pursuing their goals through
litigation. In a follow-up study, Malmsheimer et al. (2004) find that litigation against
the USFS has continued to increase between 1993-2001 according to similar patterns of
success for different groups of litigants and in the different circuit courts. They also
emphasize the role of increased publicity and delay of actions in motivating litigants to
sue the agency, even when success rates are less than 50%. Thus, the role of the public
in influencing agency behavior through litigation is hugely important.
The public also has a role to play through the NEPA notice and comment
process, although the purposes and effects of this form of public participation are not
entirely clear. The public participation requirements in NEPA seem to provide an
avenue for public input on the goals and potential effects of particular proposals.
However, statements of preferences from the public are notoriously fed into a black box
of decision-making, and the agency is not under any obligation to factor public
preferences into their decisions. This research investigates the role of public comment
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on CEA, how such comments affect decision-making, and what public interest groups
aim to achieve through this process, if anything beyond setting the stage for potential
litigation.
It is also important to note that the public also can affect decision-making in
more diffuse ways. Wood and Waterman (1993) write, “[I]nterest groups exert constant
pressure on bureaucracies through their lobbying activities, litigations, and publicity.
News media coverage of agency activities can alter the visibility and perception of
agency programs. The status of some policies is also determined by more diffuse factors
like changing public opinion….” (Wood & Waterman, 1993, p. 501). Therefore, there
are a number of ways in which the public may have a significant role in determining the
current status of how CEA is done and defining the debate over the future of the
regulation.
This research looks at how these various institutional forces and players affect
how CEA is done by the USFS and also considers how various forces may work as
impediments to improving the CEA process. The in-depth case study and associated
interviews allow for a nuanced investigation into these topics. On a broader scale, the
research serves as a vehicle for discussing the complicated interplay of factors that affect
regulatory implementation.

1.3 Applied Aspects of the Research
During the research design phase, numerous individuals at the USFS indicated
interest in this topic and recommended various possible lines of inquiry, including a
detailed account of the relevant case law across federal court circuits, research on
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different approaches to CEA across USFS regions, and investigation into the role of the
judiciary in determining requirements for EIA.9 One of the foremost experts on CEA
case law noted that there is a need for a thorough qualitative analysis of the state of CEA
in NEPA documents.10 In their findings from research on NEPA implementation by
various federal agencies, Stern and Mortimer (2007) explain that CEA is one of the
more important topics requiring research and training, according to NEPA practitioners.
They also emphasize the general need for more empirical research on NEPA
implementation. Therefore, there are a number of questions about the current practice of
CEA that both practitioners and applied researchers believe are of immediate and
practical interest for those involved and interested in forest planning.
Furthermore, the importance of this topic to the future of public lands
management cannot be overstated. CEA involves many critical issues, such as
interagency coordination, ecosystem management, and transboundary environmental
effects analysis. This topic also gets at the intersection of public and private lands. The
CEA requirement is one of the only statutory or regulatory tools that forces federal
agencies to take a large-scale look at their proposed actions, including the effects of
activities on private land. As private timberland divestment and development becomes
increasingly common, particularly in the West, consideration of the effects of these
activities on public lands will only become more critical. To date, courts have yet to
consistently enforce the aspect of the CEA requirement that emphasizes consideration of
non-federal lands (Hartt, 2002). This aspect of CEA could prove enormously influential

9

David Seesholtz and Sharon Friedman, both USFS employees, suggested potential areas of
research during conversations in June, 2007.
10
Michael Smith, personal communication (June 19, 2007).
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but has yet to be implemented fully. However, as we will see, consideration of private
lands has been a major issue in some recent CEA cases, such as NRDC v. USFS (2005).
CEA is also central to the controversy regarding the role of NEPA in forest
planning, which is currently in a state of disarray. In 2005 the Bush administration
promulgated new planning rules under the National Forest Management Act (NFMA)
and suggested that National Forest plans would henceforth be categorically excluded
from NEPA analysis.11 These regulations were later enjoined, but the administration in
2008 finalized new planning rules that are nearly identical to the 2005 rules. 12,13 When
the current rules were proposed in 2007, the USFS emphasized that forest plans must
become “more strategic”, “less prescriptive”, and “adaptable and based on current
information and science.”14 Some consider the current rules to be a thinly disguised
effort to shirk the responsibilities of complying with NEPA, while others acknowledge
that the forest planning process needs to be rethought. The question of how and when to
conduct CEA, whether it is at the plan or project level or in NEPA documents at both
levels of planning, is representative of many aspects of the debate over the role of EIA
in forest planning. Questions abound as to the importance of NEPA analysis in planning
and decision-making, the appropriate scales of analysis, and the role of empirical
information in forest planning.
These issues are particularly important in terms of wildlife analysis. In recent
testimony to the House Natural Resource Committee on the current state of forest
planning, Barry Noon, one of the foremost scientific authorities on biodiversity issues in
11

70 Fed. Reg. 1023 (Jan. 5, 2005).
The 2005 planning rules were enjoined in Citizens for Better Forestry v. USDA. (N.D. Calif.
No. C 05-1144 PJH, Mar. 30, 2007).
13
73 Fed. Reg. 21468 (April 21, 2008).
14
72 Fed. Reg. 48513, 48516 (August 23, 2007).
12
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forest management, identified cumulative effects as one of the four most important
aspects of NEPA analysis in forest management and one that is threatened by the
proposed planning rules (Oversight Hearing, 2007). Furthermore, because the proposed
regulations eliminate key provisions for species protection, Noon expressed serious
concern about the future of biodiversity protection by the USFS. His testimony
indicates that the issue of CEA as it is done for biodiversity is of utmost importance in
the current debate over forest planning.
Also relevant to this study is the issue in National Forest management of
excluding smaller projects from NEPA analysis. A recent GAO report found extensive
use by the USFS of Categorical Exclusions, a tool under NEPA that allows an agency to
exempt some smaller or less impactful actions from NEPA analysis (GAO, 2006).15
With numerous Categorical Exclusions of smaller projects and efforts to exempt forest
plans from NEPA analysis, we might ask when the synergistic and large-scale effects of
numerous agency actions will be analyzed. We could expect this to happen at the
project level, but, as discussed earlier, it is questionable whether the project level is ideal
for getting at synergistic effects of many actions. The question remains as to when and
at what scale CEA should be undertaken. Meanwhile, the CEA in those EAs and EISs
that are completed becomes more important when seen in this context.

1.4 Research Methodology
This section outlines the research objectives and protocol for this project, which
considers the current state of CEA as done by the USFS with a focus on wildlife
15

GAO (2006) found that in the review period between 2003-2005 nearly 3/4the of vegetation
management projects were categorically excluded under NEPA, accounting for almost half of
the acreage treated.
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analysis. In brief, the research provides a thorough review of the relevant case law and
the legislative and administrative history behind the CEA regulation. This analysis
sheds light on questions regarding judicial interpretations of the requirement and the
legislative intent behind CEA as part of EIA. The other major piece of this research
utilizes a case study of CEA on the Idaho Panhandle National Forest (IPNF) in order to
look in detail at how CEA is currently done, strengths and weaknesses in the analysis,
the effects of the judiciary and other political actors on CEA implementation, and
impediments to improving CEA practice. The case study includes analysis of NEPA
document and interviews with USFS personnel and other interested parties. The
sections that follow discuss the project objectives, research questions, and protocol in
detail.

Project Objectives and Research Questions
The broad objectives of this research are to answer the following questions:
1)

What is the legislative and administrative history of the CEA regulation
and how has it been interpreted and applied by the federal courts?

2)

What processes, analytic tools, and sources of information does the
Forest Service use for doing CEA for wildlife, and what does the analysis
look like in NEPA documents?

3)

What are the most important factors that affect CEA implementation?

4)

How do various players define a successful CEA and what are some
potential ways to improve how CEA is done in the future?

These main objectives can be broken down into more specific research questions
that are answered at various stages of the research. Table 1.1 details how these research
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questions relate to the objectives and the different phases of the research, which are
described in more detail below.

Table 1.1 Objectives, Research Questions, and Research Approach
Objective 1: What is the legislative and administrative history of the CEA
regulation and how has it been interpreted and applied by the federal courts?
Research Questions
Research Phase
1.1: What is the legislative and
Review of legal case history, legislative
administrative history of the CEA
and administrative records, and relevant
requirement and regulation (from 1969academic literature. Interviews also shed
2007)? How has the requirement been
light on this question.
interpreted by the courts, USFS, and CEQ?
1.2: How have the courts interpreted the
Review of legal case history, legislative
CEA requirement specifically in the
and administrative records, and relevant
context of National Forest management?
literature.
Has the judiciary been consistent in its
interpretation of the requirement in the
federal circuit courts?
Objective 2: What processes, analytic tools, and sources of information does the
Forest Service use for doing CEA for biodiversity, and what does this analysis look
like in NEPA documents?
Research Questions
Research Phase
2.1: Are the National Forests including
Document analysis.
CEA in all EAs and EISs and what does
the analysis look like in NEPA documents
(i.e. scale, empirical basis, predictive
models, clear descriptions of effects)?
2.2: What processes do the National
Evidence of CEA’s effects on decisionForests use in implementing the CEA
making in NEPA documents; interviews.
requirement? How is CEA incorporated
into the planning and decision-making
processes? How does it affect decisionmaking substantively and/or procedurally?
2.3: What information, analytic tools, and
Document analysis and interviews.
guidelines are available and incorporated
into CEA? What guidance is available
from the agency? What scientific tools
and training are available?
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Objective 3: What are the most important factors that affect CEA implementation?
Research Questions
Research Phase
3.1: What factors within the agency affect
Interviews.
how CEA is done by the National Forests?
Are there political and/or institutional
impediments to implementation?
3.2: How do executive politics, such as
Interviews.
budgeting or appointments, and
Congressional input affect CEA
implementation?
3.3: What has been the role of the judiciary Case law analysis, document analysis, and
in determining how CEA is implemented
interviews.
by the National Forests?
3.4: What has been the role of the public in Case law review, public comment on
affecting implementation of the CEA
projects, and interviews.
requirement, either through litigation or
public comment?
Objective 4: How do various players define a successful CEA and what are some
potential ways to improve how CEA is done in the future?
Research Questions
Research Phase
4.1: How do various players define a
Interviews.
“good” or successful CEA?
4.2: How might implementation of the
Document analysis and interviews.
CEA requirement evolve in the future?
What are the perspectives of CEQ, higherlevel decision makers in the USFS, and
other interested parties?
4.3: What could the agency be doing
Interviews and literature review.
differently for CEA in terms of
biodiversity, given the information and
methods available? Are there exemplars
from other agencies or organizations that
can serve as useful models?
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Research Approach
Because of the near absence of recent, policy-oriented research on CEA,
particularly with respect to how it is done by the USFS, there are a number of different
possible avenues for pursuing this topic. Intensive document analysis, a survey, or indepth case studies all would be useful approaches with their attendant strengths and
weaknesses. One option, for example, would be to conduct a broad-scale, qualitative,
and empirical document analysis for a random sample of NEPA documents. While this
approach would allow a researcher to answer a number of valuable questions, it also
would be a limited approach in some ways. One could determine whether the agency is
including CEA in all documents, for all resources, whether CEA is listed in the table of
contents, etc., in a sort of accounting based on NEPA documents. However, such an
approach would not provide insight into several compelling questions, such as whether
the analysis utilizes up-to-date empirical information, what the role is of CEA in
decision-making, and whether it captures important environmental issues or uses
appropriate scales of analysis, according to different parties. Likewise, a survey might
be useful for investigating issues such as whether the agency provides training and
emphasizes the importance of CEA. However, without any clear sense of the current
state of CEA, barriers to its implementation, or any definition of what constitutes an
adequate or “good” CEA, a survey at this point would be premature and would fail to
answer many of the research questions discussed herein.
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In order to achieve the research goals discussed earlier, it is more useful to
combine several research methods while focusing on a single case study.16 This research
utilizes a single National Forest case study and combines traditional legal and policy
analysis with document analysis and interviews. This makes it possible to provide a
legal and administrative history of the regulation, an understanding of what is presented
in NEPA documents, and an array of perspectives on the larger context of CEA practice.
A case study approach allows the researcher to investigate research questions in
depth. The approach is also ideal for descriptive and exploratory studies that focus
primarily on questions of “what” and “how” (Gerring, 2004). The obvious weakness of
the approach is that the research will not be as representative of other National Forests
as it might be with a broader research design. In this case, this trade-off is acceptable
and warranted for several reasons. For one, previous policy-oriented research on CEA
has been broader in scope and has not offered the intensive investigation undertaken in
this research. In a situation such as this, when the research in the field includes very few
in-depth studies, a case study is particularly justified (Gerring, 2004). For this specific
topic, my goals of understanding the role of strict legal interpretations, identifying
cutting-edge CEAs within the agency, looking to future possible changes to
implementation, and revisiting a National Forest where science and biodiversity
planning have historically been contentious, all provide justification for the use of an indepth case study approach.

16

Gerring (2004) defines a case study as “an intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of
understanding a larger class of (similar) units” (p. 342). Depending on the nature of the
phenomenon of interest, a case study can be defined as anything from a nation-state to a person.
In this case, I have chosen to define a single National Forest as a “case”, whereas in other
research I might define a single EIS as a “case”.
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This approach does not allow for findings that are entirely generalizable to all
National Forests, but does reveal findings that are relevant in several ways beyond the
single case study. Although the case law varies by region, all National Forests are
bound by the same laws and regulations and are required by law to implement the CEA
regulation. Therefore, many findings are relevant and informative for other National
Forests, particularly those forests in the same Region or under the jurisdiction of the
same courts. Other National Forests and Regions may benefit from research on how
CEA is being done in other parts of the agency. Furthermore, research on CEA methods
and processes, along with an understanding of how CEA for wildlife might develop in
the future, is relevant for any group undertaking forest planning whether it is at the
federal, state, or private level.
Finally, it is important to note that this research does not involve hypothesistesting. Instead, the general logic of this study can be characterized as inquiry-guided,
which relies on “the dialectic interplay of theory, methods, and findings over the course
of a study” (Mishler, 1990, p. 416). In other words, all phases of the research build upon
earlier phases of the study, and the research itself guides the final literature review.
While I developed a conceptual framework before beginning the research in order to
guide my inquiry, much of the discussion found in the following chapters includes
literature that was accessed and included based on findings that emerged during the
research process.
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The Selection of the IPNF Case Study
Several factors, including the role of litigation and interest from outside groups in
USFS activities inform the choice of the case study for this research. The Ninth Circuit
hears the majority of cases for the USFS and is generally considered the most friendly to
conservation interests (Smith, 2006). CEA litigation in the Ninth Circuit has increased
in recent years, and federal agencies, particularly the USFS, have lost the majority of
these cases. Most of these losses have revolved around National Forests in Region 1
(the Northern Region) of the USFS (Smith, 2006). Therefore, it is valuable to consider a
National Forest from Region 1 in order to understand what CEA looks like in an area
that has faced the strictest legal interpretation of the standard. The IPNF is the most
obvious choice in Region 1 because of several recent landmark decisions on CEA and
wildlife analysis involving this National Forest. Because of the attention paid to these
issues in Region 1 and on that National Forest, we might expect the IPNF to be doing a
particularly strong job with CEA. The following is a summary of the reasons why the
IPNF is used as the case study for this research:
•

It is in Region 1 and under the jurisdiction of the Ninth Circuit.

•

The most recent and contentious CEA case lost by the USFS, Lands
Council v. Powell (2004), involved a project on the IPNF. This case was
precedent-setting in terms of CEA and drew specific response from CEQ as
to the requirements of CEA. The case continues to be cited in public
comment in many EAs/EISs in the region and also is cited as precedent in
later CEA cases. It is critical to understand how this case has affected CEA
for this National Forest and, by extension, other National Forests within the
jurisdiction of the Ninth Circuit.

•

Lands Council v. Powell (2004) also was contentious in terms of
biodiversity planning, scientific uncertainty, and the use of up-to-date data
and models. This research is an excellent opportunity to revisit the issues of
scientific uncertainty and the role of science in biodiversity analysis and
consider how these issues have evolved on this National Forest.
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•

In all EAs/EISs reviewed as part of my preliminary analysis, CEA was one
of the primary aspects of NEPA analysis criticized by environmental
groups. Many of these groups, including The Lands Council and The
WildWest Institute, are actively involved in challenging National Forest
management and bringing successful legal challenges against the USFS
within the Ninth Circuit. Research on the IPNF allows for investigation
into why the issue is so contentious in the area, a look at the effects of the
comments and litigation brought by these groups, and consideration of
perspectives from all players on how CEA is done and should evolve.

•

CEA was a primary challenge in a more recent case on the IPNF, Lands
Council v. McNair (2007). This case also dealt with standards of judicial
review for agency science used in support of project analyses. The case is
central to understanding current judicial standards for both science and
wildlife analysis. Indeed, the subject matter of this case was so contentious
that it was accepted by the Ninth Circuit for an en banc hearing at the
request of the USFS (Lands Council v. McNair (2008)).

Research Protocol
This research included several phases of inquiry, which are described below in
detail. A general overview of the entire research approach is provided in this section.
Further detail, particularly on the case law analysis and the document analysis, is
provided in subsequent chapters.

Legislative, Administrative, and Legal Case History
A primary phase of this research involved developing a history of the regulation,
including when it came into law, how it is related to earlier NEPA guidelines and case
law, and how it is related to the statute itself. For research of the legislative and
administrative history of CEA, I used the Lexis-Nexis Congressional database, which
includes Congressional hearings and documents, and literature from other sources, such
as law review articles and publications on the history of NEPA. I also considered
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sources of information or guidance on CEA that have been developed by CEQ and the
USFS.
The overall goal of the case law review was to analyze some critical pieces of
early NEPA case law that inform how CEA is done currently and then use that analysis
to provide a broader context for an investigation of more recent CEA case law involving
the USFS. Early case law was found through the WestLaw and Lexis-Nexis Academic
databases and with the help of legal and policy literature on the history of cumulative
effects and cumulative actions cases under NEPA. The development of the legal history
of the requirement considered several critical cases from prior to 1998. These cases
were relevant, for example, in terms of standards established with regard to agency
discretion for deciding the scope and scale of NEPA or analytical requirements for
cumulative or connected actions.
Beyond this general review of the background and relevant case law for
understanding the CEA requirement, I completed a thorough review of all of the case
law related to CEA involving the USFS at the circuit court level for the last ten years
(1998-2007). This case law was found using WestLaw and Lexis-Nexis Academic and
includes all published cases in which CEA was a major issue.

IPNF Document Analysis
The IPNF case study involved both a document analysis and series of semistructured interviews with personnel on the IPNF, members of environmental groups
who have participated in IPNF projects, scientists, and regional and national level staff
with insight relevant for this study. The document analysis included timber-related
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project EISs from 2002-2003 and 2006-2007. A primary goal was to familiarize myself
both with the design of recent projects and the nature of the CEA in the NEPA
documents for those projects. A familiarity with methods used to do CEA, along with
information from public comments, gave me the necessary background in order to
conduct the interviews. This allowed me to delve more deeply into questions of how the
CEA is done, how it affects decision-making, and how various parties respond to
criticisms of CEA practice.
Another major purpose of the document analysis was to document the nature of
the CEA analysis in the EISs. For this secondary aspect of the document analysis, I
utilized criteria developed by other researchers (Burris & Canter, 1997a; McCold &
Holman, 1995) as checklists as I evaluated these documents. Examples of criteria
included items such as: Is there a CEA for all resources?; Are predictions of cumulative
effects supported by evidence?; Are past, present, and future actions identified?; Are
activities on private land considered?; Is the scale of analysis explicit?; and, Does the
scale of analysis vary by resource? These questions get at both the nature of the CEA
documentation and the nature of the analysis. A thorough list of these questions was
developed based on similar studies done in the past and is discussed in more detail in
chapter three.
This checklist approach was not used to rank EISs in terms of quality, nor to
provide a complete assessment of the quality or accuracy of the analysis. For instance,
if I came across an EIS that reported no significant cumulative effects for a specific
resource, it would be difficult for me to know if this was accurate. I could, however,
document whether the statement was supported and explained in the EIS. In a study
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similar to this, Burris and Canter (1997a) explain that this method does not allow a
researcher to assess how well a CEA was done but can allow one to highlight general
trends and/or deficiencies.
The document analysis also involved a more qualitative component. Based on
criticism from the public and issues raised in litigation and appeals, I identified several
important factors to look for in my review of the documents. For instance, I was
interested in documenting the nature of the empirical and scientific information in CEA.
A consistent criticism from the courts has been that agencies in their CEA describe the
nature of alternatives rather than providing an analysis of effects. Therefore, I looked
for evidence of this in the documents reviewed and pulled out relevant examples. For
the wildlife analysis, I undertook a thorough, qualitative review of how the analysis was
conducted and presented, in order to provide the reader with a comprehensive look at
how CEA is done for wildlife and to set the stage for considering criticisms, strengths,
and weaknesses of the current approach. Through the use of a checklist approach along
with a qualitative investigation of the nature of CEA in these documents, I provide an
empirical understanding of what the CEA looks like in the IPNF’s recent EISs.
EISs were reviewed for 2002-2003 and 2006-2007. I chose to review EISs and
not EAs for two reasons: EISs would include a more detailed CEA and would be done
for those projects likely to have significant effects. The time frames were chosen so that
I could 1) understand the current state of CEA practice on the IPNF; 2) familiarize
myself with recent project analyses and public comments prior to interviews; and 3)
compare EISs from before the Lands Council v. Powell (2004) decision and afterwards.
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I considered projects that were classified as “fuels treatment” or “forest
products” projects and made this choice for several reasons. The majority of USFS
litigation historically has challenged logging projects (Keele et al., 2006), and it is these
projects that are traditionally most contentious and viewed as being at odds with
conservation interests. Furthermore, all of the CEA case law mentioned in this chapter,
both at the district and circuit court levels, as well as the majority of the case law
emphasized by Smith (2006) for the USFS involved timber-related projects. Therefore,
I anticipated that timber-related projects in particular would involve detailed CEAs that
might be particularly relevant for wildlife. Focusing on timber-related projects also
served to focus my analysis, giving me some similarities between projects and effects in
order to aid in my own comprehension.

Interviews on the IPNF and Beyond
This research also involved in-depth interviews with IPNF personnel and other
parties interested and involved with CEA. The model for these interviews and analysis
was informed in part by several other recent policy studies that focused on similar issues
(Butler & Koontz, 2005; Pralle, 2006; Stankey et al., 2003). For example, Stankey et al.
(2003) utilized literature review combined with in-depth interviews to investigate
implementation of adaptive management by the USFS in the Northwest. Their project
design and research questions, which focus on “what” and “how” questions in terms of
agency implementation of a specific mandate, have much in common with this research
approach. Their interviews were qualitative and semi-structured, which allowed them to
create interview guides informed by their literature review as well as their review of
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specific adaptive management projects, while also maintaining the flexibility for
interviewees to guide the direction and depth of the interview based on their own
perspectives.
The interview approach of this research was similar. The interviews were semistructured and used an interview guide rather than an interview schedule. Interview
guides were tailored to different parties according to their roles, and the questions asked
were informed by the earlier phases of the research. For example, my review of the
EISs allowed me to familiarize myself with projects occurring on the IPNF and to
develop specific questions based on my reading of the CEA in NEPA documents and the
agency’s responses to the public comment therein. Based on my legal and
administrative review I pursued topics that I identified as important based on agency
documents, administrative records, plaintiff briefs, and other literature. The general
interview guides I used for USFS and non-USFS personnel are included in Appendix A.
A consideration of question ordering and phrasing informed the development of
the interview guide, but interviewees and I both guided the discussion and the amount of
time spent on particular topics based on the individual’s interests and areas of expertise.
This semi-structured format allowed for the exploration of topics as they arose,
providing an opportunity for interviewees to emphasize and focus on what they felt was
most important, and also allowed for the revision and improvement of questions over the
course of the research.17 Throughout the interviews, I would take the time to summarize,
reflect, and clarify what the respondent had said in order to facilitate my own

17

These consideration follow the recommendations of Charmaz (1991) and Kvale (1983).
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understanding and analysis.18 My goal was not to conduct identical interviews or
minimize my role as the researcher. Instead, my role was interpretive in that I guided
the interview, clarified responses, and interpreted aspects of the content.
Interviewees were chosen through both purposive and snowball sampling. In
other words, I identified respondents beforehand based on my knowledge of their role in
the CEA process and also asked interviewees for recommendations of other people I
should talk to. On the IPNF, I interviewed forest-wide environmental coordinators,
NEPA coordinators at the district level, project leaders, biologists, and line officers.19 At
the regional level I interviewed regional biologists, NEPA appeals and litigation
specialists, other NEPA specialists, individuals in the Office of General Counsel, and
people with particular expertise in other areas, such as wildlife planning and monitoring.
A number of members of environmental groups who have submitted comments or been
involved in litigation on the IPNF were interviewed. This group included forest watch
coordinators, NGO directors, attorneys, and scientists. A total of 31 individuals were
interviewed for this project, and interviews lasted approximately one hour.
The USFS specifically requested that I not tape-record interviews with their staff.
Given the ongoing litigation on the IPNF with regard to CEA, several USFS personnel
at the Regional office, upon finding out about this work, expressed concern that I had
conducted any interviews at all. Rather than tape-record, I took detailed notes during
interviews and typed up these notes immediately following the interviews along with my
own observations. For this reason, very few direct quotes are included as part of this
analysis, and for the most part I focus on themes that were brought up repeatedly by at
18

For more on this approach, see Charmaz (1991).
Line officers are individuals with formal decision-making authority in the agency. At the
National Forest level this would include district rangers and forest supervisors.
19
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least several interviewees. Many of my questions required little interpretation and
evaluation of meaning. For example, the response to a question such as “Was there
monitoring data available for the CEA for this project?” was relatively straightforward.
However, in my efforts to understand general barriers to CEA implementation, my
interview analysis often involved looking at the interview as a whole for emergent
themes. Individual interviews were analyzed for content, after which similar content
and themes from different interviews was condensed and summarized.

1.5 Summary
This research answers a number of critical questions on a topic of great
importance in National Forest management. The approach draws information and
perspectives from multiple sources and allows for the development of in-depth and
nuanced answers to the research questions. The ultimate goal of the research is to
provide an analysis with findings that are clear and supported with data, to effectively
synthesize the information from multiple sources, and to provide an overview of CEA
practice that will have practical applicability to decision-makers.20
The findings in the chapters that follow should help interested parties understand
more about the current state of CEA, factors that affect implementation, and ways CEA
might evolve in the future. The remainder of this document is organized as follows.
Chapter two discusses the legal/administrative history of the CEA requirement and
presents the findings of the case law analysis. The results of the document analysis are
discussed in detail in chapter three. Although the document analysis entailed in-depth
20

Patterson and Williams (2002) put forth three criteria for evaluating qualitative research. They
are persuasiveness, insightfulness, and practical utility. I find these to be useful guiding
concepts, particularly as they are defined therein, for a final research analysis.
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consideration of the public comments on CEA in the EISs reviewed, I reserve my
discussion of criticisms, strengths, and weaknesses of the IPNF’s approach to chapter
four, which is dedicated to a critical analysis of how CEA is currently practiced on the
IPNF. Chapter four also looks at some broader themes that emerged from this research,
including limitations to the way wildlife viability analysis is done, the need for increased
monitoring of management actions, institutional factors affecting CEA implementation,
and numerous impediments to improving the state of CEA and wildlife analysis in
general. Chapter five then looks broadly at the major lessons of this research,
recommendations, and some ways CEA might evolve in the future.
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CHAPTER TWO: HISTORY AND LEGAL INTERPRETATION OF THE
CUMULATIVE EFFECTS ANALYSIS REQUIREMENT
Cumulative effects analysis (CEA) has been part of National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA) documentation since the early days of the act’s implementation. The
legislative history of NEPA’s passage indicates that cumulative impacts were always
intended to be one of the central aspects of NEPA analysis. Regulations specifically
emphasizing cumulative impacts were not written until 1978, but early case law and
guidelines from the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) emphasized the need for
CEA.1 Although CEA has been an issue raised in litigation for decades, in recent years
environmental plaintiffs have brought an increasing number of complaints regarding
CEA against the U.S. Forest Service (USFS) and have met with considerable success in
court. The requirement continues to be a controversial issue in National Forest
management, and the judiciary is actively involved in defining the parameters of how
CEA is implemented. The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the
origins of the requirement and how it has been interpreted by agencies and courts.
The chapter begins with a look at the history of CEA and how it fits into the
broader concept of NEPA analysis. I consider CEQ’s role in writing NEPA regulations
and defining the baselines requirements of CEA. In section 2.2 I then discuss some
important examples of how the judiciary interpreted the CEA requirement during the first
three decades of NEPA implementation. The cases discussed, such as the U.S. Supreme
Court decision in Kleppe v. Sierra Club (1976), are critical to understanding generally
how agencies are required to approach CEA. In this section, I also explain how the
1

The NEPA regulations at 40 C.F.R. §1500-1508 were first issued by CEQ in 1978 and became
effective in 1979. The CEQ guidelines of 1973 were announced in 38 Fed. Reg. 20550 (August
1, 1973).
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requirement is similar but distinguishable from other NEPA concepts such as connected
and cumulative actions. In section 2.3 I discuss more recent cumulative impacts case
law, covering in some detail the findings of recent studies that have examined the rise in
CEA case law beginning in the late 1990s.
The remainder of this chapter is devoted to a review of all cumulative impacts
case law from U.S. Circuit Courts involving the USFS over the last ten years (19982007). During this time the USFS saw a rise in challenges brought against them
regarding the adequacy of their CEA. Section 2.4 analyzes these cases in detail, looking
at the nature of the challenges and holdings by the federal appellate courts. The analysis
is divided into sections according to the various types of CEA challenges in order to
provide a sense of the major issues raised in court. For example, I consider CEA cases
brought with regard to categorical exclusions, quality of scientific data, and scale of
analysis.
The next chapter looks at how the USFS actually presents CEA in their NEPA
documents, and that discussion focuses primarily on CEA for wildlife. In order to
understand legal requirements for USFS wildlife viability analyses, the last section of this
chapter discusses some of the cases that establish the requirements for how the USFS
must analyze effects on wildlife species. A number of these cases also involve the issue
of how courts review the scientific basis of agency decisions and effects analyses. Of
late, these questions of scientific reliability and validity often are intertwined with
questions about the quality of USFS wildlife analysis. In order to give the reader some
background on these topics, Section 2.5 provides a primer on these issues through a
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discussion of some Ninth Circuit cases that are key to contextualizing the discussion that
follows in later chapters.

2.1 History of the CEA Requirement
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) was meant to alter
agency decision-making by forcing agencies to explicitly consider the environmental
effects of their actions and explain their choices on the public record. As law professor
Bradley Karkkainen explains, "NEPA seeks to improve environmental outcomes by
forcing comprehensive disclosure of expected consequences of agency actions"
(Karkkainen, 2002, p. 903). However, the act does not require agencies to choose a more
environmentally benign course of action nor does it specify how agencies should respond
to environmental risk. Early Supreme Court interpretations of NEPA made it clear that
the Act’s requirement were primarily procedural and not substantive in nature. 2 Despite
language in Section 101 of NEPA, which clearly states that the purpose of the Act is to
protect the environment, the Court ruled that those statements do not require a particular
response from agencies.3 Agencies are obligated to consider, document, and analyze
potential environmental effects, but are not required to choose the most environmentally
preferable course of action.
As mentioned in chapter one, forest policy professor Sally Fairfax (1978), writing
several years after NEPA’s passage, argues that although NEPA was supposed to lead to
increased internal deliberation and transparency in the decision-making process, it had
2

NEPA was established as a primarily procedural statue in Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council,
Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223 (1980), and Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizen Council, 490 U.S.
332 (1989).
3
42 U.S.C. §4331 (2000).
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the unfortunate effect of drawing attention away from the more important task of
reforming and clarifying agency mandates. The information disclosure required by
NEPA certainly has resulted in more environmentally friendly decisions, but factors such
as budgetary incentives, agency mandates, and bureaucratic inertia, according to Fairfax
(1978), hugely influence how agencies make decisions. Also recall from chapter one
that NEPA cannot be characterized as having a single intent and, in fact, incorporated a
variety of goals. Some of the purposes behind NEPA include: clearer planning
procedures, ecosystem-level analysis, exploration of alternatives in project design, and
increased transparency, judicial oversight, and opportunities for public participation
(Culhane, 1990).
A thorough analysis of NEPA and its effects is beyond the scope of this project,
but it is against this backdrop that we must understand the CEA requirement. CEA is
arguably fundamental to any NEPA analysis and can be understood as one facet of the
synoptic planning requirements of NEPA. At the same time, when we ask how it was
meant to alter agency decision-making, who it was meant to benefit, or, more simply,
what was the intent of the CEA requirement, we have to recognize that there are no
straightforward answers to these questions.

The Authority of CEQ and Early NEPA Regulations
The CEA requirement is found in the NEPA regulations promulgated by the
Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) in 1978.4 These regulations guide agencies in
their preparation of environmental impact statements and compliance with Section 102 of

4

These regulations are found at 40 C.F.R. § 1500-1508 (2008).
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the act.5 Sections 201-207 of NEPA outline the responsibilities of the CEQ, but nowhere
in the act itself does it state that CEQ will interpret NEPA or promulgate any
regulations.6 Its responsibilities as outlined in the act are, in part, "to formulate and
recommend national policies to promote the improvement of the quality of the
environment."7 CEQ's job is to assist the President is his assessment of the state of the
national environment and to generally guide and shape national environmental policy.
Lynton Caldwell, one of the foremost scholars on NEPA and a principal architect
of the act itself, explains that CEQ was located in the Executive Office of the President in
order to assist the president in fulfilling his managerial duties vis-à-vis the federal
agencies (Caldwell, 1998). Because NEPA was applicable to all federal agencies and its
requirements cut across jurisdictional boundaries, CEQ would help to oversee and
coordinate federal projects that affect the environment. CEQ also was to fulfill "an
interpretative or quasi-adjudicative function" with regard to NEPA implementation and
agency coordination (Caldwell, 1998, p. 39).
The CEQ regulations were written in accordance with these interpretive
responsibilities under NEPA. While the legislative history indicates there was concern
that agencies would not know how to write environmental impact statements (EISs), no
specific provisions were included in NEPA for regulations that would guide agency
compliance with section 102 (Caldwell, 1998). In 1973, CEQ issued guidelines to assist
in the completions of EISs,8 and eventually, in 1978, as authorized by President Carter
through Executive Order 11991, it issued regulations that provided clear requirements for
5

42 U.S.C. §4332 is commonly referred to as section 102.
42 U.S.C. §§4341-4347 (2000).
7
42 U.S.C. § 4344 (2000).
8
38 Fed. Reg. 20550 (August 1, 1973).
6
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EISs.9 Caldwell (1998) explains that these regulations were meant to assist agencies in
improving upon some of the "inexperienced fumbling attempts to meet the NEPA
mandate" which were not uncommon during the first decade of NEPA compliance
(Caldwell, 1998, p. 44). He also notes that regulations were developed with the
cooperation of federal agencies and involved a thorough and unusually responsive
dialogue between CEQ, federal agencies, and other interested parties.
In summary, although the act did not originally authorize CEQ to promulgate
regulations, it appears that it was always assumed to be CEQ’s role to interpret aspects of
the act and coordinate activities across federal agencies. Given this coordinating role and
the responsibility to promote a national environmental policy, it follows that CEQ was
the appropriate body to take on the role of issuing regulations to clarify agency
responsibilities under NEPA. The CEA requirement was made into formal administrative
law with the writing of these regulations.

The CEA Requirement and its Derivation from NEPA
Because the cumulative effects requirement is so broad and difficult to comply
with, one might ask whether the requirement follows logically from the language of the
act itself or whether it is in any way a CEQ creation. In order to gain perspective on this
question, it is useful to step back for a moment and consider some background on NEPA.
For a number of reasons, including the emphasis on the need for both a long-term
perspective on environmental effects and coordination across federal, state and private
actors, the passage of NEPA was a monumental step in natural resource policy. As
9

40 C.F.R. §1500-1508 were issued in 1978 and became effective in 1979. The NEPA
regulations currently are found at 40 C.F.R. §1500-1508 (2008).
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Senator Jackson, NEPA’s primary sponsor in the Senate, put it, “[NEPA]…is in my
judgment the most significant and important measure in the area of long-range domestic
policymaking that will come before the 91st Congress. Without question, it is the most
significant measure in the area of natural resource policy ever considered by the
Congress.”10
Indeed, the sweeping language of the Act gives testament to the grand vision of
NEPA. The purpose of NEPA, as stated in the Act is: “To declare a national policy
which will encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his
environment [and] to promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the
environment and biosphere….”11 And Section 101 of NEPA states:
[I]t is the continuing policy of the Federal Government, in cooperation with State
and local governments, and other concerned public and private organizations, to
use all practicable means and measures…to create and maintain conditions under
which man and nature can exist in productive harmony, and fulfill the social,
economic, and other requirements of present and future generations of
Americans.12

In the reports and debates that preceded NEPA’s passage, Congress repeatedly
emphasized that, in the pursuit of short-term and economic goals, the people of the U.S.
had caused serious harm to the environment.13 A Senate report from the Committee on
Interior and Insular Affairs, which unanimously sponsored and supported NEPA, states:
S. 1075 [the Senate version of the bill] is also designed to deal with the longrange implications of the crucial environmental problems which have caused
great public concern in recent years. The principle threats to the environment
and the Nations’ life support system are those that man has himself induced in
the pursuit of material wealth, greater productivity, and other important values.
These threats…were not achieved intentionally. They were the spinoff, the
10

115 Cong. Rec. (Senate) 19008, 19009 (July 10, 1969) (Remarks of Sen. Jackson).
42 U.S.C. §4321 (2000).
12
42 U.S.C. §4331 (2000) (commonly referred to as Section 101).
13
See for example, S. Rep. No. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (July 9, 1969), 115 Cong. Rec.
(Senate) 19008 (July 10, 1969), 115 Cong. Rec. (House) 26569 (September 23, 1969), and H.
Rep. No. 378, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (July 11, 1969).
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fallout, and the unanticipated consequences which resulted from the pursuit of
narrower, more immediate goals.14

In this way, the legislative history of NEPA indicates Congress’ desire to improve
upon the mistakes of the past by looking beyond incremental decision-making by
independent government agencies to consider long-term and cumulative effects. As
Senator Jackson explains in a 1969 Senate Committee report:
As a result of [the] failure to formulate a comprehensive national policy,
environmental decisionmaking largely continues to proceed as it has in the past.
Policy is established by default and inaction. Environmental problems are only
dealt with when they reach crisis proportions…. Important decisions…continue
to be made in small but steady increments which perpetuate rather than avoid the
recognized mistakes of previous decades.15

Part of the intent of NEPA, then, was to force federal agencies to look beyond the
immediate effects of their projects and their own jurisdictional boundaries and provide a
larger-scale analysis of their contribution to the state of the environment. Debate in the
House in particular emphasized the need for coordination across federal agencies, and
consideration of the activities by state, local, and private entities.16 Others in the House
described the need for in-depth and broad scale study of the ecological effects of projects
over both the long and short term.17 Such comments in the House focused primarily on

14

S. Rep. No. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1969). This report is also published in full at: 115
Cong. Rec. (Senate) 19008 (July 10, 1969) as part of a Senate floor debate on bill S. 1075 (the
Senate version of NEPA).
15
S. Rep. No 296, 91st Cong, 1st Sess. 5 (1969), p.5.
16
See, for example, remarks by Representative Pelly in a House debate on NEPA found at 115
Cong. Rec. (House) 26569, 26574 (Sept. 23, 1969). Pelly stated that current institutions “cannot
accomplish the task of coordinating the activities and often conflicting interests of our Federal
agencies, State and local governments, and private industry.”
17
See, for example, remarks by Representative Leggett in the House debate on NEPA found at
115 Cong. Rec. (House) 26569, 26584 (Sept. 23, 1969). Leggett explained, for example, “When
a Federal project, such as the Peripheral canal project, irreversibly changes the ecology of a vast
region there needs to be in depth study of the total environmental effects of such a program.” He
also stated, “There is a definite need for a consistent and expert source of review of national
policies, environmental problems and trends, both long and short term.”
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the importance of CEQ, which, once established, guided the agencies to participate in the
consideration of long-term effects across jurisdictions.
The notion of CEA also follows from other language in the Act itself. Under
Section 102 of NEPA, agencies must report on "the environmental impact of the
proposed action" and "any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should
the proposal be implemented."18 The act also specifies that the EIS should discuss "the
relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the maintenance and
enhancement of long-term productivity."19 It is implied that the scope of an EIS is meant
not only to consider the immediate effects of a project but also how it might impact the
environment in the long-term, through indirect or cumulative effects with other projects.
Admittedly, the precise terminology of “cumulative impacts” is not found in the
legislative hearings that preceded NEPA’s passage. However, the cumulative effects
requirement represents some of the core goals of NEPA: to consider long-term
environmental effects, look beyond incremental decision-making, and consider the
effects of the actions of multiple actors. When seen in concert with the sweeping
environmental goals articulated in the statement of purpose and Section 101 of NEPA,
the language in Section 102, and the legislative history of NEPA, CEA is a logical
interpretation of the act itself and is not misrepresentation of intent beyond what is
articulated in the statute. Furthermore, the CEA requirement was a codification of NEPA
common law that had been established during the 1970s, as is discussed further in the
following section. CEQ guidelines also emphasized the importance of cumulative

18
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42 U.S.C.§ 4332(C)(i) and (ii) (2000).
42 U.S.C.§ 4332(C)(iv) (2000).
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impacts as early as 1973. Therefore, when the CEA requirement was included in the
1978 regulations, it was nothing new or novel.

What Does the CEA Requirement Entail?
CEQ regulations require the consideration of three kinds of impacts: direct, which
happen at the same place and time as the project, indirect, which result from the project
but occur at a more distant place and/or time, and cumulative impacts.20 The regulations
further recommend that agencies analyze in concert proposed projects that could be
considered “cumulative actions" and include analysis of these projects in the same EIS.21
The message from CEQ is consistent: agencies should analyze the effects of their projects
not only in isolation but also with a look at their cumulative effects with other activities.
However, despite the consistent message as to the importance of CEA, there has
remained a considerable lack of understanding and compliance with regard to the
cumulative impacts requirement. For example, studies conducted in the mid- and late
nineties indicated that less than half of the EAs reviewed contained any cumulative
impacts analysis (McCold and Holman, 1995). Those that did contain a section on CEA
often concluded that there were no cumulative impacts from the proposed actions and
provided no supporting evidence or analysis. Professor Michael Smith writes, "In the 15year period following the release of the 1979 version of the CEQ Regulations, cumulative
impact analyses were often ignored or given very little attention in many agency NEPA
documents, and court cases challenging cumulative impact analyses became increasingly
common” (Smith, 2006, p. 229). He goes on to explain that during the nineties, "A
20

40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(b)(3)(c) (2008).
40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(a)(2) (2008). The difference between cumulative effects and cumulative
actions is explained in more detail in section 2.2 below.
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general consensus emerged that there was a lack of a clear definition of exactly what a
cumulative impact analysis was supposed to cover, along with proper procedures to
follow in preparing one” (Smith, 2006, p. 229).
In response to this confusion, in 1997 CEQ published a handbook to cumulative
effects analysis entitled "Consider Cumulative Effects Under the National Environmental
Policy Act." This handbook does not have the force of law but is often referred to as the
primary guide for federal agencies and their preparation of cumulative impacts analyses.
Because the CEA requirement seems hugely comprehensive in scope and practically
unmanageable if it were to be done for every project, we might look to CEQ's handbook
for clarification of what is required in a CEA.
CEQ emphasizes that CEA is a crucial aspect of environmental impact analysis,
and one that has only become more important over time. The handbook elaborates on
this point and states:
Evidence is increasing that the most devastating environmental effects may result
not from the direct effects of particular actions, but from the combination of
individually minor effects of multiple actions over time…. The fact that the
human environment continues to change in unintended and unwanted ways in
spite of improved federal decision-making resulting from the implementation of
NEPA is largely attributable to this incremental (cumulative) impact (CEQ,
1997a, p. 1).

In these statements the CEQ handbook echoes the concerns of Congress in enacting
NEPA and emphasizes the continued importance of CEA analysis for meaningful NEPA
compliance.
The most difficult aspect of CEA, the handbook goes on to explain, is defining the
scope of the analysis. If it is too large the CEA analysis will become "unwieldy"; if it is
too small the analysis will miss important considerations. It goes on to emphasize the
role of "scoping" in helping the NEPA practitioner to identify potential cumulative
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effects and properly define the boundaries for each resource considered. CEQ points to
tools such as GIS mapping and monitoring data on ecological indicators to help
practitioners determine cumulative effects.
In the handbook CEQ discusses the importance of considering each resource in
turn at the appropriate scale and focusing on effects that are "meaningful" (defined by
whether the effects are of interest to affected parties). It also acknowledges that effects
almost always will have to be considered beyond political and administrative boundaries.
Clearly, the NEPA practitioner has her hands full: she has to figure out what effects are
meaningful and worthy of analysis, what is the relevant scale of analysis for each
resource (and the scale might be different for every resource), and facilitate the
completion of an analysis that will require data and information from numerous sources,
potentially across many jurisdictional boundaries.
From the looks of the guidance in this manual, CEA is a huge task. The CEQ
handbook provides an list of activities that would have to be considered for a CEA for a
BLM mining project, and no less than 26 public projects involving four agencies and 12
environmental issues are listed as relevant. Is this really what is required for every EIS?
And if so, how is accomplishing this possible? We might assume that such large-scale
analysis would be handled or assisted by a programmatic EIS.22 However, this is not
always the case, as we will see, because CEA often is reserved for the project-level
analysis when the nature of actual activities is more clearly defined. Perhaps an agency
like the USFS has adequate and up-to-date monitoring data and ecological models so that
22

By a “programmatic EIS” I mean one that might accompany a regional planning effort, such as
a BLM resource management plan or USFS forest plan. Other programmatic EISs include those
that would accompany a forest-wide travel management plan or a region-wide species
management strategy.
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any proposed project can be analyzed as part of an ongoing cumulative effects
assessment. However, this seems unlikely given that several experts point to the lack of
monitoring data as a serious weakness of federal agencies' compliance with NEPA (Bear,
2003; Karkkainen, 2002).
CEQ offers some consolation to the NEPA practitioner by saying that she should
aim "to focus on important cumulative issues, recognizing that a better decision, rather
than a perfect cumulative effects analysis, is the goal…" (CEQ, 1997a, p. vii). In other
words, an important question is whether additional analysis will inform the alternatives
analysis and help the decision-maker with the decision at hand. A CEA is not necessarily
about providing a perfect analysis for each resource, and this reminder should help
practitioners understand how to limit a CEA. Also, it is critical to recognize that NEPA
imposes no requirement to generate new information. Therefore, if the information
needed for a cumulative effects analysis is not available, planners do not have to design
scientific models or conduct new research. As Thatcher (1990) explains, "Reasonable
efforts to acquire knowledge must be made…and gaps in our understanding must be
admitted and their significance explained" (p. 644). The agency has the difficult task of
collecting what information is available but has no obligation to generate new
information.
Despite the publication of the CEQ handbook, according to Smith (2006), there
still exists considerable confusion as to how to conduct a cumulative impacts analysis.
He reports that in a recent survey of NEPA practitioners, training for cumulative impacts
analysis was identified as one of the most critical areas where more training is necessary
(Smith, 2006). Several authors have indicated that CEA case law sends mixed signals
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and that the courts do not always enforce all aspects of the CEA requirement, although
this is to be expected to some extent given that courts make decisions based on the
specific facts of particular case (Caldwell, 1998; Hartt, 2002; Thatcher, 1990). Overall,
however, it seems there is still a lack of clarity on the legal requirements and processes
for completing a CEA.

2.2 An Overview of Early CEA and CEA-Relevant Case Law
Cumulative effects analysis has been an aspect of NEPA implementation since the
early 1970s, and federal courts have required that agencies perform CEA since as early as
1975. This section considers important examples of CEA case law from the 1970s
through the early 1990s and also explores how the courts have ruled on related issues,
such as that of cumulative actions.

Cumulative Actions, Connected Actions, and Cumulative Impacts
In the years after NEPA’s passage, common law played a significant role in
fleshing out the requirements of the act. In 1976, in one of the most important, early
NEPA cases, Supreme Court Justice Marshall wrote, “[T]his vaguely worded statute
seems designed to serve as no more than a catalyst for development of a ‘common law’
of NEPA. [T]he courts…have created such a ‘common law’. Indeed, that development
is the source of NEPA’s success.”23 When CEQ promulgated formal NEPA regulations
in 1978, those regulations generally reflected the trends from NEPA common law up
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until that point (Thatcher, 1990). Therefore, it is useful to look at early NEPA case law,
which provides the foundation for how the CEA requirement has been interpreted.
There are a number of requirements under NEPA that force agencies to consider
environmental effects from multiple projects in concert. One of these, of course, is the
CEA requirement. However, cumulative actions and connected actions requirements also
demand an evaluation of effects beyond the level of a single project. In many cases, even
today, courts deal with the question of which of these cumulative effects requirements is
triggered. Is the issue at hand one of connected or cumulative actions, in which case a
single programmatic EIS is required? Or is this a case requiring analysis of cumulative
effects of multiple projects, for which a programmatic EIS is not necessarily required?
These regulatory requirements are closely related and get at the same underlying goal of
inter-project analysis. For this reason, and because some of the relevant legal standards
are applicable across these different requirements, a brief review of the case law on all
three issues in necessary.
The first cumulative effects case heard by a federal appellate court was Natural
Resource Defense Council, Inc. v. Callaway (1975), which involved an Army Corps of
Engineers proposal to dump waste off the coast of Connecticut. The Corps conducted its
EIS as if its project could be analyzed in isolation, despite the existence of several other
pending proposals for projects by other entities, both private and public, that would dump
waste at or near the same site. The court required that the Corps consider the impact of
its proposal when seen in concert with similar proposals and actions by other parties. In
essence, the court required a cumulative effects analysis. According to Thatcher (1990),
the decision was based in large part on the legislative history of NEPA and “pushed
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NEPA law in a new and logical direction” (p. 614). The requirements set forth by the
court by today’s standards are relatively mundane and are now accepted as basic CEA
practice; however, at the time, the decision sent an important message that CEA must be
included in environmental impact analysis.
A year later, an important and still oft-cited NEPA case, Kleppe v. Sierra Club
(1976) (hereinafter Kleppe), was decided that dealt with the question of cumulative
actions. At issue in this case was a decision by the Department of the Interior not to
prepare a programmatic EIS for coal-related projects in the Northern Great Plains region.
The plaintiffs contended that the projects should have been considered cumulative
actions, which are defined in the regulations as actions that, “when viewed with other
proposed actions have cumulatively significant impacts and should therefore be discussed
in the same impact statement.”24 However, the U.S. government argued that the other
projects had not been formally proposed and were not part of a single, comprehensive
coal-development strategy. The U.S. Supreme Court sided with the government, ruling
that agencies only are required to prepare a programmatic EIS when multiple proposals
are pending review for the same region and could be considered cumulative actions.
Importantly, according to the decision in Kleppe, these actions must have ripened into
actual proposals for a programmatic EIS to be required, although it can be difficult to pin
down exactly when a proposal has been made formal.25 Additionally, the agency is
entitled to deference in deciding how the region is defined and what projects are included
in a programmatic EIS.
24

40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(a)(2) (2008).
Justice Marshall wrote a compelling dissent in this case as to why this decision limits the
impact of NEPA. By not requiring work on an EIS before a formal proposal is made, argued
Marshall, the Court seriously limited the effects of NEPA, which was meant to inform agencies in
the course of developing a proposal.
25
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While Kleppe speaks to the analysis of cumulative actions under NEPA, it does
not specifically address the analysis of cumulative effects. Again, these are two different
concepts in the CEQ regulations, although they clearly share the goals of inter-project
and regional analysis. We can understand this distinction more clearly by looking at the
Sierra Club’s claims in Kleppe. The Sierra Club was interested in forcing the agencies to
conduct a region-wide analysis of the effects of coal development in the region. Legally,
there were at least two ways the Sierra Club could have approached this problem.26 The
Sierra Club’s approach was to challenge the decision not to prepare a programmatic EIS.
Because the Court decided that only actual proposals must be considered in a
programmatic EIS, and there was no pending proposal for a regional coal-leasing
program, the Sierra Club lost the argument for a programmatic EIS.
However, another tactic would have been to challenge the adequacy of the
cumulative effects analysis in a single EIS. The Court explained this in Kleppe, writing
that the Sierra Club’s claims could have been understood as “an attack on the sufficiency
of the impact statements already prepared…on the coal-related projects that the
[agencies] have approved…” (p. 408). However, it goes on to explain that it cannot
consider the adequacy of any EIS as “the case was not brought as a challenge to a
particular impact statement” (p. 408). Thus, this case did not directly address cumulative
impacts analysis in a single EIS but, instead, addressed the issue of cumulative actions.
The distinction between cumulative actions and cumulative effects is crucial.
Thatcher (1990) highlights the following excerpt from Oregon Natural Resources

26

This analysis draws upon that of Thatcher (1990) and of the Court in Kleppe.
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Council v. Marsh (1987) as a useful clarification of the distinction between the two
concepts:
The “cumulative impact” regulation requires the Corps to evaluate “the incremental
impact of the action when added to other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable
actions.” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7. Although the CEQ guidelines require that “cumulative
actions” be considered together in a single EIS, 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(a)(2), and
“cumulative actions” consist only of “proposed actions,” this does not negate the
requirement of 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7 that the Corps consider cumulative impacts of the
proposed actions which supplement or aggravate the impacts of past, present, and
reasonably foreseeable actions (pp. 1497-1498).27

In other words, cumulative impacts analysis requires the consideration of the
effects of multiple projects in concert even if a single programmatic EIS is not required
for those actions. CEA is also not limited to proposed actions but may include other
reasonably foreseeable actions. In summary, because a court has limited power to require
a cumulative impacts analysis in the shape of a programmatic EIS, cumulative impacts
analysis in a single EIS is one place where agencies can be legally required to look at the
broad-scale impacts of their actions in concert with foreseeable future actions that have
not yet ripened into formal proposals.
One other important lesson relevant for CEA should be taken from Kleppe. The
Court made it clear that reviewing courts would defer to agency expertise when it comes
to deciding the appropriate scale of an analysis. This does not mean that an agency can
arbitrarily define the scale of analysis in a project-specific or programmatic EIS.
However, if it provides a reasoned explanation justifying its choice, a reviewing court
will defer to the agency’s judgment, even if the court believes a better choice might have
been made.

27

Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Marsh, 832 F.2d 1489, 1497-1498 (9th Cir. 1987).
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The decision in Kleppe was somewhat ambiguous in several other areas. For
example, the Court indicated that an agency is entitled to discretion in deciding when a
programmatic EIS is necessary, leaving open the question of whether an agency could go
forward with several projects that might be part of a larger set of cumulative actions,
without preparing an EIS before beginning any of the projects. In Connor v. Burford
(1988) the court dealt with precisely this issue. In that case the court required the Bureau
of Land Management (BLM) and USFS to prepare an EIS on oil and gas leases in the
Flathead and Gallatin National Forests. All of the leases were approved at the same time,
although the lessees had not yet developed site-specific proposals. The court reasoned
that the agency could not approve some leases and prepare an EIS later because the
agencies might miss the point where cumulative impacts became significant. Although
the Supreme Court stated that courts would defer to an agency’s discretion in deciding
the timing of a cumulative actions EIS, the court in this case found that the agency’s
failure to undertake such an analysis prior to any action unjustifiable. This case
illustrates the difficulty in understanding, in terms of legal requirements, exactly when a
planned action might be considered a formal proposal and at what point the cumulative
actions requirement might be triggered. There is no hard and fast rule as to when a
programmatic EIS is required, and courts will rule differently on this matter depending on
the specific of the case at hand.
Also related to CEA is the idea of connected actions. When multiple projects are
connected, an agency must analyze the cumulative effects of those projects in a single
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EIS, even if not all of the connected actions have ripened into obvious proposals.28 The
Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Thomas v. Peterson (1985) is a classic example of a case of
connected actions. In this case, the USFS prepared an environmental assessment (EA) on
a road that would be used for timber harvest. The agency analyzed the effects of the road
in isolation, concluding that it would have no significant impact, and did not include the
effects of the planned timber sale in the EA. The court ruled that the agency could not
analyze the effects of a road built for timber sale without also considering the effects of
the timber sale at the same time, since the actions were clearly connected. Courts
generally use the “independent utility” test to determine whether separate actions should
be consider connected. If a single action does not necessarily trigger another and has a
utility apart from another action, a court will not consider the two actions connected.29
The analysis of connected actions is another way courts can require the analysis of
cumulative effects of multiple but interdependent projects.

CEA-Specific Case Law in the 1980s and Early 1990s
In the decades after NEPA’s passage, the appellate courts decided a number of
cases that established CEA as a clearly enforceable requirement in NEPA analyses.
Recall that in 1975 the Second Circuit made clear that CEA was a binding requirement in
Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc. v. Callaway (1975). A Fifth Circuit decision,
Fritiofson v. Alexander (1985), dealt with an Army Corps of Engineers’ EA for the

28

Connected actions are defined in CEQ regulations as actions which “(i) Automatically trigger
other actions which may require environmental impact statements[;] (ii) Cannot or will not
proceed unless other actions are taken previously or simultaneously[;] (iii) Are interdependent
parts of a larger action and depend on the larger action for their justification.” 40 C.F.R. §
1508.25(a)(1)(i)-(iii) (2008).
29
See also Native Ecosystem Council v. Dombeck, 304 F.3d 886 (9th Cir. 2002).
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approval of a permit to fill a portion of a wetland on Galveston Island in Texas. The loss
of the wetland from the permit area alone was not considered biologically significant, but
when seen in concert with foreseeable broader scale development on the island
implicated more significant effects. The court’s decision is a little confused, but it held
that the Corps must analyze the cumulative effects of their actions in concert with
reasonably foreseeable future actions involving wetland development, even when future
actions had not ripened into specific proposals. As an aside, in terms of forest
management, the precedent set in this case is interesting to consider in terms of proposed
land exchanges or road easement decisions that might have an impact on the pace of
private timberland divestment and development. Given the precedent set in this case, the
agency might have to consider the potential long-term effects of their actions on private
timberland slated for harvest and the potential for subsequent residential or commercial
development.
Other appellate court cases sent a similar message to the agencies regarding the
CEA requirement. In LaFlamme v. FERC (1988) the Ninth Circuit required that the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission assess the cumulative impacts of all proposed
and existing projects in a watershed and ruled that it was insufficient to consider the
effects of single projects in isolation. In an early challenge to the geographic scale of a
CEA, the D.C. Circuit ruled in NRDC v. Interior Department (1988) that Interior was
required to consider cumulative impacts to migratory whale and fish species resulting
from multiple off-shore oil and gas projects in both the Pacific and Alaskan regions.
According to Thatcher (1990), cases such as this, involving effects to a target resource,
such as a specific species, or effects to a distinct geographic area, generally have been
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more compelling to reviewing courts than more general “bigger is worse” claims in terms
of cumulative effects challenges.
In City of Tenakee Springs v. Clough (1990) (hereinafter Tenakee Springs), which
dealt with a timber sale contract in the Tongass National Forest, the court addressed
several aspects of the CEA requirement. First, it held that the agency was required to
analyze cumulative effects of the current proposed sales in concert with reasonably
foreseeable future sales (in this case these sales had already been announced by the
agency through published notices of intent). The agency also could not disaggregate their
analysis area-by-area as to avoid considering cumulative impacts.
In response to the court’s clear requirement of a CEA, the USFS explained that it
had already analyzed cumulative impacts in its 1979 forest plan. The court found this
argument disingenuous for several reasons. For one, the agency was required to analyze
cumulative impacts on subsistence users, in accordance with the Alaska National Interest
Lands Conservation Act of 1980, which was passed after the forest plan was completed.
Secondly, the court found the forest plan EIS to be quite general with no site-specific
analysis of the timber harvesting projects at issue. The agency then tried to argue that it
would perform a CEA in the upcoming revision of the forest plan. However, the court
held that NEPA clearly requires an analysis of effects before a planned action is
undertaken. Therefore, the agency could not wait to conduct its CEA in an upcoming
plan revision. The court concluded that the lack of CEA in the EIS under review could
not be justified without consideration of other current and foreseeable projects, nor could
the CEA in the forest plan EIS substitute for analysis at the project level.
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Tenakee Springs (1990) is a good example of what several authors have referred
to as a “shell game”, by which an agency justifies a lack of NEPA analysis in one
document by suggesting that it will be or has been done in another NEPA document
(Feller, 1995; Nie, 2006). For example, in justifying the absence of CEA in a projectlevel EIS, an agency might claim that it either already analyzed cumulative impacts at the
plan level, or that it will do so in an upcoming plan. Alternatively, an agency might
defend a lack of cumulative effects analysis in a programmatic EIS by explaining that it
will conduct the CEA at the project level. But when pushed at the project level, the
USFS often claims that certain types of analyses are beyond the scope of project level
analyses. As we will see, an agency does have some leeway to decide the appropriate
timing of a CEA. However, courts have not been blindly deferential in this area and
generally require some sort of CEA at both the programmatic and project levels.
An important Ninth Circuit case from the early 1990s that dealt with the CEA
issue at the plan level was Resources Limited v. Robertson (1993) in which the plaintiffs
challenged the Flathead forest plan EIS. The plaintiffs argued that the agency should
have analyzed the effects of non-federal actions as part of the plan’s CEA, but the agency
responded that it did not need to analyze non-federal actions because such actions are out
of the agency’s control. The court made it clear that a forest plan EIS (a programmatic
NEPA document) must include a CEA and that to exclude non-federal actions from a
CEA is contrary to the plain meaning of NEPA regulations. However, the court also
acknowledged that it is not entirely clear whether this aspect of a CEA, that is, the
analysis of private land activities, must occur at the programmatic level. It held in this
case that the agency did not have to analyze non-federal cumulative impacts “on the
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condition that the Forest Service must analyze such impacts, including possible
synergistic effects from implementation of the Plan as a whole, before specific sales”
(Resources Ltd. v. Robertson, 1993, p. 1306). Given the facts of this case, the court
decided that the best time to analyze cumulative impacts of activities on non-federal
lands would be at the project level. Nonetheless, this case is often cited in reference to
the clear requirement for a CEA in a forest plan EIS. Based on this case and others
described later in this chapter, it is generally expected that courts will look for some
degree of CEA at both the project and plan level.
Based on the first two decades of CEA case law, Herson and Bogdan (1991)
conclude that by the early 1990s the CEA requirement under NEPA had been established
as a legally enforceable requirement. Writing in the early 1990s they conclude, “[T]he
courts appear ready to reject NEPA documents (both [EAs] and EISs) on the grounds of
inadequate cumulative impact analysis” (Herson and Bogdan, 1991, p. 106). Particularly,
agencies had been required to analyze similar actions in close proximity, foreseeable
future actions, and in some cases even nonfederal actions outside of their control (Herson
& Bogdan, 1991). As part of the recommendations to practitioners, Herson and Bogdan
(1991) emphasize that agencies must be particularly careful not to improperly segment
connected actions or ignore similar actions in the same region that are under the agency’s
control. Courts will not expect the unreasonable, however, and will defer to an agency’s
CEA if the analysis was reasoned and demonstrated a good faith effort at NEPA
compliance. As we will see, more recent case law reviews reiterate essentially the same
message to agency NEPA practitioners.
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2.3 Recent CEA Case Law in the Ninth Circuit
A review of Ninth Circuit CEA case law from 1995-2004 found that the number
of cases involving federal agencies and CEA challenges has been on the rise in recent
years (Smith, 2006). In Smith’s (2006) look at CEA case law, he found that nearly half
of the published cases involving cumulative effects had been decided in the last three
years of his analysis period (2002-2004) and that plaintiffs met with more success in
those years than in previous years. The majority of these cases involved the USFS,
which lost 69% of the published cases decided by the Ninth Circuit over the ten-year
period. Smith (2006) explains that the most common challenge to CEAs and the most
common reason agencies lost in court was an inadequate analysis of past, present and
reasonably foreseeable future projects. Agencies also lost a number of cases because
their CEAs lacked supporting data or rationale.
Despite the agencies’ losing record, however, Smith (2006) concludes that the
court does not expect the impossible. He writes:
[I]n nearly all cases [the agencies] are not losing these court cases because their
cumulative impact analyses are not perfect, but rather because they either have
no cumulative impact analysis at all in their NEPA document; they leave out
obvious or critically important other past, present, and especially reasonably
foreseeable future projects in their analysis area; or the analysis consists solely
of undocumented assertions/conclusions of no impacts without any supporting
analysis or rationale to back up that claim (Smith, 2006, p. 238, emphasis in
original).

Based on his analysis, Smith (2006) offers several recommendations for
practitioners. Agencies must document other relevant projects in their CEAs, support
their claims with data and reasoned analysis, make a good faith attempt to comply with
NEPA (but also know that the court does not expect perfection), and be careful not to tier
to non-NEPA documents or programmatic EISs with no site-specific information. He
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concludes that there is little evidence that the court is pushing the requirements of NEPA
in new directions or requiring more than was intended by Congress and CEQ (although
he suggests that Lands Council v. Powell, a case from 2004 discussed in further detail
below, may be an exception).
One issue to consider is whether CEA challenges have been on this rise in the
Ninth Circuit because the court has become relatively more sympathetic to plaintiffs on
this issue over the years. In fact, there is some indication that the court in the CEA cases
from 1998 was relatively more favorable towards plaintiffs challenging timber sales. In
her analysis of Ninth Circuit case law involving timber sales in the 1990s, Brown (1999)
writes that the court in three CEA/USFS decisions in 1998, Neighbors of Cuddy
Mountain v. USFS (hereinafter Neighbors I), Idaho Sporting Congress v. Thomas, and
Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v. Blackwood (hereinafter Blue Mountains), engaged
in particularly factual and meaningful review of the basis of USFS decisions. In cases
prior to 1998, Brown (1999) explains, the Ninth Circuit had failed in a number of cases to
closely examine the details of agency decisions and had essentially denied plaintiffs any
meaningful judicial review of the issues raised. The court's more careful review in
Neighbors and Blue Mountains, she argues, "represents the proper application of the
arbitrary and capricious standard” (Brown, 1999, p. 681). She argues that in Neighbors
and Idaho Sporting Congress v. Thomas, “[T]he court did not unquestioningly resort to
deference to agency decision making, but instead looked at the facts alleged to support
the Forest Service’s conclusions. This is factually informed judicial decision making,
which properly balances the agency’s hard look burden and discretion with the
prerequisites of the law” (Brown, 1999, p. 661). According to Brown (1999) these cases,
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represented something of a judicial course correction, away from cases in previous years
when the Ninth Circuit had been overly deferential, and towards the proper application of
standards of judicial review.
As discussed earlier, prior to 1998 the Ninth Circuit had established the CEA as
an enforceable requirement of NEPA. However, Brown (1999) argues that the 1998
decisions signaled that the level of scrutiny applied to agency decisions might be
significantly ratcheted up in the future. Considering that all three of those cases dealt
with CEA challenges and that the analysis was ruled inadequate in all cases setting
important precedent in terms of CEA standards, it is very possible that the Ninth Circuit
post-1998 became a more favorable environment for plaintiffs bringing CEA challenges
against the USFS.

2.4 Case law from 1998-2007 involving the USFS and CEA
This analysis takes a similar approach to Smith’s (2006) study, analyzing CEA
case law for a ten-year period (1998-2007), but with a specific focus on USFS case law
and a look at all federal circuit courts. Circuit court cases were chosen to limit the scope
of the analysis and because, as Smith (2006) explains, “Appeals Court cases…usually
end up being the final word on most NEPA issues” (p. 229). The Supreme Court hears
very few NEPA cases, leaving the circuit courts to flesh out the details of NEPA
compliance.
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Methodology
Cases were identified for the years 1998-2007 by searching both Lexis-Nexis and
WestLaw for any cases containing the phrases “cumulative impacts” or “cumulative
effects” and in which the USFS was a primary defendant.30 Only published opinions,
which are selected for publication because they set legal precedent, and those involving
CEA challenges under NEPA were included in the sample. The search yielded 19 cases
for the ten-year period, with 16 in the Ninth Circuit, three in the Tenth Circuit, and no
published opinions on the CEA issue from any other Circuit Court. The three Tenth
Circuit cases are from 2006 and 2007 only. In the Ninth Circuit, cases were identified in
all years except 2001 and 2002, and there was no discernable trend in the number of
cases involving CEA and the USFS over the analysis period. The agency faced anywhere
from 0-3 challenges per year, with an average of 1.5 cases per year over the 10-year
period. Table 2.1, included at the end of this chapter, provides an overview of the cases
analyzed by year along with the court’s decision on the CEA challenge.

Results
In the CEA cases identified in the Ninth Circuit, the USFS’ lost 12 of the 16
challenges brought with regard to the adequacy of a CEA, giving the agency a 25%
success rate. The USFS won all of the challenges in the 10th Circuit. The most common
challenge, and most common reason the agency lost, was a failure to include in the CEA
an adequate analysis of relevant past, present, and/or reasonably foreseeable future
30

One case with the words “cumulative effects” in the decision was excluded from the sample
(Colorado Environmental Coalition v. Dombeck (185 F.3d 1162, 10th Cir. 1999). CEA was not a
primary challenge raised in this case but instead just one of numerous complaints about the
general inadequacy of the EIS.
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projects in the area.31 In other words, the agency often lost the CEA challenge because of
a failure to analyze the effects of past projects, other concurrent projects that the court
ruled should have been part of the CEA, or cumulative impacts in light of proposed or
foreseeable future projects. Another common challenge and reason the agency lost was
because the CEA was too general, lacking either adequate data, a clear rationale for
conclusions about environmental effects, or any detail about expected effects. A
summary of the main challenges and holdings from each case, along with brief notes on
other important aspects of the decision, are provided in table 2.2, which is included at the
end of this chapter.

Judicial Standards of Review
Before looking at specific cases, it is important to bear in mind several
background standards that guide judicial review of administrative decision-making. The
Administrative Procedures Act of 1946 (APA) applies to all U.S. federal agencies and
places broad parameters on the judicial review of agency decisions. Section 706
establishes what is known as the "arbitrary and capricious" standard, by which courts can
set aside agency decisions if they are not supported by a clear underlying rationale.32
Decisions must be supported by some evidence, or, at least, cannot be entirely contrary to
the evidence available. For example, in Northern Spotted Owl v. Hodel (1988) the court
used the APA to set aside the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service's (USFWS) decision not to
list the northern spotted owl. All expert opinion on the matter suggested that the owl

31

Of the 16 cases on CEA in the Ninth Circuit, 9 involved challenges on this issue. The agency
lost 7 of those 9 cases.
32
5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006).
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should be listed, and the agency offered no evidence to support its decision to the
contrary.
Under the APA, courts employ a "hard look" standard by which they ensure that
agencies have based their decisions on relevant information and have explained how they
arrived at those decisions (based on precedent set in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v.
Volpe (1971)). By this standard, courts evaluate whether decision-makers have
considered the relevant scientific information, and generally require agencies to explain
how they have evaluated competing or uncertain scientific claims (Doremus, 2004). This
said, the standard of review under the APA is relatively narrow, and agencies enjoy
substantial deference from the courts as long as they provide a clear rule-making record
and a reasonable rationale for their decisions.
Courts afford several types of deference to federal agencies based on the
constitutional separation of powers. One form of judicial deference was established in
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense Council (1984). According to this
important case, when a court is evaluating whether an agency's interpretation of a law is
defensible, it first asks whether Congress was clear on the issue in the statutory language.
If so, the agency must follow the statutory language. If not, the agency is allowed
deference in their interpretation, as long as its reading of the statue is reasonable. Courts
are also highly deferential when technical and scientific information is involved.
Consider, for example, Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council (1989), in which the
Court explained, "Because analysis of the relevant documents 'requires a high level of
technical expertise,' we must defer to 'the informed discretion of the responsible federal
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agencies.'"33 These standards of deference should be borne in mind throughout the
following analysis. Such standards, along with the APA and "hard look" doctrine, are
relevant for understanding judicial review of agency action under both NEPA and the
National Forest Management Act (NFMA), which comes into play in some of the cases
discussed below.

Analysis
Rather than cover in detail of all 19 cases analyzed in this study, this section
considers cases in sections according to the major types of CEA challenges. This
approach allows for a broad look at the lessons to be taken from recent CEA case law
involving the USFS. In the following sections, I discuss the primary CEA issues that
have been raised in court in order to provide an overview of the types of CEA challenges
and a sense of how the courts have ruled on these topics. Two of the most common
challenges raised involve the lack of supporting detail or decision rationale in a CEA and
the failure to sufficiently analyze the effects of other past, present, or reasonably
foreseeable actions as part of a CEA. Other issues discussed herein include problems
with the science behind a CEA, challenges to the chosen scale of analysis, the issue of
tiering CEA to another document or postponing it until a later analysis, and CEA for
projects that are implemented under a Categorical Exclusion (CatEx) category under
NEPA. The primary goals of the analysis are to provide insight into the different types of

33

At page 1861, citing Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976). The Court also cites the
classic statement of this type of deference from Baltimore Gas & Electric v. NRDC, 462 U.S. 87
(1983): "[A] reviewing court must remember that the Commission is making predictions, within
its area of special expertise, at the frontiers of science. When examining this kind of scientific
determination, as opposed to simple findings of fact, a reviewing court must generally be at its
most deferential."
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CEA complaints that plaintiffs have raised in court and a look at the factors that
contribute to whether a CEA is deemed adequate.

Issue 1: Lack of Detail or Clear Rationale
The first Ninth Circuit case included in this analysis serves as a useful jumping
off point for considering CEA challenges. In Neighbors of Cuddy Mountain v. USFS
(1998) (hereinafter Neighbors I) the plaintiffs challenged the EIS for a timber sale on the
Payette National Forest in Idaho. They charged that the USFS’ analysis of cumulative
effects on old-growth habitat lacked detail and in particular failed to analyze in any detail
three other reasonably foreseeable sales slated to occur in the same roadless area, known
as Cuddy Mountain. In exploring the potential effects of this sale and others on oldgrowth habitat and dependent species, the CEA included statements such as: “There is
some risk that the remaining mature and old growth forests on Cuddy Mountain may not
be adequate in size, if isolated from adjacent suitable habitat, to maintain the dependent
species” (Grade/Dukes EIS as cited in Neighbors I (1998) at p. 1379). The EIS also
stated that monitoring should be done in order to have the information necessary to assess
cumulative impacts on old-growth dependent species.
As for the other proposed sales in the area, the agency included no detail about the
amount of old-growth that would be cut in each of the proposed sales or whether any of
the sales would impact the same home ranges of pileated woodpeckers, an old-growth
management indicator species (so designated by the USFS). The court explained, “The
sole reference to future sales stated, ‘Future timber sales over the next several years
would propose to treat additional old-growth habitat’” (Neighbors I, 1998, at p. 1379,
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citing the Grade/Dukes EIS). This statement suffers from a common shortcoming in
many of the CEAs that are deemed inadequate: it describes actions, in this case in very
general terms, rather than analyzing effects to a particular resource, such as old-growth
dependent species and their habitat. In other words, the agency discloses the fact that
additional old-growth habitat will be treated, but does not then translate that in terms of
how it will actually affect wildlife populations.
As a whole, the CEA lacked any quantified or detailed information, without
which, the court explained, “[N]either the courts nor the public, in reviewing the Forest
Service’s decision, can be assured that the Forest Service provided the hard look that it is
required to provide” (Neighbors I, 1998, p. 1379). Both NEPA and NFMA planning
regulations in effect at the time, according to the court, required more detailed
information about effects on habitat resulting from multiple projects in the same area.
All of the projects had been formally proposed and thus were “reasonably foreseeable.”
The projects would take place in the same roadless area and all had the potential to affect
old-growth habitat in that area. Therefore, the agency was required to analyze the
combined effects from these sales in as much detail as possible and to justify their
conclusions about cumulative effects. The Ninth Circuit concluded by stating, “General
statements about ‘possible’ effects and ‘some risk’ do not constitute a ‘hard look’ absent
a justification regarding why more definitive information could not be provided”
(Neighbors I, 1998, p. 1380). This statement is cited repeatedly by the court in many of
the CEA cases that followed Neighbors I. As for the agency’s intention to monitor in
order to facilitate a more complete CEA in the future, the court ruled that the agency
cannot defer a CEA to a later date as NEPA requires such analysis before a project takes
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place. Even if monitoring information is limited, a CEA must be completed in the NEPA
analysis.
As in Neighbors I, a number of cases involve complaints that a CEA is too
general, lacks analysis of effects, or lacks a transparent rationale for its conclusions. For
example, in Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. USFS (1999) (hereinafter Muckelshoot), a case
involving the EIS for the Huckleberry Land Exchange, the Ninth Circuit also found the
CEA to be far too general. It observed that the EIS contained twelve sections on
cumulative effects but that “these sections merely provide very broad and general
statements devoid of specific, reasoned conclusions” (Muckleshoot, 1999, p. 811).
Again, the agency’s CEA described activities but failed to analyze effects. The CEA for
several alternatives described the amount of land to be exchanged and made predictions
about whether it would be subject to commercial harvest. However, the CEA lacked any
analysis of the potential effects of those activities on resources, except to say that the
lands the USFS received in the land exchange would be expected to develop greater
species diversity over time.
The court was dissatisfied with the lack of analysis of the possible effects of
increased harvesting on lands transferred out of federal ownership and reiterated that a
CEA must include enough detail to assist decision-makers and the public in assessing
how cumulative impacts might differ across alternatives and how those impacts might be
mitigated. The analysis also was deemed “far too general and one-sided” (Muckleshoot,
1999, p. 811) in that it considered only possible beneficial effects, which were contingent
upon future funding and action by the agency, on the lands transferred to the USFS.
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The same issue arose again in a slightly different form in Oregon Natural
Resources Council Fund v. Goodman (2007), a case in which the plaintiffs challenged the
EIS for the proposed expansion of the Mt. Ashland Ski Area in the Rogue River National
Forest. In this case the agency failed to discuss cumulative impacts on the pacific fisher
(a wildlife species) from the project in conjunction with two other future projects. The
agency argued that it did not have to provide such an analysis because the predicted
impacts of the ski area expansion were modest. But the court made it clear that such
conclusory statements, based on expert opinion but without any explanation of the
underlying rationale, will not receive deference from a reviewing court.
In summary, the Ninth Circuit has established that a CEA must include detailed
information, a clear analysis of effects, and an explanation of the rationale behind
conclusions in a CEA. In cases where the agency clearly analyzes effects, the court has
upheld their decisions. In some cases, plaintiffs express discontent with the outcome of a
CEA but fail to highlight enough deficiencies in the analysis to convince the court that
the CEA is inadequate. For example, in Cold Mountain v. Garber (2004), the plaintiffs
were dissatisfied with the agency’s conclusions that helicopter hazing associated with a
bison herding facility in the Gallatin National Forest would not significantly effect bald
eagle survival. However, the court found that the USFS engaged in a sufficient CEA
based on the information available to them at the time and in fact secured an incidental
take statement from the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service based upon its CEA with regard
to bald eagles. Likewise, in Environmental Protection Information Center v. USFS
(2006) plaintiffs argued that a watershed model used to analyze cumulative impacts
overlooked significant effects. However, the plaintiffs failed to highlight a specific
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deficiency with the model. The court found that the agency analyzed effects on both a
project and watershed level and that the model provided a sufficient amount of detail to
meet NEPA requirements.
One case from the Tenth Circuit also dealt with the issue of whether a CEA
included sufficient detail. In Utah Environmental Congress v. Richmond (2007) the
plaintiffs argued that the CEA in an EIS failed to meaningfully or realistically analyze
effects of the project on water quality and fish populations. However, the agency pointed
to several models it had used to analyze cumulative effects and emphasized that NEPA
does not prohibit the approval of projects with negative effects, as long as the effects are
disclosed. The court agreed, stating that the plaintiffs seemed to disagree with the
agency’s decision rather than point to any real deficiency in the CEA.

Issue 2: Analysis of Past, Present and Reasonably Foreseeable Future Effects
Another common CEA challenge, and one that also was an issue in Neighbors I,
is the issue of whether the agency has adequately included other past, present, and
reasonably foreseeable future projects in its analysis. This was the most common
complaint in recent CEA cases, and the most frequent reason the USFS’ CEAs were ruled
inadequate. Between the years 1998 and 2007, 11 of the 19 cases reviewed involved this
issue and the agency lost 9 of those 11 cases for failure to comply with this aspect of the
CEA requirement. Recall, for example, that in Neighbors I, the agency provided some
general information about predicted cumulative effects of all proposed timber sales in the
roadless area but no specific information about individual sales or combined effects on
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old-growth habitat and old-growth species. The court ruled that the agency must provide
specific information about individual proposed sales in its CEA.
A primary reason the agency lost in Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v.
Blackwood (1998) was also due to the failure to analyze other proposed sales as part of
the CEA in an EA prepared for the Big Tower salvage timber sale. In this case, the
agency had proposed five timber sales at the same time and as part of a coordinated fire
recovery strategy in a single watershed. However, nowhere in the Big Tower EA did the
agency analyze the cumulative effects from these coordinated actions. The court ruled
that not only was a CEA required for all the projects, but that the cumulative actions
requirement (as discussed in Kleppe) was triggered. Therefore, the agency was required
to prepare a single EIS to examine the effects of all five projects that had been formally
proposed as part of a single recovery strategy.
The court declined to require the same, however, in Earth Island Institute v. USFS
(2003), in which the plaintiffs charged that the agency should have prepared a single EIS
for two salvage projects on neighboring National Forests, both of which had been
planned in response to a single fire. In this case the fact that the projects would take
place on two separate forests, proceed on separate time schedules, and be supervised by
different personnel led to the court’s acceptance of the agency’s decision to analyze the
projects in separate NEPA documents. Nonetheless the court ruled the CEA in one of the
EISs inadequate because it failed to analyze the cumulative impacts of the project on a
spotted owl activity area in the neighboring forest.
In Muckleshoot (1999), discussed earlier, the court made it clear that the USFS
had to analyze the combined effects of the proposed land exchange with the effects of
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timber harvest on lands exchanged in previous years and the potential effects of another
proposed future land exchange in the same area. The agency argued that the future land
exchange was too speculative, but the court noted that it had already been announced in a
press release and that a proposal for the exchange had been drafter a full year prior to the
issuance of the EIS for the Huckleberry exchange. However, in Environmental
Protection Information Center v. USFS (2006) the court accepted the agency’s position
that it need not include in its CEA an analysis of a reasonably foreseeable future project.
In that case, the details of the future project, known as the Meteor sale, were deemed too
speculative at the time the EA was prepared to allow for a useful CEA. Furthermore, the
agency briefly addressed the cumulative impacts expected from the Meteor sale in their
response to public comments on this issue.
Other cases involved distinct circumstances with regard to the issue of other past,
present, or reasonably foreseeable future actions in the CEA area. For instance, in Selkirk
Conservation Alliance v. Forsgren (2003), which involved an EIS regarding the granting
of an easement to Stimson Lumber to access its lands via National Forest land, the court
dealt with the question of whether the agency should have analyzed future sales as part of
its CEA. Because of predicted effects on grizzly bears, the agency and Stimson spent
several years developing a Conservation Agreement that would guide Stimson’s activities
for all current and future projects in the area. The court reasoned that a CEA need not
analyze specific future projects in this case if the CEA analyzed instead the effects of the
Conservation Agreement as a whole. The court did note throughout its opinion, however,
that the decision hinged upon the expected enforcement of the agreement.
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The issue of analyzing past projects and the extent of the detail required in such
analyses has become a matter of significant debate in the last several years. This issue
was central to Lands Council v. Powell (2004) (hereinafter Lands Council), a challenge to
the Final EIS (FEIS) for the Iron Honey project on the Idaho Panhandle National Forest
(IPNF). The issue of cumulative impacts from past projects was particularly important in
this case. The project was supposed to be a watershed restoration project but included
logging in an area where nearly 40,000 acres had been harvested since the 1960s.
Furthermore, in the project area all but two of 14 watersheds were considered by the
USFS either to be not functioning or functioning at risk. Given this history of heavy
management in the Iron Honey project area, plaintiffs were particularly interested in the
cumulative impacts of past management actions and also wanted to know how the
proposed actions would serve to improve conditions, whereas previous timber sales had
degraded resource conditions.
In its assessment of this matter, the court wrote: “The [FEIS] generally describes
the past timber harvests…and asserts that timber harvests have contributed to the
environmental problems in the Project area. But there is no catalog of past projects and
no discussion of how those projects (and differences between the projects) have harmed
the environment” (Lands Council, 2004, p. 1027).34 The EIS made general statements by
decade, such as, “The most intensive harvests occurred in the 1960’s with over 5,900
acres harvested, of which 2,400 acres were clearcuts” (Iron Honey FEIS, 2002, p. III-2).
However, this level of detail was not provided for every decade. For instance, no
34

A catalog of past actions is generally understood to be similar to a list. Sometimes past action
catalogs include the names and dates of various activities. Catalogs of timber sales often include
the name and date of the sale along with some information on the number of acres treated and the
method used.
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information was disclosed for the 1970s making it unclear if no harvest occurred or if
those harvests simply were not disclosed. Furthermore, no list or catalog of each specific
sale was provided, which made it difficult to know where, when, and how much of the
area’s timber had been harvested. The court made it clear in its decision that it already
had been established as a general rule under NEPA that a CEA must include, at a
minimum, a catalog, or list, of other past, present, and future projects and information on
the environmental effects of these projects. Therefore, the vague discussion in the Iron
Honey EIS of prior harvests and their general effects was deemed unsatisfactory,
particularly given the facts of this case.
In Lands Council (2004) the court held that such a cataloging of projects and
project effects was necessary for a CEA and also emphasized the role of such cataloging
in informing an alternatives analysis. In fact, the latter point seemed to be the court’s
primary problem with the agency’s failure to describe in detail past projects and project
effects. The court repeatedly explained that a detailed accounting of past projects and
their effects would help both the agency and the public analyze the potential effects of the
proposed project. The court also noted that the information requested would not be
difficult or particularly cumbersome for the agency to generate.
The Lands Council decision was highly controversial. Was the agency really
required to list every past project and the effects of each project on individual resources
in order to comply with the CEA requirement? To the Forest Service it seemed that
following the court’s direction precisely would be impossible, in large part because it
simply does not have monitoring data on the effects of all individual past projects. While
the Regional office and the IPNF worked to provide some guidance to staff members as
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to how to comply with the decision, in 2005, also in response to the decision in Lands
Council, CEQ issued a memorandum entitled “Guidance on the Consideration of Past
Actions in Cumulative Effects Analysis” (CEQ, 2005).35 In this document, which still
guides CEA practice, CEQ explained that the NEPA regulations do not specifically
require agencies to catalog all relevant past actions. A detail cataloging of past projects
and their effects is only necessary to the extent that such a process would assist the
agency in identifying cumulative effects or determining the effects of alternative
proposed courses of action. The CEQ memo emphasized that agencies have significant
discretion to decide whether such a cataloging is necessary and asserted, “Generally,
agencies can conduct an adequate cumulative effects analysis by focusing on the current
aggregate effects of past actions without delving into the historical details of individual
past actions” (CEQ, 2005, p. 2). NEPA decision makers are reminded to limit the
information in a NEPA document to what is useful and relevant to decision makers and
the public. As we will see in the following chapter, the CEQ memo has significantly
influenced how the IPNF currently analyzes past actions in CEAs.
There are several problems with CEQ’s position that an agency usually can
analyze cumulative impacts based on current aggregate effects. For one, as the court
explained in Lands Council (2004), information on the specific effects of past actions can
inform decision-makers and the public in evaluating the alternatives for the proposed
action and understanding their potential environmental effects. Secondly, as Grothaus
(2007) explains, in an article specifically addressing the CEQ memo of 2005, “When
relevant prior actions are lumped into the environmental baseline and considered in the
35

The memo can be accessed at: http://ceq.hss.doe.gov/NEPA/regs/Guidance_on_CE.pdf (last
accessed Feb. 4, 2009).
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aggregate, the lessons of such actions are effectively removed from the decision making
process. Such aggregation may also lead to a false sense of security, in which prior
degradation is taken for granted because it is considered part of the environmental
baseline” (p. 888). As we will see in the chapters to come, these concerns are especially
relevant in the context of CEA for wildlife species.
Grothaus (2007) also considers the question of whether the CEQ memo, which
seems to contradict the Ninth Circuit’s position at least to some extent, is due any
deference from the courts, and he concludes that it is not. He analyzes case law involving
similar types of guidance issued by federal agencies and several Supreme Court cases
that deal specifically with the issue of deference afforded to agency interpretations of
statutes or regulations. Because the CEQ guidance was not subject to public notice-andcomment, seemingly conflicts with the intent of NEPA and the CEA regulation itself, and
was written by CEQ, a body with no enforcement power over NEPA, Grothaus (1997)
concludes that federal courts should not offer any deference to the memo. In the Ninth
Circuit, so far, the appellate court has not attributed much importance to the memo,
although several district courts have suggested that the memo is authoritative (Grothaus,
2007). It remains to be seen whether the Ninth Circuit will again address the specific
issue of whether the CEQ guidance is authoritative in the circuit. For now, at least in the
appellate court, agencies are clearly required as part of their CEA to catalog past actions
and their environmental effects.36 The question that remains is how exactly the agency
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See Great Basin Mine Watch v. Hankins (456 F.3d 955, 9th Cir. 2006), in which the Ninth
Circuit ruled that listing actions without providing an analysis of their effects was unsatisfactory
to fulfill CEA requirements. Also in 2006, the court found that the NMFS did not have to list
past actions as part of its CEA, but only because in that case the project was found to have
negligible effects on the resource in question (see Northwest Environmental Advocates v.
National Marine Fisheries Service, 460 F.3d 1125, 9th Cir. 2006).
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should get at the environmental effects of past actions and whether that must be done by
addressing effects of individual actions or alternatively by considering the aggregate
effects of many actions.
Since Lands Council was decided in 2004, other Ninth Circuit cases involving the
USFS have dealt with the requirement to catalog past actions and their environmental
effects. The issue was raised again in NRDC v. USFS (2005) (hereinafter NRDC), in
which the Natural Resources Defense Council challenged the adequacy of the EIS for the
1997 Tongass National Forest Plan. The court ruled the EIS inadequate for a number of
reasons, one of which was the failure to analyze the cumulative effects resulting from
logging on non-federal timberlands. In its decision, the court reiterated its holding from
Lands Council (2004), emphasizing that a CEA requires at a minimum a cataloging of
relevant past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions along with a discussion
of the environmental effects of those actions. More recently, the court again cited this
aspect of Lands Council as a binding requirement in Oregon Natural Resources Council
Fund v. Goodman (2007) (hereinafter ONRC). At least for now, in the Ninth Circuit the
holding from Lands Council with regard to CEA of past actions stands as valid precedent.

Issue 3: Challenges to the Science Used in CEA
Several cases analyzed for this research involved challenges to the quality of the
science used in support of a CEA. For example, another key issue in the Lands Council
(2004) decision dealt with the complaint that the data used to analyze cumulative effects
on the availability of Westslope Cutthroat Trout habitat was outdated. The court agreed
with the plaintiffs, noting that the agency had not collected trout habitat data for 13 years
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and that “the data…was too outdated to carry the weight assigned to it” (Lands Council,
2004, p. 1031). Current information on trout habitat was necessary, in the court’s
opinion, for understanding the cumulative effects of the proposed and past timber
harvests on both trout habitat and populations. Rather than include up-to-date data in its
EIS, the court stated, the agency used “stale” habitat data to predict effects on the species.
This was deemed unacceptable as a basis for the conclusions in the agency’s CEA. The
court noted that it does not require all data to be immediate, but that in this case the data
were too outdated to be used as they were in support of the CEA.
The scientific quality of models also has been raised in court with regard to CEA.
This issue also came up in Lands Council (2004), in which the court found several
problems with the scientific methodologies used by the USFS to estimate effects. For
instance, the Lands Council argued that a Water and Sediment Yields model had a
number of shortcomings, a point that the agency conceded to the court. Because these
shortcomings were not discussed in the EIS, the court ruled that the agency had not
satisfied NEPA, given its heavy reliance on the model in the EIS and failure to disclose
all of the relevant problems with the model.
Issues about the quality of the science underlying CEA models have come up in
other cases. In Environmental Protection Information Center v. USFS (2006), plaintiffs
challenged the use of a cumulative watershed effects model but, according to the court,
failed to point out any obvious faults with the model. The court ruled that it had no
reason to question the USFS’ methodology in this case and that the model was
sufficiently detailed and quantified to satisfy NEPA requirements.
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In ONRC (2007), the plaintiffs challenged the use of a Water Erosion Prediction
model and claimed it had several shortcomings. The court ruled that NEPA does not
require the best scientific methodology be used, only that the agency adequately disclose
the shortcomings and assumptions in predictive models. The agency did so in its EIS, and
the court ruled in its favor. The plaintiffs also challenged the use of an Equivalent
Roadless Area model to measure cumulative impacts, but, again, the court found no
reason to question the agency’s methodology. According to the court, the USFS had
adequately disclosed the nature of the model, which included enough detailed and
quantified information to satisfy NEPA requirements. In summary, agency models can
be imperfect and have a number of shortcomings, but, in order to satisfy NEPA, the
agency must disclose those limitations in its EISs.

Issue 4: Problems with the Scale Chosen for a CEA
An important aspect of a CEA is the scale chosen for the analysis. Courts have
required that both the temporal and geographic scales of the analysis be explicitly stated
and justified as part of a CEA. Generally, as long as the agency provides a reasonable
explanation for its choice and does not contradict statements or choices about scale that
have been made in other federal environmental analyses, courts have upheld their
decisions.
In Native Ecosystems Council v. Dombeck (2002) (hereinafter NEC) plaintiffs
complained that the agency failed to analyze the cumulative effects of several
amendments to road density standards for a number of timber sales planned on the
Gallatin National Forest. The court first asked whether the agency should have prepared
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a programmatic EIS for the road density standard amendments that accompanied the
timber sales because these actions might be considered either connected or cumulative
actions. It found that the compendium of amendments could not be considered connected
actions because they had independent utility. Whether the timber sales might be
considered cumulative actions was a closer call, but the court emphasized that the
challenge was brought with regard to whether the plan amendments, not the timber sales,
were cumulative actions. It found that the amendments had not been developed as part of
a comprehensive plan and could not be considered cumulative actions.
Next the court turned to the question of whether the road density standard
amendments required a CEA in the particular EA at issue in this case, and on this point
the court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. The court stated, “The importance of ensuring
that EAs consider the additive effects of many incremental environmental encroachments
is clear” (NEC, 2002, p. 896). In the decision the court noted that federal agencies
prepare 45,000 EAs a year as compared to about 450 EISs. Thus, it explained, EAs must
consider cumulative impacts, otherwise the cumulative effects of these many smaller
actions might be missed. Especially in the case of timber sales, the court explained, the
cumulative impacts of individually minor effects would be easy to underestimate and
must be considered in the CEA in an EA.
With regard to the road density amendments for multiple timber sales planned on
the Gallatin National Forest, the court held that these must be analyzed together as part of
a CEA. The agency argued that this was not necessary because the various timber sales
and road density standard amendments were widely dispersed throughout the forest.
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However, the court disagreed with the agency about the appropriate scale of analysis. It
explained:
The national forest was the geographic unit within which the Forest Service
chose to set forth binding road density standards in the Forest Plan…. Unless the
cumulative impacts of these amendments are subject to analysis even though
distantly spaced throughout the Forest, the Forest Service will be free to amend
road density standards throughout the forest piecemeal, without ever having to
evaluate the amendments’ cumulative environmental impacts (NEC, 2002, p.
897).

In this case, because the USFS had a forest-wide road density standard, it was
required by the court to conduct a CEA for road density standard amendments at a forestwide scale. In other words, the agency could not choose a scale for its CEA analysis in
this EA that conflicted with the choice of scale for a resource in its forest plan.
NEC also involved a challenge brought under the Endangered Species Act, and
the court’s decision on that point also dealt with a CEA issue. Although this was not a
CEA challenge under NEPA, the holding is relevant for understanding how the Ninth
Circuit views the issue of the appropriate scale of analysis for cumulative environmental
impacts. In the USFS’s biological assessment of the project’s impacts on grizzly bears,
the agency chose a cumulative effects area that failed to analyze the effects on grizzly
bears in light of a nearby sheep grazing allotment less than two miles away from the
project area. The agency provided no explanation for their choice of scale for the CEA in
the biological assessment and no justification for why the grazing allotment had been left
out of the analysis area. The court ruled the choice arbitrary, particularly given that
another EIS had acknowledged the significant impact of the grazing allotment on grizzly
bears and that the timber sale at issue in this case would clearly affect grizzly habitat.
Two lessons should be taken from this. First, the agency has to provide reasonable
justification for its choice of the size of a cumulative effects analysis area. Secondly, if
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the choice appears arbitrary in light of other NEPA analyses or agency documents, a
court is far less likely to defer to an agency’s decision without adequate justification.
The issue of scale for a CEA for wildlife was raised again in Idaho Sporting
Congress v. Rittenhouse (2002) (hereinafter Rittenhouse), a challenge to several timber
sales on the Boise National Forest. In this case, the agency again got into trouble for
making choices and conclusions in an EIS that conflicted with statements in another
USFS report. This 1996 Monitoring Report for the Boise National Forest stated, with
regard to several species that use old-growth habitat, “’Forest Plan direction is inadequate
to provide for habitat needs, because the habitat needs of these species must be addressed
at a landscape scale’” (p. 973 of the Rittenhouse decision, citing the 1996 Monitoring
Report). However, the Long Prong EIS at issue in this case analyzed cumulative impacts
to several species using their “home range” as the scale of analysis. The court held that
the agency must prepare a new or supplemental EIS that was consistent with the
conclusions of its own scientists in the monitoring report. Absent a clear rationale for
choosing a smaller scale of analysis that contradicted conclusions from its own
documents, the choice of the scale for the CEA was deemed arbitrary and capricious.
In several other cases, however, the agency’s choices with regard to the scale of a
CEA were upheld. For instance, in Neighbors of Cuddy Mountain v. Alexander (2002), a
case that revisited the EIS for the same sale (Grade-Dukes) challenged in Neighbors I, the
agency’s choice of scale for the CEA was deemed appropriate. In this case the agency
conducted an extensive CEA but chose to analyze the effects of the sale only for the west
side of the National Forest. The plaintiffs argued that the CEA area should have included
the east side of the forest, but the court found that the agency had made a reasoned
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decision and explicitly justified its choice in the EIS. The court therefore deferred to the
agency’s choice as to the appropriate scale of analysis.
Both the geographic and temporal scope of the CEA in the Stimson Project EIS
were challenged in Selkirk Conservation Alliance v. Forsgren (2003) (hereinafter
Selkirk). Recall that this case involved an EIS analyzing the effects of granting Stimson
Lumber Company an easement to access private inholdings in the Colville National
Forest. Plaintiffs claimed that the CEA should have included a proposed Stimson project
on the neighboring Idaho Panhandle National Forest. However, the agency explicitly
considered including this project in its CEA and decided not to, based on an analysis of
the relevant watersheds, wildlife activity areas, viewsheds, and transportation systems.
Furthermore, an agency biologist expressed concern that including the nearby project
could make environmental effects appear less significant. In light of the reasoned
justification for its choice, the court upheld the agency’s determination of the appropriate
geographic scale of a CEA.
In Selkirk plaintiffs also challenged the fact that the agency only analyzed
cumulative effects for a three-year period into the future. The USFS chose this short time
frame despite the fact that the Conservation Agreement established with Stimson ran for
five years. Furthermore, a USFS wildlife biologist had originally chosen a ten-year time
frame for the cumulative effects analysis. Stimson Lumber Company advanced the only
argument before the court in defense of this choice. It explained that the USFS chose this
short time period because of the uncertainty of the regulatory environment surrounding
the Conservation Agreement. Three years was the longest time frame that the agency
could be sure which rules from both the state and the USFS would govern Stimson’s
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activities. However, the court noted that the agency certainly could have made a decent
guess at what Stimson’s activities would be in years four and five, despite some
uncertainties as to future regulations. Nonetheless, although the court agreed that a
longer time frame would have been preferable, it did not find the three-year time period
arbitrary. It reasoned that the agency had some information available for a longer time
period but had the most information available for the three-year period. Therefore, the
choice of a three-year time frame for a CEA was not arbitrary and capricious. Again,
provisions in the Conservation Agreement stating that it would be revised in light of new
information were critical to the court’s decision to uphold the less-than-ideal time frame
for the CEA.

Issue 5: Postponing a CEA or Tiering to Another Environmental Analysis
Another recurrent issue in a number of the CEA cases reviewed involved
situations where the agency postponed a CEA or tiered a CEA to another document. This
issue is closely related to the shell-game, discussed earlier in the context of Tenakee
Springs (1990). In that case the USFS first tried to argue that it had analyzed cumulative
impacts in its forest plan, and then, when the court found the forest plan analysis
insufficient, argued that it would analyze cumulative impacts in its upcoming forest plan
revision. The notion of the shell-game refers to just this type of scenario wherein one is
directed to various stages of planning in search of an environmental analysis that, in the
end, does not appear to have happened at all.
This issue arose in Muckelshoot (1999), in which the agency argued that it had
analyzed cumulative impacts in the forest plan, to which the Huckleberry EIS had been
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tiered. The court noted first that an agency cannot tier to a non-NEPA document such as
a forest plan (the Huckleberry EIS tiered to the forest plan, not the EIS for the forest
plan). Secondly, the court found that nothing in the forest plan examined the specific
effects of this land exchange, which was still too speculative at that time to be adequately
evaluated, nor did it analyze the effects of logging on lands exchanged in previous years.
The court concluded, “If we were to adopt the Forest Service’s approach, the cumulative
impacts of lands exchanges would escape environmental review” (Muckleshoot, 1999,
pp. 810-811).
The issue of postponing a CEA was central in High Sierra Hikers Association v.
Blackwell (2004) (hereinafter High Sierra), in which the plaintiffs argued that the USFS
must complete an EIS to analyze the cumulative effects of issuing multi-year permits to
private outfitters in two wilderness areas. In this case the district court had ruled against
the agency, finding that the issuance of such permits was likely to contribute to
significant cumulative effects, triggering the requirement for an EIS. The agency agreed
that such an EIS was required but explained that it would prepare the EIS once it decided
how to move forward with their wilderness management plans. The Ninth Circuit upheld
the district court’s decision to provide plaintiffs with injunctive relief, stating that NEPA
requires an analysis of effects prior to agency activities and that such analysis could not
be postponed.
The court also dealt with the issue of postponing CEA in NRDC (2005), which
dealt with the failure of the agency to analyze cumulative effects of timber harvest on
private lands in their 1997 Tongass forest plan. The Forest Service argued that the plan
was only a guidance document and that specific cumulative impacts would be analyzed at
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the project level when the details of specific activities were more concrete. Here the
court referred to their decision in 1993 in Resources Ltd. v. Robertson, in which they
established that a forest plan EIS always requires a CEA. However, in Resources Ltd. v.
Robertson the court allowed the agency to defer consideration of effects resulting from
actions on non-federal lands until project-level analyses. In NRDC, the court decided
otherwise, holding that the forest plan must include a CEA cataloging and analyzing the
impacts of high-volume timber harvest on private lands.
There are several factors that likely led the court to judge that in this case such a
CEA must be done at the plan level. Over five percent of the forest in southeast Alaska is
owned by non-federal entities, and those lands have been heavily logged. The forest plan
called for high levels of logging on adjacent and nearby lands with serious implications
for old-growth habitat and species. The court reasoned:
At least in the particular circumstances of this case, the cumulative impacts on
wildlife viability from continued “highgrading” by non-federal entities, as well as
by the Forest Service…ought to be considered in a single, programmatic EIS….
A cumulative effects analysis in a programmatic EIS is necessary here for the
Forest Service and public to make a rational evaluation of this proposed federal
actions balancing the competing goals of timber harvest, environmental
preservation, and recreational use in the Tongass (NRDC, 2005, p. 816).

In other words, given the potential role of the CEA at the plan level to inform multipleuse decisions in the plan, the court opined that in this case a CEA for non-federal actions
should occur at the programmatic level.
Although the court provided a rationale for its decision in the case of the Tongass
forest plan revision, the direction from the courts on this issue is somewhat muddled.
There is no clear answer as to whether the court will require a CEA that looks at activities
on private lands in a forest plan EIS. The decision will depend on the circumstances of
the case and very likely on the panel that hears the case.
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Issue 6: Cumulative Effects of Categorically Excluded Projects
A final and critical issue that arises in case law from both the Ninth and Tenth
Circuits is the issue of cumulative impacts as a result of projects done under a categorical
exclusion (CatEx).37 Categorical exclusion categories define types of projects that can
essentially be expedited through the NEPA process. These categories are supposed to
identify types of projects that will not have significant effects on the environment; for
such projects no EA or EIS is completed. Managers are required to do some scoping and
to issue a decision memo detailing the nature of the project and why it fits into a
particular CatEx category.38
Prior to 2003, the USFS had one CatEx category for vegetation management
projects. As part of the Bush administration’s Healthy Forests Initiative (HFI) of 2002,
the USFS expanded its use of CatExes and in 2003 created four new CatEx categories for
vegetation management projects (GAO, 2006). GAO (2006) explains, “Little is known
about the Forest Service’s use of these categorical exclusions because, prior to 2005, the
agency did not maintain nationwide data on their use” (pp. 1-2). However, a GAO study
on the use of vegetation management CatExes between 2003-2005 found that nearly 75%
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The categorical exclusion provision is found at 40 C.F.R. §1508.4 and reads: “’Categorical
exclusion’ means a category of actions which do not individually or cumulatively have a
significant effect on the human environment and which have been found to have no such effect in
procedures adopted by a Federal agency in implementation of these regulations (Sec. 1507.3) and
for which, therefore, neither an environmental assessment nor an environmental impact statement
is required. An agency may decide in its procedures or otherwise, to prepare environmental
assessments for the reasons stated in Sec. 1508.9 even though it is not required to do so. Any
procedures under this section shall provide for extraordinary circumstances in which a normally
excluded action may have a significant environmental effect.”
38
There are also USFS CatEx categories for activities that do not require a decision memo. These
include activities such as routine building maintenance or the issuance of administrative
procedures (see GAO, 2006 at footnote 8).
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of such projects are now completed under a CatEx, accounting for almost half of the
acreage treated by the USFS (GAO, 2006).
In terms of CEA, plaintiffs have brought both facial and applied challenges to
CatEx categories and projects—in other words, challenges to the promulgation of the
categorical exclusion category as a whole and challenges to particular projects done as
CatExes. A recent case from the Ninth Circuit dealing with this issue is Sierra Club v.
Bosworth (2007). At issue in this case was the Fuels CatEx category, or CatEx category
10, created in 2003, which allowed for categorical exclusion for all fuels reduction
projects up to 1,000 acres and prescribed burn projects up to 4,500 acres across the entire
National Forest system. The plaintiffs argued that the agency should have prepared an
EIS before promulgating the category, establishing that the category would not have
significant cumulative impacts as a result of the implementation of numerous
categorically excluded projects under the Fuels CatEx.
Some additional background is necessary to understand this case. CEQ
regulations regarding CatExes state that agencies may “identify categories of actions
which do not individually or cumulatively have a significant effect on the human
environment.”39 Additionally, agency procedures are supposed to provide information on
“extraordinary circumstances in which a normally excluded action may have a significant
environmental effect”, in which case an EA or EIS would be required.40 Importantly, as
the court noted in Sierra Club v. Bosworth (2007), just before creation of this category,
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40 C.F.R. § 1508.4 (2008).
40 C.F.R. §1508.4 (2008). The extraordinary circumstances issue is addressed in the USFS
handbook in Ch. 30. The handbook lists resources conditions, such as the presence of endangered
species, wilderness and roadless areas, wetlands, and other factors that “should be considered in
determining whether extraordinary circumstances related to a proposed action warrant further
analysis and documentation in an EA or an EIS…” (section 30.4).
40
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the USFS changed its direction on “extraordinary circumstances.” Beginning in 2007,
various resource conditions, such as the presence of highly erosive soils, roadless areas,
or areas with threatened or endangered species, that beforehand automatically triggered
the extraordinary circumstances condition and required the completion of an EA or EIS,
now only require consideration of whether the provision is triggered and an EA or EIS is
required. In other words, managers can now use their judgment in deciding whether the
potential effects on these resource conditions require more analysis than would be done
for a CatEx.
In their decision regarding the Fuels CatEx, the court stated that an EIS is not
required as part of the process of creating a CatEx category, but that a CatEx category
can only be created if the agency determines that the category includes projects will not
have significant cumulative effects. Therefore, even though an EIS is not required, a
CEA is still required as part of the process of creating a CatEx category, and the court
found numerous reasons why the agency’s CEA, or lack thereof, was inadequate. The
agency conceded that it never conducted a CEA for the category as a whole but argued
that CEA would be conducted at the project level. The court found this argument to be in
direct contradiction with the intent of a CatEx category, which should be made for a
group of projects that together would not have significant cumulative impacts. In
essence, a CatEx category should relieve decision-makers of the need to determine in
every case whether cumulative effects are likely, except in cases of extraordinary
circumstances. A CEA for the category was particularly important in this case, according
to the court, given the nationwide scope of the category and its potential to affect over a
million acres per year. As the court explained, “[I]f assessing the cumulative impacts of
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the Fuels CatEx as a whole is impractical, then use of the categorical exclusion
mechanism was improper” (Sierra Club v. Bosworth, 2007, p. 1028).
Further problems with the agency’s analysis regarding the potential effects of the
Fuels CatEx hark back to criticisms from the court from other CEA cases. For example,
the USFS had conducted a “data call” as part of the process of creating the Fuels CatEx
to consider approximately 2,500 previous fuels reduction projects and their effects. The
report summarizing the results of the data call included many sections entitled cumulative
effects, but the court found that these sections lacked detail or provided little support for
summary conclusions of no significant cumulative impacts.41 The court wrote, “The
Forest Service does not reveal its methodology or offer any quantified results supporting
its conclusory statements that there are no cumulative impacts—it argues only that
through the exercise of its expertise it determined that there was no such impact. This is
insufficient” (Sierra Club v. Bosworth, 2007, p. 1028). Moreover, the agency made the
mistake as it did in Muckleshoot of emphasizing solely the potential beneficial effects of
projects without conducting a broader analysis of overall environmental effects.
Projects in the data call also sometimes included mitigation measures to minimize
effects, but, as the court noted, CatEx projects do not require mitigation measures.
Therefore, the category was deemed to lack the specificity that would be needed to justify
its use. The CatEx “fail[ed] to identify the maximum diameter of species of trees that are
permitted to be logged”, specified “no limit on the proximity of different projects under
the Fuels CatEx, nor any cap on the number of projects in a particular watershed,
41

Numerous projects in the data call were found to have had potentially significant effects on
wildlife, soils, and water quality but the report concluded these effects were either localized,
temporary, or of minor significance. Some of the projects analyzed as part of the data call did
have significant cumulative impacts, but the report on the data call does not give any information
as to what types of projects might lead to significant effects.
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ecosystem, or endangered species habitat area,” and lacked restrictions on thinning and
road densities (Sierra Club v. Bosworth, 2007, pp. 1032-1033). For these reasons, the
court issued a nationwide injunction on the Fuels CatEx for the lack of CEA or any
detailed analysis of potential effects.
Two cases in the Tenth Circuit also centered around the CatEx issue. Colorado
Wild v. USFS (2006) involved a facial and applied challenge to CatEx category 13, which
is for small-scale timber projects and replaces a former CatEx category that was similar
in scope. As part of developing the new CatEx category 13, the USFS undertook several
levels of analysis. For one, it considered all of the projects that had been conducted
under the former CatEx category in 1998, prior to the creation of the new category. It
also selected 154 previous timber projects that either 1) had been approved under the
former CatEx category, 2) had been approved after an EA or EIS was completed but
which could have fit within the definitions of the former CatEx, or 3) were small in
scope. Importantly, none of the projects selected had predicted significant effects. In
other words, the USFS selectively chose 154 timber projects that were predicted not to
have significant effects. USFS teams also conducted post-implementation monitoring to
verify that no significant effects had occurred for those projects. Based on this review the
USFS created three new CatEx categories. Category 12 allows for live timber harvests
under 70 acres in size, category 13 allows for salvage harvests under 250 acres in size,
and category 14 allows for harvest of insect-infested or diseased trees on sites less than
250 acres in size.
The plaintiffs in Colorado Wild v. USFS (2006) challenged the creation of
category 13 for its failure to adequately consider cumulative impacts. Specifically, the
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plaintiffs challenged the methodology used to create the category. The size limit of 250
acres was chosen because it was just below the average for all salvage projects reviewed
by the USFS during its process of creating the new CatEx categories. The plaintiffs
explained that the median size of such projects was 50 acres, but that the average size
was skewed because of the presence of several very large projects, including one of 9,000
acres, in the pre-selected sample. Essentially, the environmental groups took issue with
the fact that the USFS found a few large projects that had no predicted significant
impacts and included these in a selected sample of projects. Indeed, the USFS process
was biased. Either it should have removed the statistical outliers from their sample or
undertaken the analysis based on some sort of random sampling method. However, the
court did not find that the plaintiffs had met their burden of showing that the large
projects in the sample were unusual or ought to have been excluded from the analysis.
The plaintiffs suggested that what made the large projects insignificant in terms of effects
was the limited amount of timber per acre, and that some sort of timber volume limit
ought to be part of the consideration when creating a CatEx category. However,
according to the court, the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate clearly that this was an issue
for the projects selected by the USFS.
Compounding the USFS’ inadequate analysis, according to the plaintiffs, was the
fact that the CatEx category allowed for a ! mile of temporary road construction under
the new CatExes. To come up with this limit, the USFS noted that 35 of the projects it
selected included an average of one-half mile of temporary road, even though 119 of the
projects it selected had no road construction at all. In determining the amount of road to
be constructed the USFS did not take the average road length across all projects. Instead,
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it first removed all projects with no roads from its sample and then took an average for
the remaining projects. This approach was inconsistent with their process for setting an
acreage limit and reeked of selective data use in order to come up with a desired
outcome. There appeared to be limited objectivity in the USFS’ process for determining
what types of salvage projects ought to be categorically excluded. Nonetheless, the court
in this case deferred to the USFS’ methodology. Noting its “admittedly lay perspective”
on these statistical issues, the court refused to substitute its judgment for the agency’s.
The court’s conclusions in this case are worrisome. One has to wonder whether plaintiffs
failed to make their case clearly as to the methodological problems with the USFS’s
approach or whether the court simply did not get it. In general, the level of review as to
the nature of the agency’s approach to analyzing CEA before making a CatEx category
appeared somewhat more relaxed in the Tenth Circuit than what was undertaken by the
Ninth Circuit.
As for CEA, the environmental groups in this case contended that, particularly
given the deficiencies in how this CatEx category was created, its use might lead to
significant cumulative impacts. The court’s response was that agencies are required to
conduct scoping even on CatEx projects. In this process, the court reasoned, project
managers determine whether extraordinary circumstances might exist, which would then
trigger the need for more detailed environmental review. This provision, according to the
court, provides a safety net for cases when a project or multiple projects in the same area
might have significant cumulative effects. The plaintiffs also expressed concern that the
agency might break up bigger projects into smaller ones that fit under this CatEx
category. Despite the fact that they cite numerous cases in which the agency was found
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to do just this, the court stated that it had no choice but to trust that the agency would
observe the law in its application of this CatEx.
Another Tenth Circuit case from 2006 involved an applied challenge to a project
on the Fishlake National Forest. In Utah Environmental Congress v. Bosworth (2006),
plaintiffs argued that the Seven Mile Project, approved under CatEx category 14, failed to
include an adequate CEA. The plaintiffs charged that the agency failed to conduct a CEA
for indicator species or create a large enough cumulative effects boundary. The court
reasoned that requiring a CEA for a project approved under a CatEx category would
render the whole notion of CatExes useless. The court also noted that a CEA should
already have been conducted when the category was promulgated but did not review
whether this was the case, as the category as a whole was not challenged by the plaintiffs.
The court further explained that the only reason a CatEx might be required in this
case would be if extraordinary circumstances were present and wrote:
We agree that it may be conceptually possible for a large number of small
projects to collectively create conditions that could significantly affect the
environment. But the regulation itself contains a provision to address that
concern, namely the extraordinary circumstances exception.
And the
extraordinary circumstances safety-valve is more than capable of addressing
specific harms allegedly created by specific projects… (Utah Environmental
Congress v. Bosworth, 2006, p. 741).

This is a bit confusing—in one breath the court says the potential for cumulative
impacts from many projects should be considered prior to the promulgation of the
category and in the next says that this is dealt with through the consideration of
extraordinary circumstances. All in all this seems to place a considerable burden on the
extraordinary circumstances provision for catching potential cumulative impacts, which
is somewhat worrisome given the flexibility the agency now has to determine if such
circumstances exist and warrant preparation of an EA or EIS.
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The plaintiffs also noted that the decision memo for the Seven Mile project
acknowledged potential effects to several sensitive species and that, therefore, the
extraordinary circumstances provision should be triggered. However, the court found
that such effects were not predicted to be significant and therefore did not require further
analysis. Extraordinary circumstances, according to the USFS handbook, only exist
when there may be a potentially significant effect (Forest Service Handbook, Ch. 30). It
would be fair if at this point the reader is thoroughly confused. Is it not easy to imagine
multiple projects with individually less-than-significant effects to sensitive species that
would be cumulatively significant? When and how would this situation be detected?
And is an EA not the proper document for determining effects to a particular resource are
or are not significant? Is this an appropriate determination to make for a CatEx project,
for which a proper CEA is not even conducted?
Given this maze of questions regarding the nature of cumulative impacts and
CatEx categories, one cannot envy the position of the public or of agency staffmembers,
all of who must wade through this complicated decision-making framework. Agency
personnel are left to sort through these court decisions and figure out whether they must
consider cumulative effects as part of scoping or considering extraordinary
circumstances, or whether the heavy-lifting for CEA was adequately handled during the
creation of the category. If some sort of CEA has to occur for CatExed projects, it is
unclear what form this analysis should take, given that courts have said a CatEx project
does not require a CEA. Indeed, several people in Region 1 during the interviews for this
research expressed that they were confused about the current state of these CatEx
categories, having received direction from the agency to do some kind of CEA for such
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projects, despite the fact that the whole point of a CatEx category is to obviate the need
for such analysis. The current situation may be the inevitable result of the improper
creation of CatEx categories that include projects that may have cumulatively significant
impacts. As noted earlier, the number of projects completed by the USFS under a CatEx
category has been significant in recent years (GAO, 2006), and it appears that the
definitions of these categories push the boundaries as to the types of projects that can be
approved without more detailed environmental analysis.
In summary, it is clear that the agency has the responsibility of ensuring that
projects that fall into CatEx will not have significant cumulative impacts, but it is less
clear that the agency is meeting its obligations in this area. As the court explained in
Utah Environmental Congress v. Bosworth (2007):
[R]elatively little analysis is required of the Forest Service once it determines that
a project fits within the four corners of a categorical exclusion. This is because
the Forest Service previously did the heavy lifting when it created the categorical
exclusion—it conducted an extensive environmental analysis and determined that
any project approved under a categorical exclusion would not produce a
significant or cumulative effect on the environment in the absence of
extraordinary circumstances (p. 750).

This is the ideally how CatEx categories are meant to work; the problem is that it
is unclear whether the agency really has done this heavy-lifting for some of the current
CatEx categories. The Ninth Circuit found that, at least for one category, the agency had
not met its responsibilities in this area. It seems the Tenth Circuit has deemed that as
long as a CatEx category stands, scoping, the illegality of segmenting projects, and the
extraordinary circumstances provision are adequate for preventing cumulative impacts.
However, the burden of determining whether cumulative impacts may arise is supposed
to be handled before the creation of a CatEx category. Therefore, it is, to say the least,
confusing that the Tenth Circuit, in what appears to be a highly deferential position on
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this matter, now allows this to occur as part of scoping and consideration of extraordinary
circumstances. Compounding this problem is the fact that extraordinary circumstances
no longer automatically trigger the need for an EA or EIS.
At present, USFS staff determine whether cumulative impacts will occur during
scoping and consideration of extraordinary circumstances. However, these are improper
tools for conducting CEA. That type of analysis is precisely what an EA or EIS is for,
and is why CatEx categories are supposed to include only activities which have already
been determined not to have an individually or cumulatively significant impact. The
unfortunate fact is that both the Tenth Circuit’s position on this matter and the USFS’ use
of CatExes for projects that may have significant cumulative impacts are unsatisfactory
and skirt the requirements of NEPA and CEA. Undoubtedly, the current legal and
administrative decision-making frameworks, as a result of this confused direction from
the courts and questionable use of CatExes by the agency, are serious impediments to
effectively conducting CEA, especially for CatExed projects.

2.5 Judicial Review of USFS Wildlife Analysis
The final section of this chapter provides a brief overview of the USFS’
requirements to protect biodiversity and considers how the Ninth Circuit has ruled in
some key cases involving the review of science and wildlife analyses done by the USFS.
The discussion starts with an overview of the USFS regulations regarding wildlife
protection and then goes on to look at how the these requirements have been interpreted
in the Ninth Circuit. This primer is necessary in order to provide a foundation for the
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following chapters, in which I discuss legal requirements for wildlife planning on USFS
lands and look in detail at how CEA is done for wildlife species.
In order to understand the USFS’ requirements for wildlife protection, a little
background on USFS planning rules is necessary. In the original NFMA, Congress, in a
move that has been characterized as reflective of "a deep congressional distrust for the
capacity of the Forest Service to develop regulations in a manner reflecting the new
statutory standards," required the Forest Service to convene a Committee of Scientists to
flesh out the meaning of the statutory language in NFMA (Hoberg, 2004, p. 6).42 In
1982, the first planning regulations were promulgated based on the Committee's
recommendations, and those regulations served as the basis of forest planning until
2000.43
In recent years, the planning regulations have been the subject of much debate and
change. A second Committee of Scientists was convened in 1997 and new regulations
were promulgated based on their recommendations in 2000.44 The Bush administration
replaced these regulations in 2005, without soliciting the advice of another Committee of
Scientists.45 Despite the presence of the 2000 and 2005 regulations, in recent years some
National Forests had already begun to revise their forest plans according to the 1982
regulations and have continued to use these regulations as a basis for their revisions. In
2007, the Bush administration's 2005 planning regulations were enjoined by a Northern
California District Court for lack of compliance with the NEPA and Endangered Species
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The committee of scientists language is found at 16 U.S.C. § 1604(h) (2000).
The planning rules can be found at 36 C.F.R. § 219.
44
65 Fed. Reg. 67514 (November 9, 2000).
45
70 Fed. Reg. 1023 (Jan. 5, 2005).
43
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Act.46 After complying with its procedural obligations, the USFS in 2008 issued its final
planning rule, which was not substantially different than the 2005 rule, although this
iteration went through the NEPA process.47
A considerable amount of controversy has revolved around biodiversity
protection under NFMA. The diversity provision is a substantive requirement of the
NFMA and states that the USFS shall specify guidelines that "provide for diversity of
plant and animal communities…."48 The 1982 regulations gave further definition to the
diversity provision, stating that the agency must "maintain viable populations" of
vertebrate species.49 A number of cases involved arguments about the methodologies
used to meet this "viable populations" standard, and courts usually deferred to the
agency's choice of approach. In the 2008 rule, the viability language from the 1982
regulations no longer exists. Instead, the USFS now will focus broadly on preserving
ecosystem diversity in order to protect species and also, at its own discretion, will
manage for selected species-of-concern and species-of-interest in accordance with overall
multiple-use objectives.50
The IPNF’s 1987 Forest Plan, which is still in effect and is based on the 1982
regulations, states that the forest will maintain viable populations of vertebrate species in
the planning area (generally understood to be the entire forest). In order to understand
the IPNF’s responsibilities in terms of wildlife populations, we need to consider how the
Ninth Circuit has interpreted the viability provision from the 1982 regulations. An often
referenced case that clarifies the standard in the Ninth Circuit for how the regulation is
46

Citizens for Better Forestry v. USDA. (N.D. Calif. No. C 05-1144 PJH, Mar. 30, 2007).
73 Fed. Reg. 21468 (April 21, 2008).
48
16 U.S.C. § 1604 (g)(3)(B) (2006).
49
36 C.F.R. § 219.19 (2000).
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36 C.F.R. § 219.10 (2008).
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interpreted is Inland Empire Public Lands Council v. USFS (1995) (hereinafter Inland
Empire). At issue in this case was the EIS for eight timber sales in the Upper Sunday
watershed of the Kootenai National Forest. The plaintiffs, a cohort of environmental
groups, charged that under NFMA, the USFS was required to conduct population
viability analysis for the seven sensitive species analyzed in the project’s EIS. They
charged specifically that the USFS had fallen short of their duties to maintain viable
populations specifically because it “never examined the species’ population size, their
population trends, or their ability to interact with other groups of the species living in
neighboring patches of the forest” (Inland Empire, p. 758). They also charged that the
USFS could not limit its viability analysis to the project area because doing so violated
the CEA requirement under NEPA.
In order to understand the relevance of this case, we must consider the 1982
viability regulation in full. It states:
Fish and wildlife habitat shall be managed to maintain viable populations of
existing native and desired non-native vertebrate species in the planning area.
For planning purposes, a viable population shall be regarded as one which has the
estimated numbers and distribution of reproductive individuals to insure its
continued existence is well distributed in the planning area. In order to insure
that viable population will be maintained, habitat must be provided to support, at
least, a minimum number of reproductive individuals and that habitat must be
well distributed so that those individuals can interact with others in the planning
area. (36 C.F.R. §219.19 (2000)).

The real question in this case was not whether the USFS is required to maintain
viable populations of species on each National Forest; all parties agreed on that point.
The disagreement revolved around the methodology used to meet that substantive
requirement. The USFS’ approach, which is not different from what is done today, was
to estimate the amount of habitat necessary to maintain a viable population (although for
some species this minimum amount of habitat was never determined) and the amount of
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habitat that would be affected for each species under various alternatives in an EIS.
Plaintiffs argued that the regulations required the Service to analyze actual population
numbers and trends as well as linkages between populations, but the court ruled that the
Service’s reading of the regulation was not arbitrary and capricious. It explained that the
regulation clearly states habitat must be provided to support minimum viable populations
and must be well distributed in the planning area. Although population data would be
beneficial, explained the court, it is not required by the regulation.
The essential question is whether maintaining habitat for species actual ensures
survival or presence of that species. The USFS asserted in Inland Empire that
maintaining habitat fulfilled their obligation to maintain viable populations, and the court
found it a reasonable assumption that habitat preservation leads to species preservation.
In other words, the court deemed it appropriate that the USFS use habitat as a proxy for
determining population viability. In general, the USFS still maintains the position that its
responsibility to provide habitat, while it is a state’s responsibility to monitor populations.
Another important aspect of Inland Empire involved the issue of management
indicator species (MIS), or species that are chosen to serve as a sort of bellwether for a
group or guild of species with similar habitat requirements. The 1982 viability regulation
stated that for these species the USFS is supposed to evaluate the effects of projects “in
terms of both amount and quality of habitat and of animal population trends.”51 For the
Upper Sunday project at issue in Inland Empire the USFS had chosen the pileated
woodpecker as an MIS and had not evaluated population trends for the woodpecker. The
USFS’ estimates were only of habitat availability. The Service argued that there was no
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36 C.F.R. §219.19 (2000).
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cost-effective way to monitor woodpecker populations and that habitat analysis fulfilled
its obligations to monitor the MIS’ population viability. The court agreed that this was
reasonable, again stating the habitat evaluation was a suitable proxy for population
monitoring. Therefore, Inland Empire firmly established in the Ninth Circuit the validity
of the USFS’ use of MIS as proxies for other species and of habitat as a proxy for
population numbers. This methodology, referred to as the “proxy-on-proxy” method for
meeting the Service’s obligations to maintain viable populations on its lands, continues to
be acceptable in the Ninth Circuit today.52
Inland Empire is often cited as a case of considerable judicial deference in terms
of the agency’s scientific methodological choices. As Smith (2007) explains, “The Court
did not scrutinize the FS’s habitat modeling methodology, neither in terms of how habitat
was actually inventoried, nor how the percentages of necessary habitat had been created”
(Smith, 2007, p. 72). Additionally, although the court agreed that the maintenance of
viable populations was a strict substantive standard, it never explained how monitoring
habitat alone fulfills this standard. Instead, it only found the assumption that habitat does
serve as an adequate proxy for population numbers reasonable and not contrary to the
language of the regulations. As we will see, the Ninth Circuit has taken more of a
scrutinizing look at the agency’s scientific methodologies for providing for species
protection since Inland Empire. Nonetheless, for environmental groups and for wildlife
populations, Inland Empire was a critical loss in the Ninth Circuit. The USFS had won
the argument that habitat monitoring alone was sufficient to meet their wildlife protection
52

Other circuits have held in some cases that the USFS is obligated to monitor actual population
trends. In Sierra Club v. Martin, 168 F.3d 1 (11th Cir. 1999) the Eleventh Circuit held that the
Service was required to monitor population numbers. While the court acknowledged that its
interpretation differed from that in the Ninth Circuit, it also explained that the circumstances of
review, particularly the language of the specific forest plan at issue, were different.
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duties. The problems that result from this decision are discussed in great detail in the
chapters that follow, as we look at how the IPNF currently conducts wildlife CEA.
As for the CEA challenge in Inland Empire, the court also ruled in favor of the
USFS’ chosen methodology. The plaintiff’s charged that the USFS scope of their CEA
for wildlife species was too small, being limited to the project area. Interestingly, the
court dismissed this, saying it was not a CEA challenge. It noted that CEA challenges
usually involved the issues of whether other projects had been included in the analysis
but did not usually involve the issue of geographic scale of the analysis for a single
project. The court’s position on this issue changed over time, and, as we have seen,
plaintiffs have since brought successful challenges to the scale of analysis of the effects
of a single project. In this case, the court also noted that the USFS did extend its analysis
beyond the project area for some species, which may have contributed to its decision.
As for close review of the science underlying species viability analysis, in later
years the Ninth Circuit began to look more closely at the quality of data underlying USFS
wildlife analyses. For example, in Idaho Sporting Congress v. Thomas (1998) the court
affirmed the proxy-on-proxy method as valid but stated that the Service had to address
the quality and adequacy of fish habitat in its environmental analysis. The court also
made it clear that in NEPA analyses scientific conclusions could not rely only on expert
opinion but needed to be supported with hard data that was available to the public. In
Idaho Sporting Congress v. Rittenhouse (2002) the court invalidated the USFS’ use of the
proxy-on-proxy method, because in that case the Service’s own scientists stated that the
agency’s methodologies for ensuring the viability of old-growth dependent species and
for estimating the presence of old-growth habitat were both unreliable and inaccurate.
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Judicial review of USFS wildlife analyses and particularly the scientific basis of
such analyses has become especially controversial due to a series of decisions between
2004-2008 involving Region 1 National Forests. The story begins with the Iron Honey
decision, Lands Council v. Powell (2004), which was discussed in previous sections.
Recall that in Lands Council (2004) the court made several important decisions regarding
the scientific foundation of the agency’s environmental analysis. For one, it stated that
the IPNF could not use “stale” habitat data in support of its effects analysis for a trout
species. Furthermore, the court stated that the agency must disclose the shortcomings in
its watershed analysis model. The court also found that the USFS’ use of a spreadsheet
model that estimated soil conditions on the project site based on general data on IPNF
soils and aerial photographs was unreliable for ensuring that soil quality standards were
being met in the project area. Although this particular methodology had been ruled
inadequate in a previous district court case, the USFS argued that the methodology was
sound and that the court should defer to its technical expertise. However, the court found
that the USFS had done nothing to verify the predictions of the model. It concluded,
“Under the circumstances of this case, the Forest Service’s basic scientific methodology,
to be reliable, required that the hypothesis and prediction of the model be verified with
observation” (Lands Council, 2004, p. 1035). What was unclear from this case, however,
was whether the court meant that a model always must be verified with on-site data for
every project area and every resource.
In Lands Council (2004) the court also deemed inadequate the IPNF’s analysis
under the proxy-on-proxy method for old-growth species. While it reaffirmed the
approach as a general tool, the court reiterated that the methodology for habitat analysis
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must be reliable. The IPNF’s own scientists had stated in a monitoring report that the
timber stand management reporting system database (TSMRS) was an unreliable tool for
estimating old-growth habitat because of insufficient data on old-growth characteristics
such as snag availability and canopy closure (USFS, 1998). The court ruled that the
TSMRS therefore could not be used as a basis for the proxy-on-proxy approach for
ensuring viability.
The holdings in Lands Council (2004) set the stage for something of a firestorm
on the issue of judicial review of science in the Ninth Circuit over the next few years.
The importance of the decision became apparent in the highly controversial case Ecology
Center v. Austin (2005) (hereinafter Ecology Center) decided by the Ninth Circuit in
December of 2005. At issue in Ecology Center was the Lolo Post Burn Project, which
involved “treatment” of old-growth stands, or commercial thinning and prescribed
burning in such stands, and salvage logging in areas burned in the 2000 fires. The USFS
argued that such treatment was necessary to improve the vigor of old-growth stands and
correct for conditions resulting from years of fire-suppression.
The Ecology Center argued that there was significant scientific uncertainty around
the effects of old-growth treatment on old-growth dependent species, and that, although
such treatment is meant to improve old-growth habitat, the USFS could not ensure that
such treatment would not harm old-growth dependent species. The court sided with the
plaintiffs and explained in its decision, “While Ecology Center does not offer proof that
the proposed treatment causes the harms it fears, the Service does not offer proof that the
proposed treatment benefits—or at least does not harm—old-growth dependent species”
(Ecology Center, 2005, p. 1063). Citing the precedent set in Lands Council (2004), the
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court concluded that the USFS’ assumptions that old-growth treatment would benefit
species “is predicated on an unverified hypothesis” (Ecology Center, 2005, p. 1064). The
court particularly noted that the Service had no data to support its assumptions, despite
the fact that it had had the opportunity to collect such data in areas that it had previously
treated. In this case, it seemed the court’s decision rested both on the fact that there was
no scientific support for the Service’s assertions as well as the fact that the USFS had
failed to collect monitoring data and learn from previous, similar projects. The Service
also failed to openly acknowledge in its EIS the uncertainty of old-growth treatment or to
present the proposed project as an opportunity to test its assumptions. Instead, stated the
court, “[T]he Service is asking us to grant it the license to continue treating old-growth
forests while excusing it from ever having to verify that such treatment is not harmful.
Rather, it treats the prediction that treatment will benefit old-growth dependent species as
a fact instead of an untested and debated hypothesis” (Ecology Center, 2005, p. 1064).
The dissent in this case discussed at length the issue of relying upon unverified
hypotheses without observational data. Recall that in Lands Council (2004) this issue
was raised with regard to the soil quality spreadsheet model. However, in Ecology
Center (2005) the rule was extended and used to support the court’s holding that the
USFS must provide some verification of the accuracy of its hypotheses regarding oldgrowth treatment. In her dissent Judge McKeown argued, “[I]n Lands Council we did
not purport to create a general rule requiring on-site verification for all scientific
hypotheses adopted by the Forest Service regardless of context” (Ecology Center, 2005,
p. 1076). She pointed out that the USFS did have some observational evidence that oldgrowth treatment does indeed benefit species and also argued that to not treat old-growth
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arguably would cause even more harm to old-growth dependent species because of
predicted losses due to insect infestations. In other words, based on limited information,
the USFS had made a reasoned choice among alternatives that all involved some level of
risk.
The holdings in Ecology Center (2005) were highly controversial. On the one
hand, the case seemed to indicate the USFS no longer could proceed with its management
prescriptions without monitoring and learning from its actions. On the other hand, some
argued that the court had gone beyond standard APA review and inserted itself too far
into the nuances of the science behind agency decisions. The case was appealed to the
Supreme Court, which declined to hear it.53 However, as discussed below, the Ninth
Circuit ended up overruling the precedent set in this case two and a half years later.
The controversial nature of Ecology Center was central in a subsequent decision
from 2007 involving the IPNF. In that case, Lands Council v. McNair (2007), the same
issue regarding the unverified effects of old-growth treatment was raised with regard to
the environmental analysis in the Mission Brush EIS from the IPNF. In this case the
court issued a preliminary injunction, in which it found a likelihood of success by the
plaintiffs. Based on the precedent set in Ecology Center, the court again took issue with
the fact that the USFS had not proved that its proposed old-growth treatments would
indeed improve wildlife habitat. The court wrote in this case, “None of the documents
[the USFS] cites…demonstrates the reliability of the Forest Service’s hypothesis that
restoration treatment will benefit dependent species” (Lands Council v. McNair, 2007, p.
776). Furthermore, the court found it likely that the failure to adequately discuss the
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Mineral County v. Ecology Center Inc., 127 S. Ct. 931 (2007), cert. denied.
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uncertainty of the effects of its management prescriptions in its EIS failed to meet the
requirements of NEPA.
The body of this decision was relatively unremarkable, but the special
concurrences in Lands Council v. McNair (2007) were quite interesting. Judge Milan
Smith wrote that he joined the majority in this opinion only because he was left with no
other choice given the precedent set in Ecology Center, which he believed was wrongly
decided. In his special concurrence, Smith further argued that the judiciary’s intrusion
into Forest Service decision-making had created a moving target in terms of judicial
review of agency action and had been a prominent factor in the decline of the timber
industry in the Pacific Northwest. However, in their concurrence, Judges Ferguson and
Reinhardt emphasized that the series of injunctions on USFS activity in the Ninth Circuit
was a result not of the court overstepping its role, but of the USFS’ repeated illegal
conduct and apparent overemphasis on timber harvest rather than environmental
stewardship.
The controversy underlying this decision was dealt with the following year in an
en banc hearing, granted by the Ninth Circuit at the request of the USFS.54 It was in this
case that much of the precedent established in Ecology Center was overruled and that the
court revisited in detail its standards regarding the requirements of the proxy-on-proxy
method. None of the judges who ruled in favor of the plaintiffs in Lands Council v.
Powell (2004), Ecology Center v. Austin (2005), or Lands Council v. McNair (2007)
(except Judge Smith who made it clear he only ruled in favor of the plaintiffs because he
54

The Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d 981 (2008). An en banc panel is a panel of eleven
judges, as opposed to the usual three judge panel, which reconsiders the court’s decision in a
case. In such a case the court reviews the circumstances of the case, hears oral arguments, and
renders a new decision on the case at hand. Such review is generally reserved for issues of
special importance.
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was bound by precedent) were present on the eleven-judge panel. However, Judge
McKeown, who wrote the dissent in Ecology Center, was on the panel, and it was Judge
Milan Smith, Jr. who delivered the opinion of the court.
The en banc opinion opened by explaining that the court chose to review the case
in order “to clarify some of our environmental jurisprudence with respect to our review of
the actions of the United States Forest Service” (Lands Council v. McNair, 2008, p. 984).
The decision vacated and lifted the preliminary injunction that had been issued in Lands
Council v. McNair in 2007 and went on to address standards of judicial review of science
and wildlife analysis in the Ninth Circuit. The court spent a good deal of time addressing
and overruling the Ecology Center case, something that was notable given that the
Supreme Court had declined to hear that case and the Ninth Circuit itself had denied a
request for an en banc hearing of that case after it was decided.
Judge Smith made it clear in his opinion that the plaintiffs had done nothing less
than ask the court “to act as a panel of scientists that instructs the Forest Service how to
validate its hypotheses regarding wildlife viability…and…to explain every possible
scientific uncertainty” (Lands Council v. McNair, 2008, p. 988). Beginning with a look
at Lands Council v. Powell (2004), the court acknowledged that under the circumstances
of that case the USFS needed to verify the prediction of a soil model with on-the-ground
observation. However, the court went on to distinguish that case from Ecology Center, in
which the court applied that rule more broadly to mean that the USFS always had to
verify its predictions with on-the-ground analysis. In the en banc decision the court
retreated from such a position regarding the necessity of verifying predictions and
hypotheses with on-the-ground observation as a general rule and explained that it
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overstepped its role in applying that rule generally in both the Ecology Center case and
the subsequent Lands Council v. McNair (2007) case. The court stated that as long as
there is some observational basis for application of a model’s predictions, it is not
necessary that an agency as a rule conduct on-site verification of soils or any other types
of models. As for the effects of old-growth treatment on old-growth dependent species,
the court acknowledged that the agency had limited evidence that such species at least are
not harmed by old-growth treatment but that it is up to the USFS, and not the court, to
determine whether such evidence is significant. The decision was a step back towards
traditional judicial review under the APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard and
reaffirmed the role of judicial deference particularly in light of scientific or technical
matters.
The opinion also revisited a series of wildlife/USFS cases in the Ninth Circuit,
beginning with Inland Empire. Specifically, the court stated that although the proxy-onproxy method remains valid, “[T]he Forest Service nevertheless must both describe the
quantity and quality of habitat that is necessary to sustain the viability of the species in
question and explain its methodology for measuring this habitat” (Lands Council v.
McNair, 2008, p. 998). The agency must be clear how it defines suitable habitat and
must have reliable and accurate methods for determining available habitat. However,
courts will not ask the USFS to do the unreasonable. If the agency has no data on how
much habitat is required to support a minimum viable population, a court will almost
certainly not require the agency to determine such a number before proceeding with a
project. Instead, the agency will only be required to do what it can with the information
on hand.
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It is difficult to pin down exactly how a court might rule on this last point.
Consider, for example, Inland Empire, a case in which the agency failed to analyze in
detail feeding and nesting requirements for habitat for the flammulated owl. The court
noted that such information was not available and that “an analysis that uses all the
scientific data currently available is a sound one” (Inland Empire, 1996, p. 762). Recall,
however, that the USFS’ use of its TSMRS data for old-growth species’ habitat in Lands
Council was deemed insufficient because the database was outdated and inaccurate in
terms of several old-growth characteristics. The distinction here may be inaccurate
(outdated and incorrect estimates of canopy cover) versus unavailable data (no known
data on habitat acreage needed for feeding habitat for a species). Furthermore, while it is
not entirely clear when courts will require agencies to update their databases, such
decisions sometimes have hinged on whether the agency’s own scientists have raised
questions regarding the reliability of its data sets.55 Additionally, although NEPA does
not require an agency to generate information, the NFMA requires the agency to ensure
species viability and includes monitoring requirements in both the planning regulations
and in forest plans.56 Under NFMA then, courts can require the agency to update data
and comply with its obligations. However, there is no bright line as to when a failure to
monitor and update data is acceptable or when it is a problem that a court will require the
agency to correct.
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The court’s holdings in Rittenhouse (2002) and Lands Council (2004) that old-growth datasets
were inadequate were based in part on statements made by the agency’s own biologists in
monitoring reports.
56
The 1982 planning regulations required that plans include monitoring requirements and that
forests review conditions of resources at least every five years (36 C.F.R. §219.11 and 219.10
(1982)). The 2008 regulations are similar, requiring that plans describe a monitoring program
and that forests provide updated descriptions of conditions every five years (36 C.F.R. §219.6
(2008).
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2.6 Conclusions
In summary, when it comes to the more straightforward aspects of CEA, the
Ninth Circuit has established relatively clear standards for how the analysis must be
presented in NEPA documents. For example, the agency cannot fail to include other
relevant projects in its analysis. Some sort of catalog of past projects much be provided
and reasonably foreseeable future projects must also be included in the CEA, as long as
the details of those projects are known with any specificity. Adequate empirical support
and an explanation of the rationale behind conclusions must be provided in a CEA. The
analysis cannot be postponed to some forthcoming NEPA document, nor can it tier to
either a non-NEPA document or a programmatic document that does not include analysis
specific enough to be relevant for the decision at hand. Data cannot be obviously
outdated, particularly if the data play a big role in supporting a CEA. The scale of the
analysis must be explicitly stated, and the choice of both temporal and geographic scale
of a CEA must be justified with some degree of clear reasoning. In general, claims of
professional expertise alone will not survive judicial review.
The case law is less consistent in terms of the aspects of CEA that are more
complicated and confusing. For instance, some of the most challenging aspects of
implementing the CEA requirement involve the questions of how exactly to capture
impacts from many past actions and whether CEA is most appropriately tackled at the
programmatic or project level. Indeed, it is in these areas that judicial decisions are not
always consistent and vary according to the specific facts of the case. For instance, at
present it is not entirely clear to what extent the agency must disclose the effects of
individual past projects, as opposed to relying upon a portrait of current conditions as an
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indicator of cumulative impacts. I consider this issue in detail in the chapters to come, as
discussion of the topic benefits from a closer look at some specific examples of how the
IPNF has responded to the issue. Some of the disagreements between the courts and
CEQ as to the requirements of CEA in terms of past actions stand as significant
impediments to doing CEA. If the agencies are not clear on the requirements, this likely
impedes the development of a coherent understanding of the nature of the requirement
and effective methods for implementing it.
Requirements for CEA in programmatic NEPA analyses also vary from case to
case. For instance, it is unclear is to what extent a CEA, particularly one that addresses
private land activities, must be included in forest plan EISs. There is also no bright line
rule as to when a reviewing court will deem necessary a programmatic document for
reviewing cumulative actions. Finally, the issue of providing a CEA for CatEx categories
and projects also is messy and turns on the issue of how and when to provide a look at the
cumulative impacts of many smaller or less impactful actions.
As for viability analysis for wildlife species, the proxy-on-proxy method
continues to be accepted practice in the Ninth Circuit and by the USFS. In terms of the
quality of the science underlying species analyses, the court has occasionally required the
agency to update its databases or expand its scale of analysis, particularly when internal
agency documents highlight deficiencies in the agency’s approach. When evaluating the
availability of habitat for indicator species, the Service is required to describe the quantity
and quality of habitat required to support a viable population. At the same time it is not
required to generate knowledge where it does not exist. These standards are relevant to
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understanding much of what is discussed in the next chapter with regard to the way in
which the IPNF analyzes cumulative impacts to wildlife species.
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Table 2.1a Ninth Circuit CEA Cases by Year
Circuit Court Year
Ninth Circuit

1998

1999
2002

2003
2004

2005
2006
2007

Case

Decision

Neighbors of Cuddy Mountain v. USFS (137 F.3d 1372)
Idaho Sporting Congress v. Thomas (137 F.3d 1146)
Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v. Blackwood (161 F.3d 1208)
Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. USFS (177 F.3d 800)
Neighbors of Cuddy Mountain v. Alexander (303 F.3d 1059)
Native Ecosystems Council v. Dombeck (304 F.3d 886)
Idaho Sporting Congress v. Rittenhouse (305 F.3d 957)
Selkirk Conservation Alliance v. Forsgren (336 F.3d 944)
Earth Island Institute v. USFS (351 F.3d 1291)
Cold Mountain v. Garber (375 F.3d 994)
Lands Council v. Powell (379 F.3d 738, amended at 395 F.3d 1019)
High Sierra Hikers Assn. v. Blackwell (381 F.3d 886, amended at 390
F.3d 630)
NRDC v. USFS (421 F.3d 797)
Environmental Protection Information Center v. USFS (451 F.3d 1005)
Oregon Natural Resources Council Fund v. Goodman (505 F.3d 884)
Sierra Club v. Bosworth (510 F.3d 1016)

CEA in EIS inadequate*
CEA in EAs inadequate*
CEA in EA inadequate*
CEA in EIS inadequate*
CEA in EIS adequate; EIS inadequate for other reasons
CEA in EA inadequate*
CEA in EIS inadequate*
CEA in EIS adequate
CEA in EIS inadequate*
CEA in EA adequate
CEA in EIS inadequate*
Lack of CEA/EIS and use of CatEx in violation of
NEPA*
CEA in EIS inadequate*
CEA in EA adequate
CEA in EIS inadequate*
Promulgation of CatEx category without a CEA in
violation of NEPA*

* Indicates cases lost on the CEA challenge

Table 2.1b Tenth Circuit CEA Cases by Year
Tenth Circuit

2006

Colorado Wild v. USFS (435 F.3d 1204)

2006
2007

Utah Environmental Congress v. Bosworth (443 F.3d 732)
Utah Environmental Congress v. Richmond (483 F.3d 1127)
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CatEx category and application of category to project not in
violation of NEPA
Use of CatEx not in violation of NEPA
CEA in EIS adequate

Table 2.2a Ninth Circuit CEA Cases: Primary Challenges and Holdings
Ninth Circuit Cases
CEA-related challenges
Court decision
Neighbors of Cuddy
Mountain v. USFS,
137 F.3d 1372 (1998)

1) Challenge to Grade/Dukes
timber sale EIS on the Payette
National Forest, Idaho.
2) CEA too general; lacks
detailed analysis of effects of
this and other proposed sales
on old-growth habitat.

CEA in EIS inadequate
1) Discussion of cumulative impacts too general;
fails to meet “hard look” standard. CEA must
include detailed and quantified information.
2) CEA with specific discussion of other
reasonably foreseeable future sales must be
included.
3) CEA cannot be postponed until after decision
when more data is available; NEPA requires
analysis before the action is taken.

Idaho Sporting
Congress v. Thomas,
137 F.3d 1146 (1998)

1) Challenge to Miner’s Creek
and West Camas Creek timber
sale EAs on the Targhee
National Forest, Idaho.
2) USFS should have
supplemented the EA for the
earlier of the two sales to
account for cumulative
impacts from more recently
proposed sale.
3) USFS should have prepared
an EIS for both sales to
address cumulative impacts.

CEA in EAs inadequate
1) Court rules that an EIS is required for the sales
in order to address controversy and uncertainty
over possible effects on water quality and
fisheries.
2) Cumulative impacts were addressed in the
latter of the two EAs. If the court were not
requiring an EIS, there would be no need to
supplement the earlier EA so that it includes the
same information as the latter EA.
3) Court implies that the CEA in the latter EA is
inadequate; they say it is “sparse” and
inadequacies can be addressed in forthcoming
EIS.
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Further points from the case
1) NEPA requires some detailed or quantified
information in a CEA.
2) “General statements about ‘possible’ effects
and ‘some risk’ do not constitute a ‘hard look’
absent a justification regarding why more
definitive information could not be provided” (p.
1380).
3) USFS’s lack of compliance with NFMA and
their forest plan in terms of old-growth
protection compounded the CEA issue in this
case

Table 2.2a Ninth Circuit CEA Cases: Primary Challenges and Holdings (cont’d)
Blue Mountains
Biodiversity Project v.
Blackwood, 161 F.3d
1208 (1998)

1) Challenge to EA for Big
Tower salvage timber sale on
the Umatilla National Forest,
Oregon.
2) EA failed to mention or
analyze effects from other
proposed sales in the area.

CEA in EA inadequate
1) USFS failed to even mention 3 of the 4 other
sales in the EA. All five sales were proposed at
the same time as part of a coordinated fire
recovery strategy. Court rules these all should
have been analyzed in a single EIS (this is a case
where the cumulative actions requirement is
triggered).

1) The effects analysis for this sale is deemed
inadequate and unjustified in its conclusions.
The analysis lacks specificity, and the agency’s
assertions of no significant impacts from this
sale are unsupported and inconsistent with
statements in other documents, such as the forest
plan. In a case where the effects analysis is not
sufficient, the CEA also must be inadequate.

Muckleshoot Indian
Tribe v. USFS, 177
F.3d 800 (1999)

1) Challenge to EIS for
Huckleberry land exchange in
Mt. Baker-Snoqualmie
National Forest, Washington.
2) Failure to analyze
cumulative effects of logging
on lands that were part of an
earlier exchange, other USFS
lands, and lands to be
exchanged in the foreseeable
future.

CEA in EIS inadequate
1) Agency argues CEA was done in forest plan
and also points to another non-NEPA report. The
court rules that the agency cannot tier a projectlevel EIS to a forest plan or any other non-NEPA
document. Furthermore, neither the forest plan
nor its accompanying EIS provide an analysis of
the impacts or cumulative impacts resulting from
this land exchange.
2) Agency must consider cumulative impacts in
light of logging on previously exchanged lands.
3) Agency fails to analyze cumulative effects of
logging on lands proposed for exchanged and
only discusses speculative benefits that will result
on lands it receives. The analysis is deemed “far
too general and one-sided to meet the
requirements of NEPA” (p. 811).
4) Future Plum Creek land exchange should have
been included in CEA. Its inclusion would not
have been speculative, as the land exchange had
been announced prior to the completion of the
Huckleberry EIS.

1) Court reiterates that a CEA must include at
least a catalog of past actions, some detailed
information, and a useful analysis of combined
effects.
2) The court notes that if they accepted the
agency’s argument that the CEA had been done
at the plan level, the cumulative impacts of land
exchanges would escape environmental review.
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Table 2.2a Ninth Circuit CEA Cases: Primary Challenges and Holdings (cont’d)
Neighbors of Cuddy
Mountain v.
Alexander, 303 F.3d
1059 (2002)

1) Another challenge to the
EIS for the Grande-Dukes
sale.
2) Scale of CEA is too small.

CEA in EIS adequate
1) Court finds that the agency provides
substantial analysis and adequate justification for
their choice of geographic scale in their CEA.

Native Ecosystems
Council v. Dombeck,
304 F.3d 886 (2002)

1) Challenge to the DarrochEagle timber sale EA on the
Gallatin National Forest,
Montana.
2) USFS should issue a
comprehensive EIS to analyze
all road density standard
amendments in concert.
3) USFS failed in EA to
analyze cumulative impacts of
sales and associated
amendments to road density
standards at forest-wide scale.
1) Challenge to two timber
sales: Lightning Ridge (EA)
and Long Prong (EIS) on the
Boise National Forest, Idaho.
2) Scale of analysis for
cumulative impacts on oldgrowth dependent species is
too small.

CEA in EA inadequate
1) Court holds that the compendium of road
density plan amendments are not connected or
cumulative actions; a single EIS is not required.
2) EAs must include a CEA or tier to an EIS;
other road density standard plan amendments
must be considered in this EA as part of CEA.
3) National Forest is the scale for the road density
standards in the plan and therefore should be the
scale used for the CEA

Idaho Sporting
Congress v.
Rittenhouse, 305 F.3d
957 (2002)

CEA in the EIS inadequate
1) USFS’ own monitoring report states that some
species require viability analysis at the landscape
level. The agency analyzed CEA at a smaller
scale and did not justify why it did so. The
agency’s own documentation makes the CEA in
the EIS arbitrary, particularly where the choice
lacked any justification.
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1) Plaintiffs use NFMA to address a cumulative
effects issue; the agency loses on the NFMA
challenge, but not on the NEPA/CEA challenge.
Plaintiffs argue that the agency has failed to
monitor and protect old-growth in violation of its
forest plan and NFMA. The plan in this case
establishes a forest-wide old-growth standard.
Even if the old-growth standard is being met in
the project area, the court says that this alone is
not sufficient. The cumulative effects of loss of
old-growth habitat forest-wide are relevant for
compliance with the plan and with NFMA.
Therefore, project approval in this case requires
consideration of forest-wide effects.
1) A CEA-type issue was raised under the ESA
in the case related to the USFS’s biological
assessment for grizzly bears. The agency failed
to analyze effects of a nearby sheep grazing
allotment and provided no justification for why
this area was left out of the impacts analysis in
the biological assessment. The decision was
deemed arbitrary, particularly in light of the fact
that other environmental analyses had
considered the effects of the grazing allotment
on grizzlies.

1) This case also dealt with challenges to USFS
practices for monitoring and protecting oldgrowth species as required by the forest plan and
NFMA. The court ruled that the agency’s own
monitoring report indicated their methodologies
were unsound, which invalidated the agency’s
method of using habitat as a proxy for
monitoring indicator species.

Table 2.2a Ninth Circuit CEA Cases: Primary Challenges and Holdings (cont’d)
Selkirk Conservation
Alliance v. Forsgren,
336 F.3d 944 (2003)

1) Challenge to EIS for
granting an easement to
Stimson (a private timber
corporation) to access its lands
on the Colville National
Forest, Washington.
2) Geographic scale of
analysis too small (excludes
nearby Idaho Panhandle
National Forest areas).
3) Failure to analyze effects of
future projects in area.
4) Temporal scale of analysis
too short (3 years).

Earth Island Institute
v. USFS, 351 F.3d
1291 (2003)

1) Challenge to salvage
logging EIS on Eldorado
National Forest, California.
2) Agency should have
prepared an EIS for projects
on both Tahoe and Eldorado
National Forests because they
were both similar and planned
in response to the Star Fire.
3) Scale of analysis too small:
Eldorado EIS did not
adequately consider
cumulative impacts resulting
from actions on the Tahoe
National Forest, which was
also affected by the fire and
was planning a nearby sale of
a similar nature.

CEA in EIS adequate
1) Agency provides a reasoned justification for its
choice not to include Idaho Panhandle areas in
CEA for grizzly bears.
2) In this case the agency did not need to consider
the effects of specific sales in the EIS because
this would duplicate their assessment of the
adequacy of the Conservation Agreement, which
is the basis of and is analyzed in the EIS.
3) The short time frame chosen for the CEA is
considered by the court to be a very close issue.
It concludes, however, that while the time frame
does not appear to be the best choice, there is
justification for it and it cannot be deemed
arbitrary and capricious.
CEA in EIS inadequate
1) The two projects are not necessarily
cumulative actions. A single EIS might have
made sense but is not required because the
projects were not clearly part of a single broader
proposal. “Similar” actions may be analyzed in a
single EIS, but this is not required.
2) CEA in EIS fails to analyze how actions on the
Eldorado will affect a “protected activity center”
(PAC) for California Spotted Owls in the Tahoe
National Forest. The area under question in the
Eldorado was acknowledged as relevant habitat
for the Tahoe PAC prior to this EIS. The
Eldorado National Forest erroneously concluded
that the Tahoe National Forest would delist this
PAC; the court holds that the agency should have
foreseen that such delisting would not occur and
should have analyzed cumulative impacts on the
owl.
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1) Enforcement of the Conservation Agreement,
which governs Stimson’s activities on all of its
lands in the area, is, in the court’s opinion,
crucial to the success of this EIS. The court
emphasizes, for example, that the scale of the
CEA analysis is adequate only if the terms of the
Agreement are upheld. Similarly, the time frame
of the CEA is sufficient if requirements to
update the Agreement based on new information
are enforced.

1) Part of this case revolves around the fact that
the Eldorado National Forest erroneously
delisted the PAC at issue (which exists on both
National Forests) on their own National Forest.
It did this based on assumptions that the area
should not be inhabited given the post-fire
conditions but despite the fact that staff had
observed owls still occupying the area.

Table 2.2a Ninth Circuit CEA Cases: Primary Challenges and Holdings (cont’d)
Cold Mountain v.
Garber, 375 F.3d 994
(2004)

Lands Council v.
Powell, 379 F.3d 738
(2004), amended at
395 F.3d 1019 (2005)

1) Challenge to EA for bison
herding facility on the Gallatin
National Forest, Montana.
2) Agency failed to adequately
analyze cumulative impacts;
should have prepared an EIS.
1) Challenge to the Iron
Honey timber
harvest/watershed
management project on the
Idaho Panhandle National
Forest, Idaho.
2) Lack of specificity and
detail in analysis of prior
timber harvests in area.
3) Failure to include
foreseeable future projects in
analysis.
4) Data used for CEA for
Westslope Cutthroat Trout is
outdated and unreliable
rendering the CEA inadequate.

CEA in EA adequate
1) Court holds that the agency clearly analyzed
cumulative effects and justified their decision not
to prepare an EIS.

1) Plaintiffs are dissatisfied with decision but fail
to highlight a deficiency in the NEPA process.

CEA in EIS inadequate
1) EIS fails to provide discussion of the effects
from individual past harvests and offers only a
vague discussion of overall environmental
effects. A cataloging of past projects with
detailed information on effects is the minimum
necessary for a CEA; it is also crucial for a useful
alternatives analysis.
2) Only proposed or scoped future projects must
be included in a CEA. Analysis is adequate on
the issue of future projects.
3) Trout habitat data is nearly 15 years old and
deemed too stale to suffice for a CEA.

1) This case reiterates the Ninth Circuit’s
requirement that past actions be cataloged as part
of a CEA to inform agency decision-making,
public comment, and alternatives analysis.
2) The requirement for up-to-date data is also an
important and unique aspect of this case in terms
of CEA. Habitat data for trout was outdated.
3) The USFS used a watershed model to do
CEA. The court rules that the USFS did not
adequately disclose shortcomings in this model.
4) The court ruled that an agency must verify its
models with on-the-ground testing in a project
area. This was in response to a NFMA claim that
the USFS’ soil quality analysis was insufficient.
5) The court ruled under NFMA that the agency
must have reliable habitat data in order for the
proxy-on-proxy method of population
monitoring to be sufficient. In this case, oldgrowth habitat data was deemed too outdated
and failed to account for habitat characteristics
such as canopy closure and snag availability.
This violated NFMA’s requirements to provide
for viable populations.
6) CEQ responded to this case with a memo
emphasizing that a cataloging of past actions is
not always necessary; monitoring of current
conditions can be sufficient for a CEA.
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Table 2.2a Ninth Circuit CEA Cases: Primary Challenges and Holdings (cont’d)
High Sierra Hikers
Association v.
Blackwell, 381 F.3d
886 (2004), amended
at 390 F.3d 630 (2004)

NRDC v. USFS, 421
F.3d 797 (2005)

1) Plaintiffs contend that the
USFS needs to complete an
EIS to assess the cumulative
impacts of issuing multi-year
special use permits to
outfitters in two wilderness
areas on the Inyo and Sierra
National Forests, California
2) Agency had impermissibly
categorically excluded oneyear renewals of special use
permits from NEPA review.
1) Plaintiffs challenge the
CEA in the EIS for the forest
plan for the Tongass National
Forest, Alaska.
2) EIS fails to examine CEA
with regard to past and
reasonably foreseeable future
non-federal logging on
adjacent lands.

Lack of CEA/EIS and use of CatEx both in
violation of NEPA
1) Court rules that an EIS with a CEA is
necessary. Agency acknowledges a CEA has not
been done and says that it will comply with
NEPA when they issue future permit renewals.
The court responds that NEPA analysis is
required prior to agency actions, and the agency
is therefore in violation of the law.
2) CatExs cannot be used for activities in
wilderness areas. Again, an EA or EIS is
required to assess environmental impacts.
CEA in EIS ruled inadequate
1) Over 5% of the forest is owned by non-federal
entities and these areas have been heavily
developed. The court rules that the agency must
consider the cumulative impacts of this logging
and do so in the plan because the CEA could
significantly affect how the agency plans to
protect other resources.
2) The court makes it clear that a plan level EIS
always must include a CEA (citing Resources
Ltd. v. Robertson (1993). In that case the court
allowed the agency to defer analysis of the effects
of actions on private land until the project level.
In this case the court decides that the plan is the
appropriate time to analyze activities on private
lands.
3) The court cites Lands Council v. Powell (2004)
and reiterates that a cataloging of past, present,
and reasonably foreseeable actions and an
analysis of their environmental effects is required
at a minimum for a CEA.
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1) The court makes clear that the circumstances
in this particular case lead it to the conclusion
that the effects non-federal timber harvest in and
around the Tongass need to be considered in this
programmatic EIS. It says, “A cumulative
effects analysis in a programmatic EIS is
necessary here for the Forest Service and public
to make a rational evaluation of this proposed
federal action balancing the competing goals of
timber harvest, environmental preservation, and
recreational use in the Tongass” (p. 816).
2) The plan is also ruled arbitrary and capricious
because of an error on the part of the USFS in
interpreting information about the market
demand for timber. The USFS relied upon an
inflated estimate of market demand, which in
turn affected the amount of timber harvest
allowed in the plan, which in turn affected how
the agency balanced other multiple uses on the
forest. This issue led to a number of violations
of both NFMA and NEPA in this case.

Table 2.2a Ninth Circuit CEA Cases: Primary Challenges and Holdings (cont’d)
Environmental
Protection Information
Center v. USFS, 451
F.3d 1005 (2006)

1) Challenge to Knob timber
sale EA on the Klamath
National Forest, CA.
2) An EIS should have been
prepared because of possible
significant effects.
3) CEA for water quality
flawed.
3) CEA inadequate because of
failure to included a
reasonably foreseeable future
sale.

Oregon Natural
Resources Council
Fund v. Goodman, 505
F.3d 884 (2007)

1) Challenge to EIS for
expansion of Mt. Ashland Ski
Area, Rogue River National
Forest, Oregon.
2) Agency failed to include
two future projects in the CEA
for the pacific fisher (a
wildlife species).
3) Agency erred in its use of a
watershed impact model to
assess cumulative impacts.

CEA in EA adequate
1) Court finds that the agency analyzed
cumulative impacts to the watershed using a
model that analyzed effects on the project and
watershed scales and included past, present, and
foreseeable future impacts. The plaintiffs do not
challenge the validity of the model. The court
concludes that the CEA is sufficiently detailed
and quantified to meet NEPA requirements.
2) The parameters of the future sale were not
developed enough to allow for a useful CEA.
The agency did not act arbitrarily in choosing to
exclude it. Even if the agency made an error of
judgment in excluding the sale from the CEA, it
remedied this by providing some discussion of
cumulative impacts based on the information
available in the comments section of the EA.
CEA in EIS ruled inadequate
1) Agency failed to provide any specific analysis
of potential cumulative impacts on fisher
resulting from this and two other scheduled future
projects. EIS concludes there will be no
significant impacts on the fisher but fails to
justify these statements with any supporting
information. Furthermore, the agency cannot
justify this conclusion with the explanation that a
CEA is not necessary because the anticipated
effects of the ski area will be small. The agency
must put these effects in context in light of the
broader landscape—this is precisely what a CEA
is for.
2) Agency’s watershed model is sufficiently
quantified and detailed to satisfy NEPA’s CEA
requirement.
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Table 2.2a Ninth Circuit CEA Cases: Primary Challenges and Holdings (cont’d)
Sierra Club v.
Bosworth, 510 F.3d
1016 (2007)

1) Challenge to CatEx
category 10, the “Fuels
Catex”. Agency failed to
establish that promulgation of
the CatEx category would
have no significant cumulative
impacts.

Promulgation of CatEx category without a
CEA in violation of NEPA
1) CEA not required as part of an EA or EIS for
the creation of a CatEx category, but is required
nonetheless as part of the process.
2) USFS concedes that no CEA was performed
before promulgation of the CatEx category.
Court holds that the USFS must ensure that the
Fuels CatEx will not have significant cumulative
impacts. If this is not possible, then it should not
have promulgated the rule.
3) Agency reports indicate potentially significant
effects from similar projects on various resources
but conclude there will be no significant
cumulative impacts. No justification is provided
to support this conclusion. The court will not
accept general statements about risk (citing
Neighbors of Cuddy Mountain v. USFS (1998)) or
unsupported conclusions of no significant
cumulative impacts.
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1) The court says, “The Forest Service does not
reveal its methodology or offer any quantified
results supporting its conclusory statements that
there are no cumulative impacts—it argues only
that through the exercise of its expertise it
determined that there was no such impact. This
is insufficient.” A court will not defer to claims
of expertise without evidence in the record
providing support for such decisions.
2) The court reiterates that a CEA must be
supported with quantified or detailed
information and cannot be one-sided, focusing
only on positive benefits of an action. A useful
analysis of the effects of past projects in
combination with proposed and future projects
must be included.
3) The agency’s report lists potential mitigation
measures, but CatEx actions do not require
mitigation, nor are the measures developed
enough to be sufficient.

Table 2.2b Tenth Circuit CEA Cases: Primary Challenges and Holdings
Tenth Circuit Cases
CEA-related challenges
Court decision
Colorado Wild v. USFS,
435 F.3d 1204 (2006)

1) Facial and applied
challenge to CatEx category
13 as applied to Shaw Lake
vegetation management
project on Rio Grande
National Forest, Colorado.
2) Use of category will lead
to cumulative impacts.

Use of CatEx not in violation of NEPA
1) Although the plaintiffs make a convincing case
as to why the agency’s promulgation of this
category was flawed, the court rules that the
agency’s process was adequate.
2) Court relies upon the extraordinary
circumstances provision to prevent cumulative
impacts from CatExed projects.

Utah Environmental
Congress v. Bosworth,
443 F.3d 732 (2006)

1) Applied challenge to
CatEx of Seven Mile Spruce
Beetle Management Project
on the Fishlake National
Forest, Utah.
2) The project should not
have been approved under
the CatEx because of the
lack of a preliminary
analysis to determine that
the project would not have
cumulative effects.
3) Agency failed to analyze
cumulative impacts on
management indicator
species and sensitive species
and to delineate an
appropriate CEA area
beyond the project area.
3) Extraordinary
circumstances should have
precluded use of CatEx.

Use of CatEx not in violation of NEPA
1) Requirement to perform a CEA would render
the use of categorical exclusions useless. The
agency already determined that the category
would not have significant cumulative effects as
part of the creation of the CatEx category, which
the plaintiffs do not challenge.
2) An agency only needs to perform a CEA if
“extraordinary circumstances” are present that
preclude use of a CatEx. The court finds that no
significant extraordinary circumstances exist, and
therefore the use of the CatEx is justified.

130

Further points from the case
1) The court states that scoping prior to CatExed
projects will help the agency identify when
cumulative effects might be an issue. Scoping,
the illegality of segmenting a project, and the
extraordinary circumstances requirement,
according to the court, serve as safety valves
when it comes to cumulative impacts.
2) The court does not explicitly deal with the
question of whether the agency adequately
analyzed cumulative impacts when it
promulgated this CatEx category.
1) The court does not address, as the Ninth
Circuit did in Sierra Club v. Bosworth (2007),
the issue of whether the promulgation of this
CatEx category was in violation in NEPA due to
a lack of CEA.
2) The court states that the extraordinary
circumstances provision is a safety valve with
regard to potential cumulative impacts for
CatExed projects.

Table 2.2b Tenth Circuit CEA Cases: Primary Challenges and Holdings (cont’d)
Utah Environmental
Congress v. Richmond,
483 F.3d 1127 (2007)

1) Challenge to EIS for
Trout Slope West project on
the Ashley National Forest,
Utah.
2) Agency fails to
adequately analyze the
nature of cumulative effects
and only provides
description; agency
describes negative effects
but does not provide a
useful CEA.

CEA in EIS is adequate
1) Court rules that the agency adequately
analyzed cumulative effects, providing sufficient
information and detail and including analysis of
relevant past projects in conjunction with the
current project. The plaintiffs, in their opinion,
disagree with conclusions of the agency and their
subsequent decision, but offer no evidence why
the analysis is inaccurate or violates NEPA.
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1) As long as an agency complies with the
procedural requirements of NEPA, a court will
not second-guess its decision.
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CHAPTER THREE: A CASE STUDY OF CUMULATIVE EFFECTS ANALYSIS
ON THE IDAHO PANHANDLE NATIONAL FOREST

A central objective of this research is to determine how cumulative effects
analysis (CEA) is currently practiced and documented by the U.S. Forest Service
(USFS) and to look specifically at how it is done for wildlife. This chapter presents the
results of an analysis of National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) documents from the
Idaho Panhandle National Forest (IPNF). The IPNF was chosen as a case study for this
research because it presents an ideal opportunity to look at the effects of both litigation
and public involvement on CEA and wildlife analysis.
Recall that in the Ninth Circuit, the Forest Service has faced more litigation on
this topic than any other federal agency, with the majority of this litigation occurring in
Region 1, also known as the Northern Rockies Region (Smith, 2006). After a series of
unfavorable decisions in previous years involving CEA challenges and Region 1 forests,
a controversial case involving CEA and the IPNF, Lands Council v. Powell (2004) was
decided. One of the court’s primary holdings was that the IPNF had failed to provide a
thorough list of relevant past actions in the project area and their effects on resources as
part of its CEA. It could be assumed that the IPNF was forced to take a particularly
close look at how they conducted CEA in light of the court’s ruling. Given the history
of litigation against the USFS in the Northern Region and the IPNF in particular, the
IPNF was chosen for this analysis with the presumption that the CEA in its NEPA
documents would be among the most thorough analyses done by a federal agency or a
particular National Forest.

!

"#$!

!
The IPNF has a high degree of wildlife diversity, particularly on the North Zone
of the forest where there are a number of endangered or sensitive species, such as the
woodland caribou, grizzly bear, grey wolf, Canada lynx, American marten, fisher,
flammulated owl, and many others. Environmental groups often challenge the agency’s
wildlife analyses in project comments, appeals, and litigation. In Lands Council v.
Powell (2004), in response to plaintiff’s complaints about the validity of the agency’s
analysis for old-growth species, the court ruled that the IPNF’s data on old-growth
habitat lacked sufficient detail to be used as a basis for wildlife analyses. Complaints
regarding wildlife analyses were raised again in Lands Council v. McNair (2007), a
more recent case involving the Mission Brush project on the IPNF.1 These cases have
drawn considerable attention to how the forest analyzes effects to wildlife species.
For these reasons, the IPNF is an ideal forest to study in order to understand the
current state of CEA, particularly in wildlife analyses. Additionally, the constant
attention and comments on IPNF projects from a number of environmental groups
provide rich insight into what those groups see as the important issues and limitations in
how the IPNF handles CEA. Therefore, there is perhaps no better National Forest to
study in order to get a sense of the current state of CEA and areas of contention around
the nature of that analysis on a forest that is likely at the cutting edge in the agency for
conducting CEA on wildlife.
This chapter provides the results from the document analysis portion of this
study. Environmental Impact Statements (EISs) from the IPNF were reviewed for 2002!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1

As discussed in the case law review in Chapter 2, the Ninth Circuit issued a preliminary
injunction on the Mission Brush project (Lands Council v. McNair (2007)). The injunction was
lifted after the decision was revisited by an en banc panel in 2008 (Lands Council v. McNair
(2008)), and the case now sits before the district court of Idaho awaiting a full hearing.
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2003 and 2006-2007. These time frames were chosen in order to understand current
CEA practice and compare it to how CEA was done several years earlier, prior to the
landmark Iron Honey decision. This allows for a look at how CEA has changed over
time and consideration of how the IPNF has changed their analysis in response to that
decision. This chapter also answers the question of what processes and sources of
information the Forest Service use for doing CEA for wildlife and how that analysis is
presented in NEPA documents.
The chapter begins in section 3.1 with an explanation of the methodology used to
select and analyze the documents and then provides an overview of findings organized
into several sections. In section 3.2 I provide a summary of findings on the nature of the
documentation and CEA for the 2006-2007 time period in terms of a number of basic
parameters. For example, I answer questions such as where the analysis can be found in
the documents, whether it considers non-federal land, and whether it explicitly explains
the scale of the CEA. Next, in section 3.3, I examine how the analysis is currently done
for wildlife. The final section of this chapter explains how CEA has changed over time
by comparing documents from 2002-2003 to those from 2006-2007. Throughout these
sections I begin to point to some of the major areas of contention around the IPNF’s
CEA, although a more in-depth discussion of these issues is reserved for chapter four.

3.1 Methodology
In chapter one I provide an overview of the overall objectives and methodology
used in this study. This section explains in more detail how the documents were chosen
and analyzed for this phase of the research.
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Identifying the Sample of Project Documents
Documents were analyzed from 2006-2007 in order to get a picture of the current
state of CEA practice on the IPNF. Documents from 2008 were not analyzed so that the
sample would include only projects that had been finalized and for which the appeals
timeframe had passed. Projects were identified using the quarterly Schedule of
Proposed Actions (SOPA) put out by the USFS. The SOPA lists all ongoing projects by
National Forest and district along with the status and purpose of the project.2
I chose to analyze completed projects that listed as a project purpose either
“forest products” or “fuels management” in order to capture any projects involving
timber harvest. There were several reasons to focus on these types of projects. As
explained in chapter one, the majority of USFS litigation historically has challenged
logging projects (Keele et al., 2006), and it is this type of project that is traditionally
most contentious and viewed as being at odds with conservation interests. Timber
projects might be expected to have significant potential impacts to wildlife populations
due to the alteration and fragmentation of habitats. Furthermore, the majority of recent
CEA case law involving the USFS dealt with timber-related projects. Therefore, I
anticipated that timber-related projects in particular would involve CEA that was
relevant for wildlife and would include public comment highlighting some of the
strengths, weaknesses, and areas of debate over how the CEA is done for wildlife
species. Furthermore, focusing on these projects provided for enough similarity across
projects that I could develop some familiarity with the proposed actions and the type of

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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SOPA reports can be accessed at www.fs.fed.us/SOPA/.
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analysis provided for those actions and could compare CEA across projects involving
similar activities.
Only projects for which an EIS had been prepared were analyzed. EISs include a
more detailed CEA than EAs and therefore allow for a better understanding of the
current state of the practice of CEA on the IPNF. Furthermore, EISs are done for
projects with potential significant effects, and a project with more significant effects is
likely to include a more detailed CEA. A two-year timeframe using these parameters
yielded four EISs from various districts on the IPNF for 2006-2007 (the projects are
listed in Table 3.1). This provided a large enough sample to compare across projects,
but a small enough sample to be practically manageable given the detailed, qualitative
analysis undertaken for these documents.
Documents were also analyzed for 2002-2003. This time frame was chosen for
several reasons. Primarily, I was interested in considering CEA documentation prior to
the Iron Honey litigation in order to determine how the IPNF’s CEA had changed in
response to that decision. Investigation of this question provided insight into how the
judiciary, in response to litigation brought by environmental groups, affects CEA
implementation. Looking at this time period also allowed for consideration of whether
the nature of CEA has changed more generally over time.
These two years were chosen because they were prior to the Iron Honey
decision, included the Iron Honey EIS in the sample, and also included two projects for
which the IPNF had prepared supplemental EISs in 2006 in light of the Iron Honey
decision (allowing for a look at how the analysis was revised). Also, SOPA reports are
available for the IPNF beginning in 2002, making it easier from that year onwards to

!

"#'!

!
identify all ongoing projects on the forest. This time period also yielded four EISs from
across the IPNF districts. The table below provides basic information on the projects
analyzed herein. The project purposes listed below are taken directly from the SOPA
report sections on project purposes. Note that project purposes for the earlier time frame
included “timber harvest/sale” and “fuels reduction.”
Table 3.1 Projects analyzed from 2002-2003 and 2006-2007 on the IPNF
Project Name
District
Date Completed Project Purpose(s)
Myrtle Creek
Bonners Ferry
8/07
Fuels management
HFRA
Hidden Cedar
St. Joe
3/07
Watershed management;
road management; forest
products
West Gold
Sandpoint
5/06
Fuels management; forest
products
Mission Brush
Bonners Ferry
4/06
Wildlife, fish, rare plants;
watershed management;
road management;
recreation management;
fuels management; forest
products
West Gold
Sandpoint
11/02
Ecosystem restoration;
vegetation and wildlife
habitat restoration; fuels
reduction; watershed
improvement; road
management
Hidden Cedar
St. Joe
9/02
Timber sale; road
construction; watershed
restoration; access
management
Iron Honey
Coeur D’Alene
2/02
Watershed improvement;
timber harvest; fuels
treatment
Little Blacktail
Sandpoint
1/02
Ecosystem restoration;
vegetation and wildlife
habitat restoration; fuels
reduction; watershed
improvements; road
management
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Analyzing the EISs
For each project reviewed, the Record of Decision and EIS summaries were read
to develop a basic familiarity with the project. The document analysis then focused on
both the nature of the overall documentation of CEA and the nature of the analysis
specifically for wildlife. An evaluation form was developed based on several factors
(the evaluation sheet can be found in Appendix B). A number of questions comprised a
straightforward checklist based on criteria used in previous studies on the documentation
of CEA in EAs/EISs (Burris and Canter, 1997a, McCold and Holman, 1995). These
questions focused on the nature of the general CEA documentation and included
questions such as:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Where is the CEA found?
Is it done for each resource?
Does the scale vary by resource?
Is there a definition of cumulative impacts?
Are cumulative impacts summarized in a particular place?
How are past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions accounted
for?

This last question was of particular interest not only because it is one of the basic
requirements of a CEA but also because of the court’s holding in Lands Council v.
Powell (2004). Recall in that decision that the court stated the IPNF was required to
provide a comprehensive list of past actions and their environmental effects as part of its
CEA. Therefore, I was interested in determining how the IPNF has responded to that
requirement in its current NEPA documents.
In looking the nature of the CEA for specific resources, I focused on how it was
done for wildlife species in the EISs. I chose to focus on a single resource to narrow the
scope of the analysis. Wildlife was chosen because it is an issue that garners constant
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attention from the public, has been the subject of numerous court cases, and is an issue
that allows me to investigate aspects of the ongoing debate over how the USFS plans for
species protection on National Forests. For this part of the analysis, the approach
required more than a checklist of questions in order to capture the complexity of how
CEA is done for wildlife and to discern some of the general strengths and weaknesses of
the analysis. I considered questions such as:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

What species is CEA done for?
Is the scale of the CEA defined and justified for each species?
Are non-federal lands considered and how are they incorporated into the
CEA?
How are past, present, and reasonably foreseeable actions dealt with?
What are the effects variables used in the CEA?
How are cumulative impacts analyzed and presented?
Is the presentation clear, logical, and thorough so that it aids in
understanding cumulative impacts to wildlife species?

In order to document findings, relevant passages from each document were
selected and are discussed herein in order to build a more complete picture of how the
CEA is done for wildlife. This aspect of the analysis necessarily involved some
subjectivity in terms of what sections were highlighted. Any insights or conclusions are
supported with relevant quotes and sections so that the reader can evaluate the validity
of any conclusions.
It is important to note that the overall goal was not to rank EISs or provide a
complete assessment of the quality or accuracy of the analysis. For example if an EIS
reported no significant cumulative effects for a species, it would be difficult for me to
assess whether this was accurate. Instead, the goal of this process was to determine
general trends in how the IPNF is documenting cumulative effects. The analysis also
aimed to identify specifically how CEA is done for wildlife, highlight some of the areas
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where the analysis is more or less clear, and examine aspects of the analysis that are the
subject of some contention.
Finally, for each project from the 2006-2007 timeframe, public comments and
the agency’s responses were reviewed and analyzed for relevant content. If a project
had been appealed or litigated, the appeal, legal briefs, and agency responses were also
analyzed. These steps were taken in order to get a broader understanding of areas of
contention around how CEA is done. This also allowed me to identify whether there
were commonalities among areas where I as the researcher, members of the public in
their comments, or interviewees found strengths and weaknesses in the various
documents.
The following sections detail the results of this document review. Sections 3.2
and 3.3 present the results of the document analysis in terms of both the overall
approach to CEA and the approach to CEA for wildlife specifically. Section 3.4
considers how CEA changed between the two time frames. Results are presented along
with some initial analysis in order to highlight several important areas of contention;
however, a closer look at some of the strengths, weaknesses, and criticisms of the CEA
is reserved for the next chapter.

3.2 General Aspects of CEA Documentation
As discussed in chapter one, earlier studies found that CEA was not present in all
NEPA documents or for all resources (Burris and Canter, 1997a; Cooper and Canter,
1997; McCold and Holman, 1995). Recall that, according to those studies, less than half
of EAs even mentioned cumulative impacts and that CEA is EISs was less than
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complete. Therefore, as part of this analysis I considered some general questions about
the documentation of cumulative effects.
These findings can be summarized briefly. CEA was conducted in 100% of the
documents reviewed. It was included for all resources, and the scale of the analysis was
stated explicitly and varied by resource. For example, watersheds were used for CEA
for water quality, whereas the activity area often was the CEA area for soils. Some
justification for the scale of the CEA area was provided for each resource. For wildlife,
the CEA area varied by species but in general was the same as the project area. The
justification for this was that the project area had been delineated at least in part based
on topographic features and was the size of multiple home ranges for the species
analyzed. Non-federal lands and past, present, and reasonably foreseeable actions were
discussed, albeit to different extents, for all resources where it was deemed relevant in
every EIS.
No document provided a comprehensive overview of cumulative impacts in one
place. All of the EISs approached CEA resource-by-resource, and the relevant CEA
could be found in the “Environmental Consequences” sections for each resource where
direct, indirect, and cumulative impacts were presented together. All documents
provided a definition of cumulative impacts somewhere in the EIS. The only document
to include an index was the Hidden Cedar EIS. “Cumulative effects” was not an item in
the index, but it did refer the reader to relevant sections such as that on “Past, present,
and reasonably foreseeable future actions.”
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Consideration of Past Actions in CEA
One aspect of CEA examined in detail was the way in which past projects were
presented and analyzed. In Lands Council v. Powell (2004) (referred to hereinafter as
Lands Council or the Iron Honey decision) the court held that the agency was required
to provide a list or “catalog” of relevant past activities in the area and their effects.3 The
reasoning for this appeared to be twofold: 1) such a list would facilitate the development
of a useful CEA and provide documentation of what projects had been considered as
part of the CEA, and 2) documentation of project effects would allow for comparisons
among of the proposed alternatives presented in EIS and their possible effects in light of
documented effects from past activities. Recall that in that case, the effects of past
management were quite significant, with all but two of the 14 watersheds in the project
area considered to be either not functioning or functioning at risk, in large part as the
result of nearly 40,000 acres of timber harvest since the 1960s.
The requirement from Lands Council could be read to be potentially quite
challenging. Agencies would have to not only list past actions in an area but also their
environmental effects on each resource. In other words, Lands Council could be read to
mean that the USFS would have to list, for example, all past timber harvests in an area,
the types of harvests conducted, the number of acres affected, and the effects of
individual projects on each resource, including, but not limited to, soils, water and air
quality, and wildlife. The ability to do this would require that a forest have access to
monitoring information that would allow it to determine the effects of individual past
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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By a catalog, the court meant a comprehensive list of all past projects and their effects.
Webster’s dictionary online (at www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/) give the word “list” as
the first definition of catalog and, as the second, provides the following: “a complete
enumeration of items arranged systematically with descriptive details.”
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projects. It is important, however, to remember that courts do not require agencies to
generate new information in order to comply with NEPA. Therefore, the agency would
have to present the information available but also could acknowledge gaps in its
understanding of past impacts.
One important question in this research is how the IPNF has responded to this
decision. This issue was dealt with somewhat differently in every EIS reviewed from
the 2006-2007 period. For example, the Myrtle Creek Final EIS (FEIS) from 2007 did
not provide an overview of how the agency chose to respond to this requirement as part
of the main document. However, the IPNF did speak to this issue in its “Response to
Objections” from members of the public regarding the adequacy of the project’s CEA.
The response provided in this section is entitled the “Cumulative Effects Response”,
which is, as some interviewees called it, a sort of boilerplate CEA response developed
by the IPNF after the Iron Honey decision. This response was found in every EIS
reviewed from 2006-2007, and therefore deserves further explanation.
The “Cumulative Effects Response” makes several primary points. It begins by
recapping the Iron Honey decision and then discussing the Council on Environmental
Quality (CEQ) memo that was released soon thereafter (CEQ, 2005, as discussed in
more detail in chapter two of this manuscript). The first important point, according to
the IPNF, is that, as the CEQ memo explains, although sometimes a catalog of past
projects and their environmental effects might be useful for predicting cumulative
impacts, NEPA regulations do not require that agencies exhaustively catalog past
projects.
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The EISs reviewed for 2006-2007 include a list of past timber harvests and their
prescriptions, along with general lists of past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future
projects and activities that might be relevant for the CEA for individual resources. For
example, the West Gold Final Supplemental EIS includes a list of relevant past, present,
and ongoing activities that “may be considered in the cumulative effects analyses” (p. I8). These are listed in general terms with very little specific information; examples
include “firewood gathering”, “hunting”, and “road maintenance activities.” The way in
which these activities are actually incorporated in the CEAs varies in the analysis for
each resource. I take a closer look at how this issue is dealt with for wildlife in the next
section.
The second critical point from the IPNF’s “Cumulative Effects Response” is that
CEA generally is supposed to focus on the incremental impact of the present action in
combination with the aggregate effects of other actions. To explain this concept, the
IPNF cites the CEQ memo, which states, “Generally, agencies can conduct an adequate
cumulative effects analysis by focusing on the current aggregate effects of past actions
without delving into the historic details of individual past actions” (CEQ, 2005, p. 2).
“Therefore,” explains the IPNF, “while we have listed all past, present and reasonably
foreseeable actions individually, their effects may be aggregated when the qualitative
benefit of considering cumulative effects analysis of individual past, present and
reasonably foreseeable actions is indistinguishable from considering them in aggregate”
(West Gold Final Supplemental EIS, pp. III-1, III-2). In other words, the IPNF, based
on CEQ’s guidance, concludes that detailing the effects of individual actions often is no
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more useful than considering current conditions, in which the aggregate effects of all
past actions are embedded.
Finally, a third critical point is made in the “Cumulative Effects Response.” The
IPNF explains:
This EIS has provided a description of known past activities and their effects;
however due to the marked difference between current land management
practices and policies, this analysis did not further aide in assessing whether one
form or another of the proposed activities would assist in meeting the project’s
purpose and need for action with minimal environmental harm (Myrtle Creek
Record of Decision, Appendix A, p. 158).

In other words, according to the IPNF, forestry practices have changed too significantly
and rapidly for an analysis of past activities and their effects to be useful in assessing the
possible effects of the alternatives presented in current EISs.
The remaining three pages of the “Cumulative Effects Response” detail how
road design, timber harvest practices, best management practices (BMPs), and
watershed protection strategies have changed over the last several decades. The
response concludes:
…[C]hanges in road construction/reconstruction and maintenance practices;
implementation of INFISH4 direction and watershed BMPs; and the changes
that have occurred in Forest Service harvest practices and objectives, an indepth analysis of the direct and indirect effects of each past action occurring
within this project’s analysis area(s) would not help illuminate or inform the
analysis about alternatives presented for this project. Where appropriate,
information obtained from monitoring the effects of recent similar actions has
been used to predict the direct or indirect effects of the proposed action and its
alternatives (Myrtle Creek ROD, Appendix A, p. 160).

Despite assurances that such information would not be useful to a CEA, one
interesting question is whether the IPNF has adequate monitoring information to
understand effects from past projects. Even if such monitoring information would not
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INFISH stands for the Inland Native Fish Strategy, which is a set of standards used by Region
1 for protecting riparian areas.
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be useful for an alternatives analysis, why not present it in order to facilitate a CEA?
The IPNF’s response is that this is not necessary because cumulative impacts are
represented in the current environmental condition. However, the IPNF states that a
portrait of similar actions and relevant monitoring information will be included when
possible.
The approach to cumulative effects of past actions is identical in every EIS,
although the location where this information is provided varies from one document to
the next. For example, whereas the West Gold provides the boilerplate language in an
appendix, the Hidden Cedar SFEIS includes the CEA response at the beginning of
Chapter Three: “Affected Environment and Environmental Consequences.”5 In that EIS
the CEA response is followed by a comprehensive list of past, present, and reasonably
foreseeable future actions, including federal actions and actions on state and private
land. It also provides some details, such as acres harvested, for the USFS timber sales in
the project area. The section does not include the effects of any actions on particular
resources and is only a comprehensive list of the actions that may be relevant for the
resource analyses. The way that these past activities are incorporated into CEA varies
for each resource.
The issue of how the IPNF is analyzing past actions is important to consider
because it captures how the forest has responded to the Iron Honey decision. The
holding in that decision is relevant for all forests under the jurisdiction of the 9th Circuit
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As another example, the Mission Brush SFEIS lists ongoing and future activities in Chapter 1.
A list of past harvest activities can be found in Appendix A, including details on acres harvested
by various methods. Chapter 3 then includes the boilerplate language, and in Chapter 4
cumulative effects is dealt with slightly differently for every resource.
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and has been cited by courts outside of the Circuit as well.6 In summary, the IPNF’s
response is that CEA is supposed to be “forward-looking” (this language is included in
some versions of this CEA response) and can capture the effects of past actions by
characterizing the existing condition of a resource. Furthermore, according to the IPNF,
there is no obvious benefit to be derived from an analysis of the effects of past actions
because practices have changed so much over the years. Essentially, the IPNF’s CEA
response makes the case that the requirements laid out in Iron Honey are not necessarily
useful to a CEA or an alternatives analysis.
It is questionable whether the IPNF’s approach to past actions meets the
requirements of creating a catalog of past projects and their effects as set forth by the
Ninth Circuit in the Iron Honey decision; however, the approach is in line with the CEQ
guidance issued thereafter (CEQ, 2005). Overall, the implications of the Iron Honey
decision remain unclear. Recall from chapter two that the applicability of the
requirement in legal cases has been held to vary from one set of circumstances to
another. It also remains debatable whether CEQ’s guidance on the matter will benefit
from judicial deference in future cases. Typically courts give CEQ’s interpretation of
NEPA substantial deference, especially if that interpretation is written into formal
regulations.7 Notably, the CEQ guidance has been written specifically into the USFS’
NEPA implementation regulations, making it more likely that these regulations will be
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For example, the case is cited in two important CEA decisions in the Seventh Circuit: Habitat
Education Center v. Bosworth, (E. Dist. Wisc. No. 03-C-1023, April 1, 2005) and Habitat
Education Center v. Bosworth (E. Dist. Wisc. No. 04-C-0254, March 31, 2005).
7
CEQ often cites Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 358 (1979) when emphasizing this point.
It is less clear how deferential courts will be to CEQ’s interpretations when they are issued as
guidance and not as formal regulations.
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afforded deference in the future.8 Nonetheless, the challenge of analyzing past actions
gets at some of the more complicated and confusing aspects of CEA and is discussed at
length in the next chapter.

3.3 The IPNF’s Approach to CEA for Wildlife
The IPNF’s approach to CEA for wildlife differs slightly for each species,
depending on the variables used to evaluate effects for a species (also referred to as the
“effects variables”) and the information and management strategies available for each
species. In order to provide the reader with both a general understanding of how CEA is
done and a look at the complexity of the analysis, this section tackles this issue on
several scales. It begins with an overview of the commonalities in how the IPNF
analyzes direct, indirect, and cumulative effects for wildlife species. Yet, to some
extent, the devil is in the details when it comes to understanding how CEA is done for
wildlife. Therefore, I provide a closer look at several species, each of which represents a
slightly different approach to effects analysis for wildlife.
A look at the analysis for these species gives the reader an overview of the
various approaches used for different species while also allowing for more
comprehensive understanding of how CEA is done, at least for a few commonly
analyzed species. It would be impossible to do justice to the USFS’s approach to
wildlife analysis, to understand some of the criticisms and concerns about the analysis,
or to provide useful, substantive recommendations, without diving in to the nuances and
tedious details of viability analysis for wildlife. Once this more in-depth perspective is
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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These regulations can be found at 36 C.F.R. §220 and were announced at 73 Fed. Reg. 43084
(July 24, 2008).
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established, we can then step back and consider some of the broader questions that are
necessarily implicated by this topic, including the overall purpose of cumulative effects
analysis and the challenges involved in broad-scale planning for wildlife protection.

The General Approach to Wildlife CEA
The IPNF analyzes effects on threatened and endangered species, regional
forester sensitive species (RFSSs), and management indicator species (MISs) that will
be affected by a project. For each project the Forest determines which species will be
analyzed in detail based on whether habitat for the species is found in the area and
whether the project is predicted to have any possible effects on the species. Some
species are analyzed as part of a guild with other species and therefore not analyzed in
detail on their own.
While the IPNF does some monitoring of species presence, such as inventorying
and monitoring of goshawk nest sites, it does not have data on population trends for
species on the forest. Long-term conservation assessments based on presence and
absence data are underway for some species, such as the pileated woodpecker and
northern goshawk, as part of ongoing efforts by the terrestrial wildlife program at the
Region 1 office. The Rocky Mountain Research Station is also researching the
population status of several species, including marten and fisher. Population estimates
from those efforts are not currently in use by the IPNF in their EISs. Estimates of
population numbers in areas of the IPNF are available for several species, such as the
grizzly bear and woodland caribou, although USFS biologists interviewed for this
project disagree as to the accuracy of this data. For all other species, population data of
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any kind is not presented in the CEA for wildlife and current estimates of population
abundance, distribution, and trends are not available.
Effects to wildlife are analyzed in terms of habitat-based variables. The IPNF’s
approach is to assess the amount and quality of habitat available for various species and
then utilize various management strategies to try to maintain or improve current
conditions. In some cases the IPNF estimates whether there is adequate habitat to
maintain either existing home ranges or a viable population forest-wide. Because
population data is not available, habitat is used as a proxy for estimating species
presence and populations in environmental effects analyses. Importantly, this practice
depends on at least two key assumptions, which are that: 1) habitat is a useful proxy for
population numbers, and 2) the way that vegetation is mapped is an accurate proxy for
habitat (Cushman & McKelvey, in press).
Forests designate Management Indicator Species (MISs), which often are
supposed to represent a guild of species with similar habitat requirements.9 For
example, the pileated woodpecker is an MIS on the IPNF and is meant to serve as a sort
of bellwether for other species that require some old-growth habitat. This MIS therefore
serves as a proxy for other species, and habitat for the MIS is a proxy for actual
population numbers. Recall from chapter two that this method of planning for species
viability is known as the “proxy-on-proxy” approach and has been upheld by the Ninth
Circuit as a valid approach to meeting the wildlife protection requirements incumbent
upon the USFS.
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Utilizing one species to represent a group or guild of species is often referred to as a surrogate
approach to wildlife conservation planning.
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Effects variables for all species, then, are indicators of habitat quality and
availability. For example, the effects variables for lynx are impacts to denning habitat
and the amount of habitat converted to an unsuitable condition within a 10-year
timeframe in a “lynx analysis unit” (LAU). For the black-backed woodpecker changes
in distribution and quality of snag habitat are the effects variables. For goshawks and
fisher the variables are changes in suitable nesting habitat and suitable denning habitat
respectively. Effects on pileated woodpeckers are measured by considering changes to
large snag and mature or old-growth habitat.
For most species the IPNF considers the amount of habitat in a “suitable” and
“capable” condition. Capable habitat is defined by the IPNF as habitat that has “the
inherent potential of a site to produce essential habitat requirements of a species”
(Myrtle Creek FEIS, p. B-5). This inherent potential is based on fixed attributes such as
elevation or slope. Suitable habitat is habitat that is currently meeting species’ habitat
requirements. It has both the fixed attributes that make it capable habitat as well as the
current mix of variable attributes, such as canopy cover, stand age, or stand density, that
make it currently inhabitable by a species (Myrtle Creek FEIS, p. B-5).
The scale of the CEA varies by species. For lynx, the Lynx Conservation
Assessment and Strategy (LCAS) sets forth guidelines for managing habitat for lynx
(see Reudiger et al., 2006). This document, put out by the Northern Region of the USFS
in collaboration with the Bureau of Land Management and U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service, directs the agency to designate lynx analysis units (LAUs), which approximate
the size of a home range used by lynx and are used to analyze cumulative effects.
Grizzly bears are analyzed using Bear Management Units (BMUs). As the USFS
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explains “BMUs are not intended to be the actual home range of known adult female
grizzly bears, but are used to analyze cumulative effects. By maintaining sufficient
suitable habitat quality in each BMU, then the entire recovery area would remain as
viable habitat” (Myrtle Creek FEIS, p. B-13). For most other species the cumulative
effects area is the project area boundary. The reason given for this is that the boundary
often is the size of multiple home ranges for species, reflects topographic features that
govern species movement, and represent the point of diminishing effects. By this, it
seems the USFS means that beyond the project boundary, project effects are too small
relative to the entire landscape to be meaningfully analyzed. Although this may seem
reasonable at first glance, it raises the question of whether and at what point larger-scale
and forest-wide assessments of viability and cumulative impacts are undertaken.
A number of conservation strategies guide the way the IPNF analyzes effects on
species and designs their management actions. Management for lynx, for example, is
guided by the LCAS, which directs that a certain amount of each LAU be maintained in
a suitable condition. For goshawks the IPNF utilizes recommendations from Reynolds
et al. (1992) that specify that a certain number of potential nesting stands be maintained
over a particular number of acres and also give direction on the structural composition of
vegetation needed to meet habitat needs for goshawks. Other conservation strategies,
such as the Northern Region’s snag protocol, are used to guide the management of
habitat for species such as black-backed woodpeckers, which rely almost entirely upon
snag habitat. Other strategies and scientific assessments are also utilized for various
species and include guidelines such as those found in the IPNF Forest Plan (USFS,
1987) and the Integrated Scientific Assessment for Ecosystem Management in the
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Interior Columbia Basin (Quigley et al., 1996). Finally, work by Samson (2006a,
2006b) assessing population viability and minimum habitat thresholds for several avian
species is also used in the wildlife CEAs.10 One of the most heated areas of contention
is whether these management strategies and assessments are scientifically credible and
valid tools for guiding species management; this matter is discussed in more detail
below and in the next chapter.
Private, state, and other non-USFS lands are generally not analyzed in detail in
terms of wildlife habitat. Instead, the IPNF assumes that most of these lands are
managed for timber extraction and are therefore not providing any mature forest
structure over the long-term. In general, it says these lands cannot be relied upon over
the long-term to provide any particular type of suitable habitat. Furthermore, the
information available about the habitat conditions or the long-term management plans
on these lands is of limited availability and would be costly to obtain. The IPNF’s
approach, then, is to assume that these areas do not provide any habitat for species
analyzed. In this way, explains the IPNF, the Forest takes a worst-case scenario
approach to the issue of non-federal lands by assuming that the maintenance of
sufficient habitat depends entirely upon USFS lands. The one exception to this is for
grizzly bear management, in which case federal agencies are required to compensate in
some way for habitat loss on non-federal lands in BMUs (see, for example, the
explanation in the Myrtle Creek FEIS, p. B-22).
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Samson (2006b) also draws conclusions about population viability and minimum habitat
thresholds for the American marten and fisher. This work is not used to support the analysis for
those species in the IPNF documents reviewed herein.
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Past actions and their effects are dealt with by considering the “environmental
baseline,” meaning the existing condition, of species’ habitat. In no EIS did the analysis
for wildlife include a detailed list of past actions and their effects. In most cases the
effects of past actions are discussed generally and the combined effects of past actions
are integrated into the description of the current condition of the resource. In many
cases, there is no clear reference point with which to compare the current condition; this
makes it difficult to understand how habitat availability or population numbers may have
changed over time.

CEA for Various Wildlife Species
Between 7-13 different species were analyzed in detail in the EISs reviewed.
Some species such as lynx and grizzly bears are managed according to detailed
conservation strategies. Others, such as goshawks and fisher are managed using
guidelines from scientific assessments developed by the Forest Service. The following
sections look more closely at how CEA is done for three species, lynx, fisher, and
pileated woodpeckers, in order to provide an overview of three different approaches
being used by the IPNF for CEA for wildlife.

Canada Lynx
Lynx (Lynx canadensis) are one example of a species for which management
guidelines and the approach to CEA are relatively straightforward. For lynx and several
other species, the IPNF has developed a habitat capability/suitability model based on its
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TSMRS data.11 The TSMRS is essentially a timber stand database that is used in
wildlife analysis to estimate habitat availability. IPNF personnel use the database to
determine the availability of capable and suitable habitat and then verify the validity of
estimates, particularly estimates of suitable habitat, through interpretation of aerial
photos and field visits to the project site. These field visits ideally allow the IPNF to
verify whether stands are actually suitable habitat and evaluate for the presence of
characteristics that are not accounted for in the TSMRS data.12
All management for lynx is done within the framework of the Lynx Conservation
Assessment and Strategy (LCAS), a conservation strategy that guides management visà-vis lynx and sets some cumulative impacts limits (Reudiger et al., 2000). The LCAS
was developed by the Northern Region after lynx were listed as threatened under the
Endangered Species Act of 1973. In areas of lynx habitat the USFS is to designate Lynx
Analysis Units (LAUs), which represent theoretical home ranges for the individual lynx.
Within LAUs the USFS is to maintain at least 10% of the habitat in a suitable denning
condition, and this habitat is supposed to be well-distributed and in patches greater than
5 acres. The USFS cannot convert more than 15% of lynx habitat to an unsuitable
condition within 10 years and cannot reduce suitable habitat at all if more than 30% of
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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TSMRS stands for timber stand management record system or timber stand management
reporting system.
12
This field verification is partly in response to a holding in the Lands Council v. Powell (2004)
decision. The court held that the TSMRS data was outdated, being over 15 years old at the time.
It also stated that the data were inaccurate in terms of canopy closure estimates and that the
TSMRS included insufficient data on snag habitat. This, concluded the court, made the use of
the TSMRS data unreliable as a foundation for the proxy-on-proxy method of estimating
population viability, particularly for old-growth species. This holding was based largely on the
IPNF’s statements in their 1998 monitoring report. The IPNF’s approach to remedying this
situation has been to field verify conditions in stands deemed suitable habitat through use of the
TSMRS database. IPNF personnel indicated that this process of updating stand-level data
through project-site field visits also was occurring before the Lands Council decision in 2004
and has continued since.
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the LAU is already in an unsuitable condition. These standards serve as cumulative
impacts thresholds for habitat alteration both spatially and temporally. Corridors also
are to be maintained, and there should be no net increases in over-the-snow routes and
snowmobile areas.
The existing condition for lynx in any project area is described as the number of
LAUs in the project area and the percentages of habitat in suitable and unsuitable
conditions. Effects to lynx are presented in terms of how the various alternatives would
impact suitable foraging and denning habitat and would increase the overall amount of
unsuitable habitat acreage. Changes to suitable habitat over the last decade are also
disclosed. No alternative would be viable if it exceeded the LCAS guidelines, and
cumulative effects are deemed insignificant as long as these guidelines are met.
The approach to CEA for lynx focuses on current conditions, changes to those
conditions over the last decade, and the requirements of the LCAS. Past, present, and
reasonably foreseeable future management activities are considered primarily in general,
qualitative terms. For example, the Mission Brush EIS in its CEA for lynx explains:
The road construction associated with [past] sales increased access for trappers
and snowmobilers, potentially causing negative impacts to lynx through
increased trapping mortality and snow compaction allowing access to lynx
habitat for competing predators. However, motorized use of these roads during
summer had a relatively minor impact, since lynx are not normally displaced by
human presence (Mission Brush, SFEIS, p. 4-59).

After discussing these and other activities in terms of their general contributions to
impacts on lynx, the section concludes, “These activities would not have cumulative
significant impacts when added to the proposed action, since the effects are already
incorporated into the environmental baseline” (p. 4-59). This oblique statement
concludes nearly every single CEA for wildlife in the EISs reviewed.
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While the information presented on past, present, and future actions is not
particularly integrated in terms of impacts on lynx, in this case the conclusion that
cumulative impacts are not significant is not without foundation given the LCAS
guidelines. The LCAS guidelines set cumulative impact thresholds for management
actions over a 10-year timeframe. This approach is meant to prevent further significant
cumulative impacts for lynx and the loss of any suitable LAUs. It is important to note,
however, that there are no estimates in the EIS of actual lynx population numbers, nor
any disclosure of how populations are thought to have declined over time in the area.
The approach here to CEA is to prevent further declines to lynx populations by
preventing the crossing of what have been established as habitat thresholds within
LAUs. This type of strategy based on the use of the LCAS removes some of the burden
from individual forests and their project analyses through the provision of clear
guidelines for all projects in lynx habitat. A number of biologists and project leaders
interviewed on the IPNF explained that the LCAS makes their job easier when it comes
to designing project and analyzing effects in areas where lynx may be present. Of
course, the efficacy of the strategy is entirely contingent upon the validity of the LCAS
approach and its consistency with the prevailing science regarding lynx and its habitat
requirements.
The EISs recognize that timber harvest on non-federal lands may adversely
affect lynx but state that the LCAS directs the USFS to provide adequate habitat on
USFS lands. Therefore, effects on private lands are not considered relevant to the
analysis. This approach to private lands is important to consider. While the USFS
makes the case that it is taking a worst-case scenario approach by excluding private
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lands from its analysis, it is also likely overlooking effects on populations that could
result from private land development. As one IPNF employee put it, the worst-case
scenario approach probably does not provide an accurate picture of changes to habitat
and populations over time.
In summary, because of the presence of a conservation framework with a
mechanism for analyzing cumulative impacts, the approach to CEA for lynx is relatively
straightforward and unproblematic for project level analyses. Criticisms of how the
USFS manages for lynx necessarily implicate issues beyond what is happening on the
IPNF. For example, one might criticize the validity of the LCAS or more broadly the
use of habitat as a proxy for population estimates. It also would be difficult to know
how populations of lynx have changed on the IPNF relative to some point in the past,
based on the information in an EIS. These are all potentially valid issues, and some are
discussed in more detail in the next chapter. However, within the current legaladministrative framework it is difficult to find any fault with the IPNF’s approach to
lynx management.

Fisher
Fisher (Martes pennanti) are a Regional Forester Sensitive Species, which are
species that the Northern Region has identified as having possible threats to viability.
Like lynx, fisher are analyzed in terms of acres of suitable and capable habitat in the
project area. Unlike lynx they do not benefit from a comprehensive management
strategy and cumulative impacts thresholds are unclear. As for the current status of
fisher populations, the Mission Brush EIS explains that fisher populations in the
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Western U.S. “have remained at low numbers or are absent from their former range”
(Mission Brush SFEIS, p. 3-64, citing Heinemeyer and Jones, 1994). The EIS goes on
to explain, “Population trend information for fishers in northern Idaho is unavailable, but
based on sighting information, fishers are currently rare” (Mission Brush, SFEIS, p. 364). Anecdotally, interviewees suggested that fisher populations are at serious risk; the
fisher is a species for which viability concerns are likely very real on the IPNF.
The primary effects variables for fisher are changes in acres of suitable denning
habitat and road densities. The IPNF utilizes a habitat suitability model based on the
TSMRS data for fisher analysis. Suitable habitat is generally considered to be mature
and old-growth stands. Fisher habitat is difficult to model, according to the IPNF,
because of a lack of information on habitat requirements of fisher and limitations in
accounting for various habitat characteristics with the TSMRS data (Mission Brush
SFEIS, p. 4-76). Reasons are given for why the TSMRS may overestimate fisher habitat
availability and steps that are taken to compensate for this, such as the elimination of
previously logged stands from suitable habitat estimates due to the probable lack of
large woody debris. Generally, areas modeled as suitable fisher habitat are field verified
in some way, although it is unclear how intensive or effective this process is. The
Mission Brush EIS, for example, indicates that fisher habitat was verified incidentally
during the field verification of lynx habitat.
Existing percentages of mature/old-growth structure are presented along with
predicted changes to those percentages by subdrainage. These percentages are
compared to guidelines for fisher management in Heinemeyer and Jones (1994), which
provides a series of guidelines developed for use by the Northern Region that rate the
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quality of a subdrainage as fisher habitat based on the percentages of stands in various
vegetation structural stages.13 For example, a “high quality” subdrainage is one that has
65-75% of stands in the mature/old-growth class, whereas a moderate quality
subdrainage is one with greater than or equal to 40% of stands in the mature/old-growth
class. The effects analyses for fisher explain how much habitat is in each structural
stage (mature sawtimber, immature sawtimber, pole/sapling, and open/seed) and how
much these percentages will change as a result of management actions. Note that this
analysis is not based on a well-developed wildlife-habitat relationship model for fisher,
but rather estimates effects to fisher based on the use of vegetative structural stages as a
coarse proxy for fisher habitat. In other words, habitat requirements for this species are
poorly understood, and timber stand data, with limited detail on various habitat
attributes, is used to estimate habitat availability. For these reasons, the effects analysis
for fisher rests on a shaky foundation.
The IPNF does not set any limits on how much suitable habitat can be converted
in an area over a particular length of time, nor does it explain whether there are any
thresholds in terms of habitat on the forest as a whole. The general approach to fisher
management is to maintain or improve the current condition of subdrainages and to limit
effects on fisher through management prescriptions. For example, the Myrtle Creek EIS
explains that LCAS and INFISH standards both should benefit fisher. The Mission
Brush EIS states that the IPNF’s general approach is to preserve mature and old-growth
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13

Heinemeyer and Jones (1994) present what they call and interim strategy for fisher
management. The paper collects what information is available from the literature and from
discussion with experts in order to provide some management guidelines. However, the authors
acknowledge, “We presently lack much of the required information necessary to develop an indepth conservation strategy for fishers across western North America” (Heinemeyer and Jones,
1994, p. 26).
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stands, protect riparian areas, and increase the amount of large woody debris across the
forest. In the conclusion for effects on fisher the analysis explains, “While [some
management strategies] may temporarily reduce fisher habitat at the local scale, habitat
should improve for this species with time and should be maintained on a landscape
scale” (Mission Brush SFEIS, p. 4-80).
For an example of a specific effects analysis for fisher we can look more closely
at the Mission Brush EIS. That analysis explains that the project analysis area is
currently a moderate quality subdrainage and that no alternative will convert the
subdrainage to a lower quality status. Effects will be minimized through the application
of management standards, such as maintaining canopy cover at 50% or greater in
selectively harvested areas, following Regional snag protocols, and utilizing BMPs to
maintain coarse woody debris on harvested sites.
According to the Mission Brush EIS, the no action alternative would preserve
more denning habitat than any of the action alternatives. The EIS explains, “The no
action alternative would preserve potential foraging habitat for fisher, and would bring
some stands into suitable denning condition more rapidly than treatment would.” It goes
on to say:
[H]owever, with this comes the increased risk of stand-replacing wildfire, which
would effectively remove most burned-over areas from suitable fisher habitat
for many years. ….[T]hese stands are at higher risk of stand-replacing wildfire
than historic, open grown dry-site stands would have been. In summary, while
the no action alternative would provide better fisher habitat than the action
alternatives in the near future, some of these acres may subsequently be
converted to unsuitable conditions through fire (Mission Brush SFEIS, p. 4-77).

The analysis makes the case that although treating a stand may decrease habitat
availability, that stand also is at risk of being destroyed by fire. Managers, according to
this passage, are essentially faced with choices among a variety of activities that pose
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some risks to resources. Notably, an analysis such as this is based on several
assumptions. The likelihood of a stand-replacing fire is the subject of debate, as is the
question of whether timber harvest in the area would reduce that risk significantly or for
any significant length of time, given the probability of such a fire (for more on the broad
terms of this debate, see Keiter, 2006). What is notable is that the possibility of such a
fire is used as a justification for further treatment without any clear explanation of the
likelihood of these relative risks.
All other alternatives in the Mission Brush EIS will eliminate suitable habitat,
but reasons are given for why this loss of habitat is either negligible or of minimal
consequence. For one, no alternative will reduce the amount of timber in the
mature/sawtimber class below 40%, although one alternative reduces the timber in that
class from 48.9% to 42.2%. Therefore, no alternative will lead to a less than moderatequality subdrainage.

For alternative two, we are told that suitable habitat that will be

altered is mostly in upland areas and is not critical range for fisher. Furthermore, in
areas that will be selectively harvested, the IPNF explains, management prescriptions
maintaining 50% canopy cover, the use of snag protocols, and grapple piling in thinned
units will maintain fisher habitat in a suitable condition even in treated areas. Under this
alternative, 225 acres of suitable habitat also would be clearcut (regeneration harvested).
The analysis explains, “Regeneration harvest generally eliminates stands from suitable
denning condition, although foraging opportunities would remain to some extent”
(Mission Brush SFEIS, p. 4-78). Unfortunately, all of these assurances ring somewhat
hollow, given that, according to the assessments used by the IPNF, wildlife-habitat
relationships for this species are not well-known.
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The analysis goes on to state that acres of suitable habitat that are proposed for
treatment in the Brush Lake area have high levels of root-rot infestation, making it likely
that these stands will be short-lived as suitable denning habitat. Furthermore, these
short-lived denning stands lack connectivity corridors to other suitable habitat. In the
Mission Creek area of the project, the EIS states:
185 acres of currently suitable fisher habitat are proposed for regeneration
harvest. …Suitable habitat in Units 58, 60, and 125 (~30 acres each) are
somewhat isolated, and lack connectivity to other suitable stands. Other suitable
habitat within proposed treatment units are on the periphery of capable habitat,
and thus would not cause breaks in connectivity corridors if harvested (Mission
Brush SFEIS p. 4-78).

Despite assurances of the overall management strategy for fisher populations, it
is impossible to know exactly what this kind of information means in terms of fisher
populations. Has the forest made a case for why isolated patches of suitable habitat are
not as necessary to maintain? It seems that the assumption is that because these patches
are “somewhat isolated” and lack connectivity they are less important for this species.
However, this assumption is not clearly supported by any discussion of dispersal ranges
or patch size requirements and availability in the area for fisher. The message in terms
of connectivity corridors is also murky. Why does the elimination of suitable habitat on
the periphery of capable habitat lead to the conclusion that connectivity corridors would
not be affected? Without stating upfront the basis for these conclusions, it is difficult to
know how to interpret this kind of information if we are interested in understanding
possible effects on already dwindling fisher populations.
This analysis is combined with information on past activities to provide a picture
of cumulative impacts. Again, let us consider the Mission Brush EIS. It explains in the
CEA section that past harvest had the potential to eliminate some fisher habitat, although
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it does not estimate how much fisher habitat has been lost in the project area. The CEA
for past activities concludes:
In combination with past natural and human-caused events, the proposed action
would reduce the quantity of suitable fisher denning habitat. However, given
the low density of fisher populations, it is unlikely that they are limited by
denning habitat. Previous activities would not have cumulatively significant
impacts when added to the proposed action, since the effects are already
incorporated into the environmental baseline (Mission Brush SFEIS p. 4-79).

While it is apparent that the IPNF is making the case that its management
prescriptions are designed to minimize effects on fisher and maintain the quality of the
subdrainages in the project area, the quality of this kind of CEA is dubious and raises
several questions. For one, if fisher are not considered to be limited by denning habitat,
then why is this a useful indicator of effects on fisher? If denning habitat is abundant
relative to current fisher population numbers, what factor(s) explains their current
status? What if denning habitat is abundant, but population numbers are extremely low,
and the habitat in this particular area is supporting some critical portion of the small
population that remains? Perhaps the habitat in this area is particularly important;
however, with no actual data on the abundance or distribution of the population, it is
impossible to know whether this area is critical habitat for fisher.
Furthermore, it is impossible to know what types of effects would lead the IPNF
to conclude that there would be significant effects to fisher populations. If denning
habitat is not limiting, the implication seems to be that such habitat could be reduced
significantly with no effect on fisher populations. If this is the case, it would be helpful
to know at what point the IPNF would have a significant cumulative effects problem on
their hands. Without any thresholds, we simply have to take its word that these minimal
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reductions in suitable habitat are insignificant.14 The assertion, “Previous activities
would not have cumulatively significant impacts when added to the proposed action,
since the effects are already incorporated into the environmental baseline,” rings
somewhat hollow without an attendant explanation. Imagine instead if the analysis
stated the following: “Past effects are incorporated into the environmental baseline and
proposed actions would not have a cumulatively significant impact because we are still
not reaching threshold x.” In this case the reader would at least be clear where the red
flag would be raised in terms of significant cumulative effects. However, without
defining what a viability threshold might be, the reasons for stating cumulative effects
are not significant are opaque.
It is impossible to know, without any broad-scale cumulative impacts analysis or
viability assessment for this species, when the IPNF would have a cumulatively
significant effect on their hands when it comes to fisher. Presumably, as long as no
project degrades the quality of any subdrainage in terms of fisher habitat, at least
projects are not creating any additional threats to viability aside from those that may
already exist. However, without more knowledge about wildlife-habitat relationships
for fisher, or about the status of populations, it is difficult to be confident that the IPNF’s
guidelines for maintaining fisher habitat are effective.
Beyond this issue of not knowing when thresholds would be crossed, we also are
not presented with a clear accounting of what has been lost in terms of fisher habitat or
populations in the area. How, for example, would a reader know if over time, say 20
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Notably, although it was not used in any of the EISs reviewed, Samson (2006b) did set a sort
of habitat threshold for fisher on the IPNF. The validity and reliability of this threshold,
however, are highly questionable, according to almost every individual I interviewed, including
both agency and outside scientists (this issue is discussed in more detail in the next chapter).
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years, the subdrainages in this area had been degraded from high quality status to
moderate quality status? This information is central to a CEA, which might not always
be only about whether thresholds are being crossed but also about how current
conditions compare to conditions at some point in the past. In the case of fisher, this
information on habitat loss might be particularly useful, at least as some indication of
possible cumulative impacts, given that the current status of populations is not known.
The IPNF provides a proxy for this information but in a somewhat indirect way.
If a reader wanted to know whether this drainage used to include more suitable habitat
for fisher, rather than having only a picture of the current environmental baseline, she
could seek this information in the analysis of forest vegetation. This section of an EIS
often paints a picture of how much of a project area is estimated to have been in various
structural stages at some point in the past and also will detail how many acres have been
harvested according to various harvest prescriptions. A reader could then utilize this
information to understand how timber harvest might have reduced fisher habitat in the
area. This would be an indirect approach though, in that it would only give a picture of
how much forest has been altered in terms of vegetation structural stages. We can
assume that these provide only a very rough proxy of suitable habitat for a species like
fisher and that habitat itself in only a very rough proxy for population numbers.
As an example of this approach, the CEA in the Mission Brush EIS concludes,
“[T]he amount of fisher denning habitat is comparable to the quantity available
historically, as evidenced by comparison of the sum of mature/large and old growth
forest size classes now versus historically” (Mission Brush SFEIS p. 4-80). A look at
the analysis for forest structure in the EIS provides the basis for this statement. It
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explains that current estimates of mature forest structure are 36%, which is larger than
the estimated historical range of 15-35%, and of old-growth are 12%, which is below the
estimated historical range of 15-35%. Detailed information on past harvest also can be
found in Appendix A. Therefore, one could piece together a sense of how much fisher
habitat has changed in the project area over time, but it would be a rather rough sketch
based on timber harvest data and comparisons to historic conditions. Compounding this
problem is the fact that these discussions of old-growth availability do not parse out
types of old-growth. High elevation old-growth stands, dry-site ponderosa pine stands,
and mid-elevation mesic stands are all lumped together in the 12% estimate. The forest
does have information on the types of old-growth in each stand, but at least from the
EISs it is not easy to get out how current estimates of old-growth availability relate to
the needs of old-growth dependent species. It is possible, and likely, according to some
USFS scientists, that less than 12% of the type of old-growth required by a species like
fisher remains.
As with most other species, private lands are assumed to provide no long-term
habitat for this species. The Hidden Cedar EIS in particular deals with the private land
issue due to the large percentage of private land (46%) in the project area. In this case,
the IPNF explains, it is difficult to put the USFS lands in context in terms of fisher
habitat suitability without a large-scale management strategy for the area. Nonetheless,
the analysis is done in terms of habitat availability on USFS lands. In this area the
drainage is currently in a “low-quality” condition. Because of the presence of private
lands in the area, the conclusion is that regardless of conditions on USFS lands, the area
will remain in a low-quality condition for species such as fisher.

!

"'(!

!
In general, the CEA for fisher fails to paint a clear picture of how much habitat
has been lost over time in the area, and none of the information provided indicates how
population status may have changed over time. The IPNF’s approach to CEA focuses
on the combined effect of the current action in combination with the existing condition.
As discussed in the previous section, this approach is not at all inconsistent with CEQ’s
recent guidance on how to present cumulative impacts, but it fails to provide a clear
sense of cumulative impacts over time. The forest also aims to maintain subdrainages
at their present quality or trend them towards improved quality of habitat for fisher.
Generally, the EISs explain that INFISH, LCAS, and other management guidelines will
benefit fisher, and forest-wide there is an effort to trend towards older structural classes,
preserve old stands, protect riparian areas, and preserve woody debris. Therefore,
effects to fisher should be minimal, according to the IPNF.
If we compare the approach to that for lynx, the primary difference in how these
two species are dealt with is the presence of a comprehensive habitat management
strategy for lynx. The LCAS sets clear limits about how much denning habitat needs to
be maintained in a single lynx analysis unit and how much habitat can be altered from a
suitable condition over a 10-year period. By contrast, it is not clear for fisher how much
area should remain in a suitable denning condition to support a home range or viable
population or how much habitat could be converted in an area without threatening
populations.
In summary, a number of things are missing from the fisher analysis. There is no
clear management strategy, nor any clear cumulative effects thresholds for fisher that
would provide some context for projects that eliminate small portions of habitat. In
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terms of CEA, if a reader were interested in how fisher populations have been affected
over time or how timber management over the last several decades has affected fisher
habitat, this information would be impossible to come by. We could deduce changes in
available habitat over time based on rough changes in forest vegetation, but this tool,
which uses vegetations structure as a rough proxy for habitat, which itself is a rough
proxy for population status, would be our only means for guessing at how populations
have been affected. There is, in effect, no real assessment of cumulative effects, either
generally or as a result of management actions. Furthermore, the fact that there are no
population estimates for fisher and no forest-wide analysis of the status of the species
makes it impossible to know if the forest is actually supporting what might be
considered a viable population.

Pileated Woodpeckers
Pileated woodpeckers are a Management Indicator Species (MIS) on the IPNF.
The species was designated as an MIS because it is a “[p]rimary cavity excavator, old
growth indicator because of dependence on large snags,” and is “associated with mature
forests” (Hidden Cedar SFEIS, p. 324). Therefore, it is meant to serve as a bellwether
for other old-growth species. Pileated woodpeckers do not benefit from an overall
management strategy as do lynx, but they were evaluated as part of a region-wide
viability assessment (Samson, 2006a), which is used as part of the effects analysis for
this species. Other species analyzed in the IPNF’s wildlife analyses also are supported
by a region-wide viability assessment. For this reason, I have chosen the pileated
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woodpecker as an example of a slightly different approach used for CEA as compared to
what we saw for fisher and lynx.
Pileated woodpeckers are managed based on several documents: Old-Growth
Habitat and Associated Wildlife Species in the Northern Rocky Mountains (USDA,
1990) and Samson’s region-wide viability assessment, entitled A Conservation
Assessment of the Northern Goshawk, Black-backed Woodpecker, Flammulated Owl,
and Pileated Woodpecker in the Northern Region (Samson, 2006a). Both of these
documents were developed by the USFS to guide the management of a number of oldgrowth associated and sensitive species in the Northern Region.
Samson’s (2006a) work is cited as part of the CEA for this species as well as that
for goshawks, flammulated owls, and black-backed woodpeckers in all EISs reviewed.
In every EIS that includes a CEA for these avian species, the IPNF states that, according
to Samson (2006a), the short-term viability of these species is not in question because:
1) “No scientific evidence exists that the [species] is decreasing in numbers”; 2)
“Increases in the extent and connectivity of forested habitat have occurred since
European settlement”; 3) “Well-distributed and abundant habitat [for the species] exists
on today’s landscape”; and 4) “The level of timber harvest [in 2004, 0.0009% of the
forested landscape in the Northern Region] is insignificant” (Hidden Cedar SFEIS, p.
327). The author of this study, Fred Samson, was the regional ecologist for Region One
until a couple of years ago. A separate document by Samson from 2006 assesses the
availability of habitat for each species by forest and sets what is essentially a minimum
amount of habitat necessary to support a viable population (Samson, 2006b). It is
important to note that his work was not peer-reviewed and is the subject of considerable
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debate as to its validity by individuals both inside and outside of the agency. I discuss
this issue in more detail in the following chapter.
In order to determine possible project effects on pileated woodpeckers, TSMRS
data are used to identify suitable habitat. Based on USFS management guidelines for
the species, old-growth and mature stands are mapped, and then hypothetical 1, 000-acre
home ranges are delineated around suitable nesting stands or groups of stands.
According to the management standards used by the IPNF, at least 100 acres of
contiguous suitable nesting habitat should exist in each home range to be sufficient for
the species. The areas around suitable nesting stands are evaluated as to whether they
provide feeding habitat, which should be comprised of at least 500 acres of mature or
immature sawtimber habitat. Effects are then analyzed based on these parameters for
each home range, and cumulative effects are assessed by looking at all home ranges
across the project area.
To get a better sense of how this plays out, let us consider the Hidden Cedar
EIS’s analysis for pileated woodpeckers. In the project area six home ranges were
delineated, two of which rely on feeding habitat from non-USFS lands. The EIS
explains at the outset the effects that are common to all alternatives and states, “No
alterative would impact existing old growth or suitable habitat on [USFS lands] to an
extent that would affect the availability of suitable pileated woodpecker habitat or
populations” (Hidden Cedar SFEIS, p. 326). It then explains that no cumulative effects
are associated with the project for the following reasons: 1) the project will have limited
effects; 2) suitable habitat and home ranges will be maintained in the analysis area; and,
3) immature timber stands would be maintained to succeed to suitable habitat.
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Furthermore, the IPNF cites the work by Samson (2006a), which concludes that the
short-term viability of the pileated woodpecker is not threatened in the Northern Region
based on the abundance and distribution of habitat for the species across both the IPNF
and the Region.
After this analysis is presented in the Hidden Cedar EIS, a closer look is
afforded to the effects of each alternative. Several aspects of the analysis are difficult to
interpret. For example, direct and indirect effects from the Hidden Cedar EIS for
alternatives B and C are explained as follows:
These alternatives would maintain suitable habitat to support pileated
woodpeckers in a minimum of three home ranges…. Proposed harvest
treatment would impact ~148 of the 178 acres of mature suitable nesting habitat
in Home Range A. This could result in insufficient suitable nesting habitat in
Home Range A. However, design features (i.e. snag retention levels),
prescriptions (i.e. thinning), pileated woodpecker use of areas with 10% forest
cover (Samson, 2005), information that indicates that cavity habitat and pileated
woodpecker us[e] can be maintained in partially treated stands (Quesnel and
Steeger, 2002), and the amount of immature size class maintained reduce the
risk of loosing sufficient suitable nesting habitat (Hidden Cedar SFEIS, p. 328).

This passage raises several issues. We are told that all but 30 acres of suitable
nesting habitat in this home range will be eliminated (recall that each home range is to
have at least 100 acres of contiguous nesting habitat). However, this loss of habitat is
then dismissed based on uncertainties about what exactly is required to maintain suitable
nesting conditions. A variety of factors reduce the risk, by some undisclosed amount,
that sufficient nesting habitat will be lost or that the loss of this habitat is important.
What is the point, though, of delineating suitable habitat and using this as a standard for
identifying home ranges, when the characterization of suitable habitat is so flexible that
losses to it can be explained away as potentially insignificant?
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In general, the passage raises questions about how the analysis handles
uncertainty. Are we meant to understand that the risks to suitable nesting habitat have
been deemed insignificant? It is not clear exactly what conclusions have been reached
about possible effects to the home range, whether they are important, or whether there is
any bottom line in terms of how many home ranges can be depleted of suitable habitat.
In this case, the IPNF uses uncertainties about the effects of its practices or in various
scientific studies to cast doubt on whether predicted effects to species habitat are
actually important. However, without clearer explanations or some estimation of how
likely measures are to reduce effects on homeranges and habitat, these sorts of passages
can appear to be nothing less that a strategic use of uncertainty in cases where it supports
the USFS’ proposed actions.
It is also difficult to reconcile the statements in this effects analysis, which
indicate the potential loss of a home range, with the statements made up front in this EIS
that, “No alternative would impact…suitable habitat on [USFS] lands to an extent that
would affect the availability of suitable pileated woodpecker habitat or populations”
(Hidden Cedar SFEIS, p. 326). And, recall that the CEA states, “There would be no
cumulative effects associated with this project or analysis area that would jeopardize
populations of pileated woodpeckers” with one of the reasons given being “the limited
effects from this project” (Hidden Cedar SFEIS, p. 327). In light of the effects analysis
for alternatives B and C, more explanation is necessary to understand how the
conclusion of “no effects” from any alternative is reached, despite the potential
elimination of one or more home ranges that are currently in a suitable condition under
some alternatives.
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The Myrtle Creek EIS’s analysis for pileated woodpeckers focuses more on the
importance of large-diameter snag habitat for the species and considers the effects of
past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future projects. The CEA provides a
discussion of the general effects of past actions and some consideration of present and
future activities, including activities on non-USFS lands. Other thinning projects,
noxious weed treatments, other active timber sales, a land exchange, and activities on
private land are all considered in the CEA. Other effects of past activities also have
been analyzed as part of consideration of the environmental baseline. The section on
past activities includes statements such as:
In general, [timber] sales that involved regeneration logging or overstory
removal damaged pileated woodpecker habitat, while sales that involved
thinning from below preserved or improved habitat…. As a result, the ultimate
legacy of historic logging in the project area is a decrease in large-diameter
(>20” dbh) snags. However, these activities would not have cumulatively
significant impacts when added to the proposed action, since the effects are
already incorporated into the environmental baseline (Myrtle Creek FEIS, p. B38).

This analysis, while it does speak to the effects of past actions, leaves several questions
unanswered. The analysis does not explicitly answer whether sufficient snag habitat
remains, how many potential home ranges might have been lost in the past due to
harvest of mature or old-growth stands, and whether the current number of home ranges
forest-wide is sufficient to support a viable population.
The question of how many home ranges are sufficient to support populations
comes up again in the Mission Brush EIS. The EIS explains that for two of the
alternatives analyzed, mature and immature sawtimber would be reduced below 500
acres making them potentially insufficient in terms of foraging habitat for pileated
woodpeckers. The analysis goes on to explain, however, that the woodpeckers might be
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able to forage in areas of different theoretical home ranges thus making up for habitat
deficits in each home range. This kind of statement again raises the issue of how
flexible home range standards are as well as the question of how conclusions are drawn
in cases of uncertainty. The analysis goes on to explain that even if these home ranges
were no longer suitable for the species, a majority of home ranges (ten of the thirteen in
this project area) would be maintained in a suitable condition. Although this analysis
paints a clear picture of the current status of habitat in the project area and potential
effects to that habitat, we need more context to interpret what exactly these effects may
mean in terms of pileated woodpecker populations. It is never made clear how many
home ranges are necessary in the project area or forest-wide to maintain viability for the
species. The answer to this question apparently lies with Samson’s (2006b) analysis,
which indicates that ample habitat remains for the species on the IPNF and that therefore
no thresholds will be crossed that may threaten species viability. In other words, a
considerable amount of habitat or number of home ranges could be converted to an
unsuitable condition without threatening the viability of the woodpecker.15
The West Gold analysis also deals with pileated woodpeckers, but in this case it
appears that the project area currently does not include enough suitable habitat to
delineate a home range. The analysis acknowledges the specific acreage of capable
pileated woodpecker habitat that has been altered by past harvests, providing some
indication that a potential home range might have been lost in this area due to past
actions. However, these harvests are said to have removed “high-risk” stands and
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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In addition, the IPNF forest plan states that in order to maintain viable populations at least
40% of the maximum potential habitat for species will be preserved. However there is no
reference to this in the EISs and no discussion of whether there are estimates of the maximum
potential habitat or potential number of homeranges on the forest.
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replaced them with tress that are “more disease-resistant and more ecologically
compatible with historic vegetation patterns” (West Gold SFEIS, p. III-118). Current
actions all are presented as trending the habitat towards conditions more suitable for
pileated woodpeckers, thus causing no further effects to woodpecker populations.
Present actions combined with the effects of past actions are said to have an overall
positive cumulative effect on the species.
The analysis in this case explains the rationale of affecting additional capable
habitat. It states that cutting in snag habitat will occur in areas with only minimal
mature forest structure and that these areas are expected to suffer from mortality without
treatment and/or will be thinned according to snag retention guidelines for largediameter trees. Regeneration harvests are not predicted to be harmful to potential
suitable habitat because they are meant to encourage longer-lived tree species and the
persistence of large snag habitat in the long-term. Based on assumptions that the USFS
management prescriptions will lead to the desired outcomes and that the habitat
requirements of pileated woodpeckers are sufficiently understood, the analysis makes
the case that management actions should largely benefit pileated woodpeckers and other
old-growth associated species.
In summary, the CEA for pileated woodpeckers utilizes habitat guidelines by
hypothetical home range. Home ranges are delineated and analyzed for each project by
alternative, and conversion of home ranges to an unsuitable condition is disclosed.
Several issues remain unaddressed, however. Because the IPNF has abundant habitat,
according to Samson (2006b), projects can convert some home ranges to unsuitable
conditions. Current home ranges are delineated based on the presence of currently
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suitable nesting habitat. If several projects over time were to eliminate home ranges as
suitable habitat, would this be disclosed in the next EIS for the area? For example,
would a future sale in the Mission Brush area disclose that some home ranges had been
lost due to past projects or would it just paint a picture of current conditions? More
broadly, are EISs clearly depicting what has been lost in an area as opposed to just
telling the reader that forest-wide the thresholds established by Samson (2006b) have not
been crossed? Would this information not be useful, and is it not essential to a CEA?
And, in terms of CEA, the efficacy of this entire approach depends on the validity of
Samson’s work and the proxy-on-proxy method of maintaining species viability. These
issues are related to a number of central questions about the IPNF’s approach to wildlife
CEA and are discussed in more detail in chapter four.

Summary
At this point, the reader should have an overall picture of some of the approaches
the IPNF uses to evaluate effects on wildlife species. Other species vary to some extent
depending on the various management guidelines used for the species but generally are
managed and analyzed in a similar fashion. In general, the IPNF analyzes cumulative
effects ostensibly through an analysis of current conditions. For some species,
thresholds have been established for forest-wide habitat requirements or managementrelated changes to habitat conditions. Over the long-term, the IPNF explains that its
actions will not degrade current conditions and will trend habitat towards more suitable
conditions for wildlife. Limitations to the analysis stem from poorly understood
wildlife-habitat relationships, limited data on habitat characteristics in vegetative stand
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data, lack of data on population abundance or distribution, and weaknesses in the use of
surrogate species to indicate for other species. Furthermore, long term changes or
cumulative impacts to habitat availability or population status are both unclear.
Criticisms of the IPNF’s approach to wildlife CEA are abundant in the public comments
on these EISs. Interviews with environmental advocates as well as USFS personnel
shed light on some of the ways wildlife CEA might be improved, but an in-depth
treatment of these issues is reserved for the next chapter.

3.4 Changes in CEA from 2002-2003 to 2006-2007
As part of this analysis, EISs from 2002-2003 were also reviewed in order to
understand how CEA has changed over time, particularly in response to the Lands
Council v. Powell decision from 2004. Recall that in that case the Ninth Circuit ruled
that the EIS for the Iron Honey project on the IPNF was insufficient in a number of
ways, including the quality of the data underlying the CEA and the depth of the CEA
itself. The court ruled that in the circumstances of that case a catalog or list of all past,
present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions and their effects was required as part
of a CEA. The court deemed this a necessary component of CEA, in part because of the
utility of such a list in informing the alternatives analysis for the Iron Honey project.
One important issue considered in this section is how the CEA in documents
before Iron Honey differ from those completed after that landmark decision.
Additionally, this section looks at how CEA specifically for wildlife changed over the
time between 2002-2003 and 2006-2007. As with the 2006-2007 period, EISs were
analyzed for projects involving timber harvest, which for this time period included
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projects with a listed purpose of fuels treatment, fuels reduction, or timber
sale/management. For the 2002-2003 time period, four projects were identified for
which EISs and records of decision had been issued. A list of these EISs is provided in
Table 3.1 at the beginning of this chapter.

Cataloging of Past Actions and Effects
The Iron Honey EIS from 2002 provides a good starting point for looking at the
treatment of past actions as part of CEA. In the introduction to the chapter on
environmental conditions and consequences, past activities are described generally by
decade. For example, the EIS includes statements such as, “More intensive management
began in the late 1950’s with the use of clearcutting harvests fragmenting the landscape
into smaller patch sizes” (Iron Honey FEIS, p. III-2). The introduction goes on to
discuss total acres of areas harvested commercially, with specifics on the total number of
acres clearcut, salvaged harvested, or thinned. It also explains that some areas may have
been harvested more than once. Maps are included showing the road matrix in the
project area. The forest vegetation section also details total acres cut in the past within
each watershed. However, there is no catalog of all past harvests listed individually in
the document, and there is no specific information about the environmental effects of
individual past projects. The section concludes by explaining that effects of past
activities on individual resources are discussed where appropriate in the CEA for each
resource. However, the primary approach to cumulative effects from past actions is not
to consider the effects of specific projects. As with the EISs from 2006-2007,
cumulative impacts are accounted for by assessing current conditions.
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The Little Blacktail EIS from 2002 takes a similar approach to past actions as the
Iron Honey EIS. In the introduction past activities are listed in general terms. For
example, it says past activities that may be included in a CEA are timber harvest,
planting, firewood gathering, road construction, etc. For foreseeable future actions, the
analysis states that urban and residential land use, activities on private forest land, and
other factors will be considered where relevant to the resources analyzed. A list of past
timber harvests is also included. The way these past actions are dealt with varies by
resource.
After the Iron Honey case was decided, Forest Supervisor Ranotta McNair asked
her staff to supplement several EISs in light of the court’s decision. Both the West Gold
and Hidden Cedar EISs had been appealed and were in litigation when the Supervisor
pulled them for revision. These EISs are part of the 2006-2007 sample in this research
and also were both originally finalized in 2002. These two project EISs therefore
provide an excellent opportunity to look specifically at how the CEA in those documents
was revised. Both of the supplemental EISs explain in detail how the analysis was
supplemented in light of the Iron Honey decision.
The primary change or revision in both documents is the inclusion of the CEA
boilerplate language, which was discussed earlier in this chapter. For the West Gold
EIS, both the 2002 and 2006 documents include lists of past, present, and future
activities, along with lists of past timber harvest and associated details on total acres cut
and the cutting method used. In the 2006 document a map of past timber sales has been
included along with a separate Appendix D on CEA, where the boilerplate CEA
response is located. In that section, the IPNF reiterates that CEQ’s guidance on CEA,
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issued post-Iron Honey, states, “Generally, agencies can conduct an adequate [CEA] by
focusing on the current aggregate effects of past actions without delving into the historic
details of individual past actions” (CEQ, 2005, p. 2). The changes to the Hidden Cedar
EIS are nearly identical. The boilerplate language is included in the body of the EIS at
the beginning of their chapter on environmental effects, along with a comprehensive list
of all past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions.
In the end, there is very little additional information given in the more recent
EISs as to the specific effects of past USFS activities on various resources. The IPNF’s
response to the Iron Honey decision is to include more thorough lists of individual
activities relevant to a CEA. It also includes the standard cumulative effects response,
which explains that it is not required to detail the effects of individual past actions and
that management practices have changed too much over the last decades to meaningfully
compare past actions with the proposed actions. In essence, the IPNF argues, with the
support of CEQ, that the requirements set forth in Lands Council v. Powell (2004) are
unnecessary and are not essential to conducting a CEA.

CEA for Wildlife
The CEA for wildlife species in the 2002 EISs is somewhat less detailed than
that in the 2006-2007 EISs, although the general approach is the same. For example, the
wildlife section in the Iron Honey EIS approaches CEA almost identically to the later
EISs. Past actions are supposed to be reflected in current conditions, (a.k.a. the
environmental baseline), and the specific effects of past actions on populations are only
discussed in very general terms. For instance, the cumulative impacts analysis for fisher
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makes some general statements that fisher populations have declined over time and are
at present at precarious levels, but it does little more than summarize the direct and
indirect effects analysis. Some discussion of the effects of trapping on fisher is provided
in the beginning of the analysis for this species, which states, “Over trapping, habitat
losses from settlement and logging, and the widespread use of poisons as a predator
control agent caused population reductions in many areas” (Iron Honey FEIS, p. III166). However, any more specific analysis of changes over time, or of the specific
effects of past USFS activities, is nowhere to be found. It is difficult from this section to
get a sense of how populations have been affected over time and how past activities
have affected habitat or populations.
A summary of cumulative impacts to wildlife is provided at the end of the
wildlife section. This summary discusses general losses of old-growth and interior
habitat. Some analysis is provided of how several other proposed sales might affect
wildlife, and then a summary of cumulative impacts is provided by alternative. To give
an example, the cumulative impacts on wildlife for alternative eight (the proposed
alternative) are as follows:
This alternative would increase the young age class from 14% to 23%. Age
classes 80 years and older would be reduced by 9%. Large security blocks of
interior habitat would be provided under this alternative over the long term.
This alternative would result in significant short-term impacts to wildlife.
Habitat suitability for wildlife would increase after 50 to 80 years (refer to
discussions on goshawk, marten and pileated woodpecker). Snag standards in
compliance with recommendations in the Upper Columbia River Basin Draft
EIS and companion report by Bull (1997) would be implemented under all
alternatives, ensuring viability of snag dependent species. Road densities are
reduced which will maintain viable populations of furbearers. Watershed
restoration projects that would trend watersheds towards historical conditions
would maintain viability for amphibians over the long term (Iron Honey FEIS,
p. III-191).

This sort of CEA is no different from what is found in the later EISs and is
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unsatisfactory for a number of reasons. The rationale for conclusions simply is not
clear. Most of what we are told are percentage changes in available of habitat by
successional stage. It is unfortunately difficult to know what that means for populations.
There will be significant short-term effects to wildlife, but we are not told if those
“significant” effects will threaten viability or how they might affect populations. It must
be assumed that although these effects will be significant, viability will not be
threatened, because in the effects analysis nowhere does it indicate alternative eight may
threaten viability. The analysis also suffers from a sort of optimism based on assertions
that prescriptions will help species over the long-term (50-80) years. It is unclear how
certain the USFS is that its treatments will lead to the desired conditions or that shortterm significant effects will not seriously affect populations. We are also told that
because road densities will be reduced, furbearer populations will not be threatened; this
implies that road densities are the only significant threat to such populations. All in all,
it is nearly impossible to follow the logic in a paragraph such as this. The conclusions
may be accurate in the end, but the way they are presented and explained leaves the
reader struggling to understand the basis of conclusions and flipping through any
number of sections of the EIS wondering if maybe valuable information might be found
elsewhere.
Although in general the CEA for wildlife suffers from the same problems in both
the older and more recent EISs, some additional information is included in the more
recent analyses. A look again at the Hidden Cedar and West Gold EISs provides the
clearest insight into how wildlife CEA evolved over time. Very little changed in terms
of the CEA for wildlife in the Hidden Cedar EIS. For the species that were analyzed by
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Samson (2006a), information is included on that analysis and its conclusions that
viability of those species is not threatened. However, the West Gold CEA for wildlife
includes more analysis than the documentation from 2002. For instance, when
discussing cumulative impacts of all alternatives on pileated woodpeckers, the 2002 EIS
only discusses the effects of firewood cutting on snag availability. However, the 2006
EIS includes more information on past road construction and timber harvest.
Nonetheless the additional information is quite general. For example, the 2006 EIS
states, “Past timber harvest…likely removed forest structure that may have been
characterized as capable habitat for pileated woodpeckers. Past regeneration harvests
altered about 626 acres of capable pileated woodpecker habitat, converting them into an
earlier stage of forest succession….” (West Gold, SFEIS p. III-119). The analysis
concludes that the resources are recoverable and that any changes are reflected in
existing conditions.
The problem remains in EISs from both time periods that forest-wide analyses of
viability for some species are simply not available. For example, in the response to
comments in the Iron Honey EIS, the USFS explains that the Ninth Circuit has deemed
it acceptable to use habitat monitoring as a proxy for monitoring populations.
Nonetheless, it also concedes, “A forest-wide assessment of populations is outside the
scope of this project” (Iron Honey FEIS, p. A-24). Because wildlife viability is an issue
that must be addressed at a scale larger than the project area, and eventually at the forestwide scale, it is important to ask at what point will a forest-wide assessment of
populations be undertaken. Is that something we look for in 5-year monitoring reports
or in the plan revision? One place we see this issue addressed in later EISs is with

!

")%!

!
Samson’s (2006a, 2006b) work, which states that adequate habitat occurs on the IPNF to
support the viability of the species analyzed therein.
For some species, however, no forest-wide analysis of viability of any kind is
available in either the 2002-2003 or 2006-2007 EISs. Consider the following statements
from the 2002 Hidden Cedar EIS concerning fisher:
Forest carnivore conservation/management requires an ecosystem management
approach at a scale larger than the Hidden Cedar wildlife analysis area or even
the IPNF. There is no existing management strategy. It is therefore difficult to
put the habitat in the St. Maries drainage and Hidden Cedar wildlife analysis
area into a landscape perspective. However, current literature (including
existing draft assessments and strategies) can be used to establish existing
conditions, identify opportunities for management, discuss tentative objectives
for the Hidden Cedar wildlife analysis area, and establish some sideboards for
management objectives (Hidden Cedar FEIS, p. 3-174).

In other words, the current status of fisher populations at a landscape scale is
unknown, and there is no comprehensive management strategy for this sensitive species.
It is therefore nearly impossible to understand project-level impacts in any broader
context or conduct a CEA for populations of this species. What is possible, according to
this passage, is to look at existing conditions, identify opportunities for improving those
conditions for fisher, and limit effects of management prescriptions on the species. This
passage from the Hidden Cedar EIS from 2002 openly acknowledges what is and is not
possible in the analysis for fisher, and in fact, this is really what the IPNF does for most
species, rather than provide an actual landscape-level analysis of cumulative impacts to
species viability.16
Although the information available is not different in the Hidden Cedar EIS from
2007, the open acknowledgement of uncertainty is toned down in the later version of
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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One difference is that for some avian species later EISs rely on Samson’s (2006a) work,
which asserts that viability is not at issue on the IPNF or at the regional scale.
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this EIS. The 2007 EIS explains that the goal of a project-level analysis is to maintain
functional home ranges within the project area. It also states that it remains difficult to
put the habitat in the analysis area into a landscape level perspective and that there
continues to be no large-scale management strategy for the species. The final sentence
is less tentative and states, “[C]urrent literature can be (and was) used to establish
existing conditions, and assess potential effects at the project scale” (Hidden Cedar
SFEIS p. 338). Nonetheless, it remains clear that a forest-wide assessment of the
viability of this species and a broad-scale approach to cumulative impacts for fisher are
still unavailable.
In summary, in terms of wildlife analysis, there is very little difference in how
CEA was done across the two time periods, aside from the inclusion of Samson’s work
and a bit more detail on potential contributing factors to cumulative impacts.17 The lack
of broad-scale assessments of population status and minimal information on wildlifehabitat relationships undermine the quality of the CEA in both time periods. A longterm understanding of cumulative impacts over time also remains elusive.

3.5 Conclusions from the IPNF Case Study
It is remarkable, given how central CEA was to the Iron Honey decision, how
little the IPNF’s treatment of past actions changed in light of that case. The IPNF
justifies this based on the CEQ guidance from 2005 and explains their approach in their
“Cumulative Effects Response,” included in all of the recent EISs. Essentially, the IPNF
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17

One minor detail is that specific viability standards appear to have changed for some species.
For example, in the 2002 Iron Honey EIS, the Region 1 viability standard for goshawks was 1
pair per 10,000 acres. In the later EISs this viability threshold is no longer discussed and
appears to have been replaced by Samson’s regional viability analysis for the species.
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and CEQ disagree with the court that a catalog of past actions and their effects is
important to conducting both a CEA and an informed alternatives analysis. The forest’s
primary response has been to be sure to include a list of all activities relevant for a CEA
and explain why knowing the specific effects of those activities is not critical to a CEA.
Several interviewees from the USFS explained that, in their opinion, in the Iron
Honey decision the court overstepped its authority. They felt that the court was valid in
stating that the CEA was not adequate but went beyond its appropriate role when it
prescribed a specific procedure (the cataloging of past actions and effects) as a remedy
to the CEA problem. The IPNF’s response has been to explain why the court’s approach
is not useful and to continue to assess cumulative impacts based on current or
environmental baseline conditions. The persistent question is whether their approach to
CEA captures important cumulative impacts. The lack of a picture of how past actions
have affected resources limits the ability to understand what cumulative impacts to a
resource have been, either generally or as a result of management actions. While the
court in Lands Council (2004) might have gone too far in telling the agency how to
address past actions in CEA, the problem remains that the way in which the cumulative
impacts of past actions are presented is less than satisfactory. It remains to be seen how
the Ninth Circuit will rule in future cases brought against the USFS in terms of the
adequacy of their CEA. The CEA was particularly relevant in the case of the Iron
Honey project, because much of what was being proposed to restore the area seemed
indistinguishable, to the court and the plaintiffs, from past actions that had degraded
conditions in the project area in the past. The court might deal with the issue again if a
future case brings similar circumstances.
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The IPNF’s wildlife analysis suffers from a number of serious deficiencies,
including the lack of information on population status on a forest-wide scale and limited
information on wildlife-habitat relationships. There is only limited use of thresholds to
provide a sense of whether viable populations likely exist on the IPNF, and there is no
clear information on how population distributions and abundances might have changed
over time. In order to gain more insight on these issues I considered secondary literature
and public comment on these topics, and also interviewed people both inside and outside
of the USFS to get their perspectives. These are incorporated into the analysis that is the
subject of the next chapter, where I consider strengths, weaknesses, and criticisms of the
IPNF’s approach to CEA in general and specifically for wildlife.
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CHAPTER FOUR: EMERGENT THEMES, LESSONS LEARNED, AND
IMPEDIMENTS TO IMPROVING CEA
Cumulative effects analysis (CEA) is a rich and complex topic for study for the
same reason that it has become such an important legal issue in recent years. The
requirement is so broad that it encompasses a number of different aspects and
controversies in forest management. It is, in essence, a window into some of the most
complicated and intractable challenges in both forest planning and in National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) analysis. One cannot talk about CEA without delving
into issues such as how private land actions affect planning on National Forests, the
overwhelming data and knowledge gaps and the associated need for increased, strategic
monitoring on public lands, or how budgets and institutional biases affect wildlife
protection on National Forest lands. When we talk about CEA, we necessarily have to
deal with questions about the scale and timing of landscape level analysis and where such
analyses fit into the NEPA process. And, in considering problems with CEA, we also are
forced to look at the issue of whether the traditional ex ante analysis of projects under
NEPA is sufficient and effective.
This chapter builds upon the case law review and case study from the previous
chapters to consider some of the most important and pressing issues that arise though the
investigation of the challenges with CEA. The analysis herein draws upon the case study,
public comments from the EISs reviewed, and approximately 30 interviews that were
conducted with U.S. Forest Service (USFS) personnel, environmentalists involved in
forest management in the Northern Rockies, and others with expertise on this topic,
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including scientists from academia and other NEPA experts.1 Integrated throughout the
analysis are perspectives from scholarly literature, which is used to nest this discussion
within a broader dialogue regarding NEPA implementation, forest planning, and
biodiversity conservation on public lands.
The chapter begins in section 4.1 with a look at an issue particularly salient to the
Idaho Panhandle National Forest (IPNF), given the Iron Honey case and the emphasis in
that decision on the analysis of past actions and their effects as part of a CEA. The issue
of past actions, or more generally incorporating other actions and their effects into a
CEA, is one of the most controversial aspects of CEA, and it deserves a closer look. Part
and parcel of this discussion are questions of how an analysis of past actions should fit

1

The majority of comments discussed from the EISs come from a number of environmental
groups who are actively involved in monitoring, commenting on, and participating in forest
management on the IPNF. For example, The Lands Council in Spokane, WA comments on the
majority of IPNF timber sales. Their forest watch coordinator writes extensive, substantive
comments on the IPNF’s approach to forest management and analysis of effects on forest
composition, old-growth forests, soils, and wildlife species. The Lands Council often coordinates
its efforts with the Kootenai Environmental Alliance, which also employees a forest watch
coordinator who provides substantive comments on the IPNF’s water quality analyses. Often
comment letters submitted to the IPNF are on behalf of all of these groups and others, including
the WildWest institute in Missoula and the Alliance for the Wild Rockies. Comments from these
groups were found along with every EIS reviewed for this project.
It is important to note that many of the criticisms and concerns discussed in this section
are from this coalition of environmental organizations. Aside from the Idaho Conservation
League, which sometimes takes a distinctive approach, these groups are usually the most vocal in
terms of providing substantive criticisms of the IPNF’s activities and the effects of activities on
natural resources. These groups also have been the primary force behind litigation on the IPNF.
For instance, the Lands Council, Kootenai Environmental Alliance, Idaho Sporting Congress, and
WildWest Institute brought the case challenging the Iron Honey project (Lands Council v.
Powell, 2004). The Lands Council and WildWest brought the case challenging the Mission
Brush project (Lands Council v. McNair, 2007 and ongoing). Numerous other cases discussed
herein, such as Ecology Center v. Austin (2005), Inland Empire Public Lands Council v. USFS
(1995), Idaho Sporting Congress v. Rittenhouse (2002), and the cases brought by Neighbors of
Cuddy Mountain in southern Idaho also involved many of the same environmental groups or
attorneys involved in the more recent cases against the USFS in Region 1. I emphasize this only
to be clear that much of the critique highlighted in this section comes from a cohort of
environmental groups that has been extremely active in challenging USFS practices in this region.
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into the long-term process of forest planning and forest plan revision, how to analyze
effects from private land activities, and how to determine the appropriate scale of CEA,
particularly for wildlife.
Section 4.2 of this chapter focuses on a number of challenges associated with the
science behind wildlife CEA. Questions of the adequacy of a habitat-based approach to
viability analysis and of the credibility of the USFS’ wildlife analyses are explored in
detail. CEA also provides a lens though which we can look at some of the most enduring
and challenging aspects of NEPA implementation. In Section 4.3, I look at some of the
limits of prediction associated with NEPA analysis and the companion issues of how to
improve monitoring, mitigation, and flexibility in the NEPA process. These issues were
some of the primary themes raised in interviews with USFS personnel and environmental
groups alike and are also prominent themes in the scholarly literature. The discussion of
these issues draws upon this literature in order to situate the analysis herein within a
broader policy discussion on NEPA analysis and the challenges of adaptive management
on public lands. The final section of this chapter considers institutional issues that came
to the forefront as part of this research. I look at the interplay of institutions such as
Congress, the USFS, the judiciary, and public interest groups as these intersect and affect
CEA implementation.

4.1 The Challenges of Scope and Scale in CEA
The issue of incorporating past actions is a key part of the current debate as to
whether a CEA can be entirely forward-looking or whether it should paint a picture of
change over time. Associated with this issue is the conundrum of the appropriate scale of
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analysis for a CEA, both temporally and spatially. In terms of wildlife, a critical question
is at what point long-term, cumulative impacts are analyzed. Even if such an analysis is
not required under NEPA for every project, it is something that must occur for both
NEPA and National Forest Management Act (NFMA) compliance at some point in the
forest planning process. The section also looks at the issue of actions on private lands
and how those are brought into CEA on the IPNF. All of these topics get at the challenge
of determining the appropriate scope, scale, and timing of a CEA.

The Environmental Baseline Approach to Past Actions
The issue of how to include an analysis of past actions and their effects was one
of the central aspects of the important Iron Honey decision involving the IPNF (Lands
Council v. Powell, 2004). The case was discussed in detail in chapter two, and in chapter
three I looked at how the IPNF has responded to the court’s holding that the agency must
provide a catalog of past actions and their effects. Rather than do what the court asked
for, the IPNF has emphasized that past effects can be effectively analyzed by considering
the current condition of a resource. According to the IPNF, CEA is supposed to be
forward-looking, meaning that it is meant primarily to inform the decision at hand and to
help to determine whether any legal thresholds (such as species viability or soil quality
standards) will be crossed. Furthermore, the IPNF argues that management practices
have changed so much that it is not useful to an alternatives analysis to compare current
activities to past projects.
Despite the fact that the IPNF’s approach is consistent with CEQ guidance and
that the USFS has issued regulations echoing that guidance, the question of how to
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handle past actions is far from settled. The matter remains controversial, is raised
repeatedly in comment letters from the public, and has been the subject of ongoing
discussions on how to revise or improve NEPA. For example, in 2005 the House
Resources Committee, under the leadership of Chair Richard Pombo of California,
organized a Task Force on Improving the NEPA.2 One of the task force’s
recommendations is that NEPA be amended to establish that the assessment of current
environmental conditions is the appropriate manner in which to analyze the effects of
past actions. The report emphasizes that it does not encourage agencies to ignore the
effects of past actions, but that the requirement set forth in Lands Council v. Powell
(2004) is too cumbersome and not useful. According to the report, “[Our]
recommendation allows agencies to focus on past actions in the proper context of the
proposed action, rather than an exhaustive and improper examination of all past actions”
(p. 13). By contrast, in its comments on the Task Force Report, the Environmental Law
Institute (ELI) argues, “The cumulative impact issue deserves more attention by agencies
and stakeholders that deal with it on a day-to-day- basis before a single approach is
locked in place by statute—particularly because agencies’ current assessment methods
may be the source of difficulty rather than the solution” (ELI, 2006, p. 12).3 ELI explains
that rather than codify the Task Force’s recommended approach to analyzing past actions,
instead, agencies, CEQ, and interested stakeholders should come together to discuss how
best to deal with this complicated issue.

2

The task force report is no longer available on the House Resource Committee website, but it
can be found at:
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/gelpi/research_archive/nepa/NEPATaskForce_FinalRecommend
ations.pdf (last accessed Dec. 28, 2008).
3
ELI’s report can be accessed at: http://www.eli.org/pdf/eli_nepa_comments.pdf (last accessed
April 10, 2009).
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There are several reasons the issue of past actions remains so controversial and
important to a discussion of CEA. While the court’s holding requiring the USFS to list
all past actions and their effects might be unduly cumbersome and might fail to achieve
the goal of providing an integrated look at the synergistic effects of past actions, it is
unclear what methodology would effectively provide that perspective. A number of
USFS personnel argue that in Iron Honey the court identified a problem, the lack of CEA
regarding past actions, but then took the inappropriate step of prescribing the solution.
The question remains, however, as to what other approach might provide the perspective
on past actions that the plaintiffs and the court were looking for in that case and in project
analyses that have been completed since that decision. It is doubtful that the current
emphasis on the environmental baseline actually captures cumulative impacts and
suffices for fulfilling NEPA requirements.
At the root of this question is the problem that no one seems to agree on what
exactly a CEA is supposed to accomplish. During the interviews, one question I asked
interviewees was about the overall intent of CEA: Is it about how management actions
have affected the landscape over time? Or, is it about whether cumulatively effects will
cross a preset threshold? Or, is it both? One USFS staff member stated that s/he and
their staff are constantly debating those questions, but that they try to stick to CEQ’s
guidance that CEA is “forward-looking” and should focus on whether significant
thresholds will be crossed.
The IPNF’s environmental watchdogs disagree with the notion that CEA is solely
about whether thresholds, such as population viability, are being crossed. For example,
in comments on the Mission Brush SFEIS they write, “The discussion about past timber
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sales is too cursory for understanding cumulative effects” and go on to explain that the
analysis does not explain whether past projects had the same goals, whether those
projects accomplished those goals based on monitoring information, or whether past
management actions led to the need for the project at hand. In other words, an
understanding of past actions and their effects would not only help the public understand
what factors led to current conditions, but would also help inform the decision at hand
through consideration of the effectiveness of past actions in terms of their management
goals. This is essentially the same argument the plaintiffs made in the Iron Honey case.
In a recent appeal on the neighboring Kootenai National Forest, the same
appellants write, “There’s no real understanding in the agency as to just how its past
management has resulted in the existing conditions or if, in fact, those were the intended
conditions based upon repeated rounds of heavy-handed management. There is lack of a
comprehensive cumulative effects analysis in the EIS of the past logging and other
management activities in the project area” (Young Dodge Appeal, p. 17).4 With regard to
indicator and sensitive species they write, “The questions a [CEA for species] is supposed
to answer are: How much habitat in the project area and on a forestwide, landscape level
have all projects modified….? And: How do the remaining, depleted habitat conditions
compare to the habitat needs for a well-distributed, viable population of such
species….?” (Young Dodge Appeal, p. 57).
Although the Young Dodge appeal is targeted towards a project not on the IPNF,
the articulation of the CEA problem in that appeal most closely matches what members

4

This appeal by The Lands Council and other environmental groups on the Kootenai National
Forest’s Young Dodge project is on file with the author. Information on appeals and litigation
can also be accessed at: http://www.fs.fed.us/emc/applit/appeal_decisions.htm.
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of environmental groups identified during the interviews as some of their primary
concerns with CEA. In fact, what the environmental groups ask for is central to what a
CEA should provide: a sense of how conditions have changed over time and how current
conditions compare to desired conditions or minimum standards required by law. In
current EISs, not only does there appear to be limited learning from past actions, but
there is no comprehensive account of how past management actions have affected
resources. For instance, at no point in any EIS is there a clear and comprehensive
estimate of how populations or habitat availability for a species has changed over time.
What is available from sections of the EIS on forest vegetation are estimates of historic
patterns of vegetation and an accounting of acres harvested over time, from which one
could piece together an estimate of changes in stand structure. This in turn is only a
rough proxy for habitat, which is itself a rough proxy for population numbers.
In order to make sense of the debate over what should be incorporated into a
CEA, we can begin by taking a closer look at this question of whether the environmental
baseline approach satisfies the intent of NEPA’s CEA requirement. Throughout this
discussion, it is important to keep in mind the purpose of NEPA. Recall that the act has
been characterized as having twin aims: to force consideration of environmental values in
decision-making and to inform and involve the public.5 In order to answer the question
of what CEA should involve, it might be useful to distinguish between information that is
critical to complying with NEPA, versus information we might like to have generally as a
part of forest planning.

5

Numerous NEPA cases discuss these “twin aims”. See, for example, Baltimore Gas & Electric
Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 462 U.S. 87, 97 (1983).
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Despite the convenience of the approach, it is doubtful that a picture of the
existing condition suffices as measure of cumulative impacts of past actions. The
approach is analogous to walking up the scene of a crime and declaring that all of the
factors leading up that crime are represented in the conditions we see before our eyes.
The crime is obviously a result of a variety of actions in the past, all or most of which are
represented in some way in the resulting scene. What we see is a result of that legacy,
and embedded in the current condition of the crime scene somehow are the cumulative
effects of many past events. However, we could not know the causes of the crime based
only on what is before our eyes. It would surely be useful to understand what factors led
up to the event in order to interpret what we see, understand what happened and why, and
possibly figure out how to prevent it from happening again. In terms of understanding
causality, a look at the current conditions can only tell us so much.
Aside from the learning opportunities that might be missed by focusing only on
current conditions, there is also the question of whether CEA is supposed to be entirely
forward-looking or is also supposed to provide a sense of how conditions have changed
over time. This issue gets at the heart of one of the most central aspects of the debate
around CEA. Several USFS personnel that I interviewed emphasized that CEA is only
meant to inform the decision at hand. Therefore, they explained, particularly if a project
is only going to have minimal effects on a species, an understanding of how that species
has been affected over time might be interesting, but is not important for informing the
present decision. Indeed, this argument echoes the most recent guidance from CEQ on
the issue of past actions (CEQ, 2005).
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However, this argument is untenable for two key reasons. For one, NEPA is also
about informing the public about effects, with CEA emphasizing long-term synergistic
effects. Even if a species is not at a viability threshold, NEPA’s disclosure requirements
lend credence to the notion that a CEA, at some level of planning, should include a
picture of significant changes to a resource over time. Secondly, it is nonsensical to
argue that a broad picture of long-term effects, even if the project at hand will have only
minimal effects, is not critical to decision-making. The USFS has a legal obligation to
protect species diversity and therefore must have some kind of long-term, landscape level
analysis of how species have been affected over time and how the effects of a new project
might contribute to cumulative impacts to species. Particularly when no viability
threshold of any kind has been established for a species, there is nothing other than a
picture of long-term effects that might address whether the agency is meeting its
stewardship obligations with regard to biodiversity. Furthermore, diversity and viability
standards under NFMA play a critical companion role to the Endangered Species Act,
because they may serve as a tool for recognizing species declines before species-wide
viability thresholds are crossed. In the U.S. species usually are not listed as threatened or
endangered until well after the crossing of what would be considered a minimum
viability threshold (Crumpacker, 1998). Therefore, an understanding of effects over time
is crucial to getting some sense of effects on species viability.
An exclusive focus on current conditions also runs the risk of feeding into what
has been called the “shifting baseline syndrome” whereby “successive generations of
wildlife managers use as their baseline the conditions they experienced at the start of their
careers, resulting in lower expectations with each new generation” (Tear et al. 2005,
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citing Pauly, 1995). In other words, long-term losses might go unnoticed until a
threshold is crossed. For these reasons, the question is not whether this sense of
cumulative effects over time is critical, but rather, how exactly to get at it, especially for
wildlife species.
Eccleston (2006) lends some useful perspective and guidance on this area in terms
of the broader challenges with CEA and NEPA implementation. He begins with the
premise that many resources have already sustained what might be considered
cumulatively significant impacts and provides the following as an example. Consider a
campground that has existed for many years and has had a significant effect on the
environment. The noise from the campground has displaced several species and water
quality in a nearby stream has been degraded. In other words, cumulative significant
impacts have already occurred. Now the USFS wants to do a project to improve a trail in
the campground, and the incremental effects of this action will be insignificant.
However, there are significant cumulative effects when you combine the effects of the
current project with past effects. In other words, the current project’s effects are not
significant, but the cumulative impacts are. Is the USFS really required to write a fullblown EIS in this case? This question also arises when we consider any project that
contributes to global climate change in any way. A strict reading of the regulations,
according to Eccleston (2006), implies that any project that contributes at all to
significant cumulative impacts requires preparation of an EIS. This reading of the
regulations, however, leads to an absurd and untenable result. Indeed, it is for this reason
that CEQ seems to emphasize that CEA is supposed to focus on the “incremental impact”
of the proposed action (CEQ, 2005).
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To fully capture the intent of NEPA, Eccleston (2006) recommends that the
“Significant Departure Principle” be employed to deal with this paradox to help NEPA
practitioners recognize the situations in which an EIS is required. By this concept, an
impact would be significant, therefore triggering the preparation of an EIS, if it
constituted a significant departure from the environmental baseline or existing condition.
An EIS would not be necessary just because in absolute terms a resource had sustained
significant cumulative impacts, if the proposed action only minimally contributed to that
baseline condition. Eccleston (2006) goes on to explain, however, that if a small or
incremental impact caused a threshold (such as a loss of population viability or violation
of an air quality or some other management standard) to be crossed, this would be
considered a significant effect, triggering the need for an EIS. Furthermore, a significant
departure from a baseline condition might be considered a significant cumulative impact,
even if it does not cross a threshold or if the threshold has already been crossed. What is
crucial to recognize then, is that a cumulative impact might be considered significant if it:
1) crosses a threshold, or 2) constitutes a significant departure from a baseline condition.
A small incremental impact, however, might only be considered significant if it leads to
the crossing of a threshold. However, this does not necessarily mean that the combined
effects of past actions are not already significant. Undoubtedly, this entire approach
raises issues of whether and how to define thresholds or significant effects/departures
compared to the existing condition.
Eccleston (2006) also raises an important criticism of his approach, which is that
many small or incremental impacts to a resource might be approved without preparation
of an EIS, particularly when thresholds are not crossed. This might lead to a
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cumulatively significant impact that is not accounted for anywhere, or not until a clear
threshold is crossed. Consider the following scenario, which is particularly relevant for
wildlife analysis (although it is a gross simplification of what might constitute a useful
management approach for a species). Assume that we originally have 25,000 acres of
habitat for a particular species, and we have determined we only need 5,000 acres to
maintain a viable population in this particular planning area. We therefore establish the
maintenance of 5,000 acres as a minimum threshold for maintaining species viability.
Now say we approve a series of small projects that eliminate habitat, and after 20 years
we have only 6,000 of the original 25,000 acres of habitat is left. This 6,000 acres of
habitat is now our current condition or environmental baseline. Our approach to CEA is
“forward-looking” and focuses on the question of whether we are crossing thresholds. In
our next EIS we plan to eliminate 500 more acres of habitat. Our CEA in this EIS says
the following: “Elimination of 500 more acres of habitat will not be cumulatively
significant because past actions have been incorporated into the environmental baseline.”
Our logic, although it is not entirely clear from this statement, goes like this. The
environmental baseline or current condition, prior to this project, is the presence of 6,000
acres of habitat. We will eliminate 500 more acres of habitat, but we do not consider this
cumulatively significant because the only thing we would consider significant would be
the crossing of the pre-established threshold of 5,000 acres. Therefore, there are no
significant cumulative effects.
There are several important points to consider about this approach. For one,
having some kind of threshold is the only indicator in this scenario of whether significant
cumulative effects have occurred. In other words, the only way we know when we have
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reached a cumulatively significant effect is because the 5,000 acre threshold has been
explicitly established. Without this clearly established threshold, we might never know
or disclose when we have caused cumulatively significant effects.
Secondly, it also would be useful to know what has been lost. The loss of 19,500
acres of habitat is significant, even when it does not cross our 5,000-acre threshold, and
significant cumulative change due to incremental impacts is precisely what the CEA
requirement is about. If we only discuss whether we are reaching some minimum habitat
threshold, the long-term loss of habitat might never be discussed until thresholds are
crossed. Particularly if this habitat loss happened in small, incremental steps and no EIS
was ever deemed necessary, it is unclear at what point the significant loss of all these
acres would be accounted for and analyzed. Additionally, if we are unsure about the
validity of our threshold, how well habitat models represent actual populations, or what a
minimum viable population would be, knowing how much habitat has been lost could be
a particularly useful piece of information. This scenario closely mimics the CEA
approach currently undertaken by the IPNF and other Region 1 forests, and the current
approach could easily lead to the failure to account for long-term cumulative losses to
wildlife populations and habitat.
I would argue that it is the accumulation of small, incremental changes, none of
which alone is significant but which together constitute significant environmental change,
that is precisely the thrust of CEA. Therefore, if such analysis is not undertaken at the
project level, then a big picture analysis must be undertaken at a programmatic level. If
CEA for wildlife is beyond the scope of project level analysis, programmatic analyses of
viability are necessary either at the forest or regional level. Notably, the IPNF is utilizing
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some such programmatic analyses, such as the Lynx Conservation Assessment and
Strategy (LCAS) (Reudiger et al. 2000). Samson’s (2006a) work is not nearly as
comprehensive as the work for that species, but at least provides some sort of landscape
level analysis for project managers to tier to. However, for other species, the USFS
seems to be playing what is sometimes referred to as the “shell-game”, which was
discussed earlier in chapter two (Feller, 1995; Nie, 2006). The idea is that the agency
consistently explains that a sought after analysis can or will be found at some other stage
of planning, but in the end such analysis is not comprehensively undertaken at any point.
Project analyses state the necessary analysis is beyond the scope of the project and needs
to be undertaken at a broader scale. However, a broader scale analysis has yet to be
completed or is not specific enough to inform project-level effects analyses.
The lack of understanding with regard to this issue is a serious challenge
conceptually for conducting CEA, and there is no clear agreement among the courts, the
USFS, and members of the public as to whether CEA is just about crossing thresholds or
is about resource change over time. CEQ has said that CEA is forward-looking, a notion
echoed by many of the USFS staff I interviewed. However, environmental activists in
the region unanimously assert that CEA is precisely about knowing what has been lost,
specifically as a result of management decisions. I argue that the crossing of thresholds
cannot possibly be the sole thrust of CEA and in fact misses the point of CEA, which
should involve disclosure of cumulative changes over time. This is the intent of NEPA
and follows from the clear language of the CEA regulation. As Eccleston (2006) posits,
significant departure from a baseline condition, and not just the crossing of thresholds,
constitutes significant environmental change. NEPA documents are supposed to
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document significant environmental effects, and it is impossible to argue that significant
effects under NEPA only occur when clear and explicit thresholds are crossed. As the
federal agencies well know, NEPA can involve disclosure of significant cumulative
impacts that do not stop a project from going forward and do not violate any statutory
standard or explicit threshold, such as species viability or a forest plan standard.
Furthermore, even if a project will have only minimal impacts on a species, at
some point to meet its legal obligations under NFMA, the USFS, at least under its
planning rules and plans implemented prior to 2005, must have some kind of forest-wide
viability analysis available, and that analysis must provide some kind of useful guidance
and context for project-level analyses. NEPA also requires a disclosure of long-term
significant effects, if not in a project level analysis, then in some kind of programmatic
analysis. Even if a project will not increase risks to a species, some sort of long-term
CEA is necessary to comply with both laws, in part to provide a basis for assertions that
project level activities are inconsequential. At present, CEQ’s interpretation of the
regulation sets the standard for analyzing the effects of past actions and deems it
appropriate to focus on current conditions. While cataloguing the effects of all past
actions is cumbersome (or potentially impossible) and might not be the most effective
way to capture cumulative impacts, a look at current conditions alone also does not
satisfy the CEA requirement.
In terms of wildlife analysis, looking only at current conditions is especially
problematic for several reasons. It is unclear where long-term habitat loss or changes in
population numbers are accounted for. And, for species such as fisher, which was
discussed in chapter three, no programmatic analysis has been completed and no
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thresholds are disclosed in current analyses. Therefore, not only can we not know what
has been lost in terms of habitat, but we have no idea about the status of actual
populations nor any indication when a red flag would be raised in terms of significant
effects to fisher. Other than listing under the Endangered Species Act, it is unclear at
what point the USFS might determine that management actions are significantly affecting
the species. For other species, project-level activities that may cause some harm to
species are supported by regional analyses such as Samson’s (2006a) work, which at the
least provides some landscape level basis for assertions that losses to habitat at the project
level of insignificant. However, such analyses still do not paint a picture of changes to
populations or habitat over time at either a regional or forest-level scale.

Past actions and landscape level analysis
If a picture of current conditions does not paint a clear picture of incremental
losses over time, at what point are long-term and landscape-scale effects discussed? Is
this something we look for in project-level EISs, even if a project’s effects are minimal,
or is a larger scale analysis best handled elsewhere? Among the interviewees, I found no
agreement as to when this analysis is supposed to occur. Several USFS personnel
explained that forest plans were where one should look for an analysis of long-term
changes to resources. However, seeing as the IPNF has not revised their forest plan in
over 20 years, we might want some kind of landscape level picture of CEA to be
available in the meantime. Others suggested that long-term changes to populations or
habitat availability should be addressed at the regional level or in periodic monitoring
reports. Another issue raised was that such analysis would have to occur at the project
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level in the future, if the most recent planning regulations stand, because no EISs would
accompany forest plan revisions.
The challenge of determining the appropriate scale of analysis for wildlife is a
particularly tricky aspect of CEA, especially in project level EISs. Recall that the IPNF
generally states that the project area is the appropriate scale of analysis for wildlife
species because the project area reflects actual geographic boundaries to some extent and
is the size of multiple home ranges for species. However, that does not explain exactly
why it is sufficient as the CEA area, and in fact there are several potential problems with
the approach. For example, impacts from a road or clear cut at a project site might have
effects not only on habitat availability in the project area but on the behavior of species at
a scale larger than the project area. Or, imagine for example a project that would
eliminate significant habitat for a particular species in the project area. And recall that
the 1982 forest planning regulations, which still guide management on the IPNF, require
the USFS to maintain viability and well-distributed habitat over the planning area/unit,
which has generally been understood to be the National Forest. To put that project’s
negative effects into context, a CEA would have to consider the project’s effects as part
of a forest-wide viability assessment. In other words, the analysis would have to ask, can
we afford to lose these home ranges or habitat in the project area? Is sufficient habitat
available elsewhere? Is that habitat well-distributed? Are populations robust enough to
sustain losses in this area?
Members of the environmental groups raise this issue in their comments on the
Mission Brush SFEIS and write:
For the proposal to be consistent with the Forest Plan, enough habitat for viable
populations of old-growth dependent wildlife species is needed over the
landscape.
The cumulative effects of carrying out multiple projects
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simultaneously across the IPNF makes it imperative that population viability be
assessed at least at the forestwide scale. Also, temporal considerations of the
impacts on wildlife population viability from implementing something with such
long duration as a Forest Plan must be considered, but this has never been done
by the IPNF” (Mission Brush, SFEIS, p. F-16).

Another public comment states, “According to FS experts, population viability analysis is
not plausible or logical, from a scientific standpoint, at the project level such as the scale
of a timber sale(s), absent some tiering to a larger-scaled study” (p. F-17 MB SFEIS).
The USFS explains that including a cumulative effects area big enough to truly
insure viable populations would be unreasonable to do in project level analysis. In
response to the aforementioned comments on the Mission Brush SFEIS, the USFS’
states: “It is unreasonable to ‘include a [CEA] area that would include truly viable
populations in project level analyses,’ since for some species this would include a
‘cumulative effects analysis area’ several orders of magnitude larger than the project area
itself…. Analyzing at this scale would effectively dilute the impacts of project-level
activities—defeating the purpose of [CEA]” (Mission Brush SFEIS, p. F-17).
Undoubtedly, it is difficult to identify the appropriate scale for wildlife CEA in
project-level analyses. Given how the IPNF analyzes effects to species, by considering
acres of habitat affected as a percentage of the total amount of suitable habitat available,
or by analyzing effects to home ranges, an analysis at the forest-wide level would make
project impacts seem relatively inconsequential in terms of the percentage of total forestwide available habitat affected. However, the broad assertion that analyzing project
effects at a larger scale would dilute project level impacts is not accurate, and, in fact, a
larger scale analysis is important and necessary. The real problem is that at present there
is no clear way for the IPNF to do a meaningful CEA at a larger scale that also puts
project effects into context. However, at some point National Forests must conduct a
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forest-wide or some kind of broad-scale analysis of species in order to assess population
viability, and ideally such an analysis would provide some kind of useful guidance to
project managers that could be used in a project level EIS. What is important to take
from this discussion is not a message that the IPNF is in someway particularly
complacent or avoidant with regard to this issue. The problem is bigger than that: the
USFS, at least in this region, does not currently have the money, data, or tools to do the
kind of analysis for most species that is necessary in order to meet legal obligations and
to meaningfully understand project level impacts in the context of a broader analysis of
viability.
The question of what would be the appropriate scale of analysis for wildlife is the
subject of a paper from Conservation Biology written by several scientists from the
Rocky Mountain Research Station. The paper deals specifically with the challenges of
population viability analysis and the appropriate scale of analysis in forest management.
The authors write, “The disparity between the scale of a local management action (e.g., a
timber sale) and the scale of the ecological response (e.g., species viability) is a
fundamental problem in assessing population viability” (Ruggiero et al., 1994, p. 366).
They go on to explain: “Disparity between the scale of a proposed management action
and the scale at which the corresponding ecological response is evaluated can result in
viability analyses that are questionable. This mismatch in scale can easily lead to an
erroneous conclusion regarding the impact of management actions if one confuses the
inability to measure an effect with the absence of an effect per se” (Ruggiero et al., 1994,
p. 366). This is exactly the problem encountered on the IPNF in their CEA for wildlife.
The project level analyses often fail to provide a landscape-level context for project-level
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effects and explain that broadening the CEA area, which would be necessary to put
project effects into some context of population viability, effectively dilutes the effects of
a project. It is therefore difficult to detect any significant effects at either the project or
the landscape level.
Ruggiero et al. (1994) suggest that an effects analysis area should be analogous to
the scale at which meaningful effects to the resource occur. In the case of wildlife
species, when possible the analysis area should be roughly equivalent to the boundaries
of a wildlife population. Nonetheless, if the population is so wide-ranging that this would
lead to a gross mismatch between the scale of the management action and the scale of the
analysis, they suggest using a more reasonable scale of analysis, such as a ranger district,
which is still considerably larger than a project analysis area. Furthermore, for CEA,
even at the project level, they suggest that the analysis area be large enough to consider
metapopulations. They write, “[CEA] ought to examine how changes from past, present,
and future management actions may alter metapopulation structure and affect the
persistence of the population under study” (Ruggiero et al., 1994, p. 369). Again, for
wide-ranging species they suggest using some more manageable area, such as a ranger
district, for delineating an analysis area. Finally, they stress that linkages between
patches of suitable habitat must be considered as part of the analysis for wildlife
populations.
As we saw in chapter three, the CEA area for species on the IPNF is almost
always the project area and for most species is not done on a scale analogous to the range
of a population. Project level effects are not put into some broader context of population
viability, as Ruggiero et al. (1994) suggest, except for the species that have benefitted
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from some kind of habitat-based viability analysis. It is important to note though, that
although they are not available for all species, regional strategies (such as the lynx
conservation strategy) and regional assessments of habitat availability by forest (Samson,
2005) do provide at least some broader context for project-level analyses.
Forests such as the IPNF are obviously faced with serious challenges as to how to
effectively understand cumulative impacts to wildlife species, but at least there is some
good news. General improvements of management practices and standards on the IPNF
and the Region and increased use of broad management protocols make it easier for the
IPNF to at least limit effects to wildlife at the project level. By minimizing effects
through project design, the IPNF creates a situation where CEA is less complex,
especially if the analysis focuses on the incremental impact of the project as opposed to
broad-scale cumulative effects. IPNF interviewees emphasized that projects are designed
from the outset to have limited effects on wildlife species and that by the time various
alternatives are developed for in-depth NEPA analysis, those alternatives have already
been prescreened by interdisciplinary (ID) team-members and resource specialists to
avoid unacceptable negative effects to resources. Another team leader stated that s/he
might have a project in mind but would look for a place to implement it ideally where
sensitive species would not be an issue. So many areas of the forest are in need of
restoration, s/he explained, that it was often possible to choose between various possible
project sites and pick an area that would have the least effects on sensitive wildlife
species.6

6

These statements echo an argument that is often made in support of NEPA’s efficacy. Many
contend that one way NEPA works to further protection of the environment is through a law of
anticipated reaction: because project managers know effects will be analyzed and disclosed
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A number of other employees from the IPNF pointed towards several ways in
which negative effects to species are minimized. The majority of IPNF personnel I spoke
with emphasized that the entire direction of forest management in the region has shifted
away from resource extraction and towards restoration, something that they said will be
the primary emphasis of the forthcoming IPNF forest plan revision. They noted that
management practices have changed considerably over time and that currently negative
effects are minimized in numerous ways, echoing the IPNF’s arguments in its standard
“Cumulative Effects Response.” In other words, although a landscape level picture of
species viability and how it has changed over time is not available, the IPNF argues that
the additional effects of new projects will be minimal or inconsequential. Some project
analyses present effects to species as a sort of choice among risks, such as loss of habitat
due to catastrophic wildfire, versus short-term losses due to management actions meant to
reduce the risk of fire. In cases such as this, again, long-term CEA is not available, but
project managers can at least assert that the project is not leading to any increased effects
on species. However, as was discussed in the previous chapter, often these risks are
discussed without any attendant discussion of the scientific support for management
strategies or without discussion of the likelihood of competing risks.
IPNF personnel also pointed towards preventative practices such as the
implementation of INFISH standards, which are meant to buffer and protect riparian

through the NEPA process, many projects with potential negative environmental effects never get
formally proposed at all (Nie, 2006). According to IPNF interviewees, some alternatives or
projects are taken off the table before the formal NEPA alternatives analysis even is begun.
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areas and aquatic resources.7 One interviewee explained that these standards were an
improved management approach compared to the use of baseline thresholds. Rather than
focusing on a threshold of harm that cannot be crossed, s/he explained, something like
INFISH is more prophylactic, emphasizing protection and improvement of the current
condition of the resource. However, an environmental advocate expressed concern over
the reliance on INFISH. S/he agreed it might prevent further harm but questioned
whether the utilization of something like INFISH in current projects does anything to
address past harms and cumulative impacts. Prophylactic standards alone do not help us
deal with cumulative impacts, but only insure that the current situation will not get worse.
The continual improvement of BMPs, the use of strategies such as INFISH or the
LCAS, which are meant to minimize further harm to resources, and the use of other
Regional guidelines, such as the Northern Region’s snag protocol, are at least positive
steps towards limiting further cumulative impacts and are tools for supporting current
CEAs. Frameworks and guidelines such as these not only work to minimize overall
effects but also provide management strategies that guide project implementation, inform
effects analysis, and emphasize habitat protection. Wildlife biologists on the IPNF all
stated that these Regional protocols are helpful in guiding effects analysis and project

7

INFISH standards give increased protection to aquatic resources and riparian ecosystems and
were developed by the USFS to guide management in the Inland Northwest. Guidelines and
performance standards are provided for a variety of management activities including timber
harvest, recreation, watershed restoration, etc. The idea behind INFISH is that in Riparian
Habitat Conservation Areas, riparian-dependent resources are given priority over other activities,
which are still allowed, but cannot degrade conditions. INFISH direction was incorporated into
the IPNF’s forest plan in 1995 as an amendment. The IPNF has on record more detail on
INFISH. See: Inland Native Fish Strategy Environmental Assessment: Decision Notice and
Finding of No Significant Impact. Idaho Panhandle National Forest, Coeur d'Alene, ID. 1995.
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implementation and make project level planning and analysis much clearer in terms of
what needs to be done.
IPNF staff also felt that Samson’s (2006a) work provides a regional analysis that
lends support to conclusions in CEAs for the wildlife species analyzed therein. They
explained that while biologists still do a CEA for the project area, Samson’s (2006a)
work provides at least some degree of the kind of landscape-scale perspective needed to
understand large-scale cumulative impacts. Regarding the necessity of forest-wide
thresholds and larger-scale analyses, several staff pointed out that these were precisely
the goals of Samson’s work. His assessments do set some forest-wide thresholds and do
take a Region-wide look at the viability of some species. However, although some
district biologists and project leaders noted that this regional analysis provided credibility
to their statements in public documentation, a number of staff questioned the validity of
that work. Numerous interviewees felt that it should have been peer-reviewed in some
way or done by someone outside of the management arm of the agency. And,
interviewees both inside and outside of the agency, particularly those with graduate level
academic training in the natural sciences, questioned the validity of Samson’s work. In
summary, the issue appears to be two-fold: Samson’s analysis provides a basis for
statements in EISs and is an internal agency assessment that project leaders and agency
biologists can rely upon when challenged on their conclusions. Thus, it lends them some
credibility with the public and with the courts. However, whether that analysis is actually
credible or scientifically valid is a separate issue and one that is discussed in further detail
in the next section.
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Overall, the Region is slowly moving towards more large-scale assessments and
the establishment of thresholds with studies such as Samson’s (2006a, 2006b). The
Region 1 terrestrial wildlife program is also working towards developing conservation
assessments for some species. Other species benefit from species-specific management
strategies, although the validity of these approaches is the subject of some debate. For
instance, a number of interviewees, some who work with the USFS, indicated that the
current goshawk strategy based on Reynolds et al. (1992) is both inapplicable to this
ecosystem and also is not being implemented as it should be.8 Currently, researchers at
the Rocky Mountain Research Station are engaged in a research program to collect
population distribution data on the IPNF and build wildlife-habitat relationship models
based on large samples of species occurrence and spatial data at multiple scales (Dr. Sam
Cushman, personal communication). These models are hugely promising as a method for
improving CEA for wildlife and are discussed in the final chapter in more detail as a way
in which CEA will improve in the future.
A final but important issue to revisit is the fact that forest-wide analysis for
species are necessary at some point to comply with NEPA but are also relevant for
complying with the National Forest Management Act (NFMA). Environmental groups
raise the issue in their project comments that a National Forest’s obligations to ensure
viability over the course of forest plan implementation require a periodic assessment of
viability at the landscape level. The question is, if such an analysis is required as part of
the agency’s responsibilities under NFMA, where can it be found? If it is not to be found
in project-level NEPA analysis, some sort of separate viability assessment would have to
8

Environmentalists and USFS personnel raised this issue in interviews; it is also alluded to in the
comments accompanying the Mission Brush SFEIS (p. F-18).
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be undertaken—presumably this is the goal of Samson’s (2006a) work, in which the
USFS asserts that viability is not threatened for several sensitive species.
With regard to forest-wide impacts, in the interviews several environmental
activists explained that their whole strategy, which has emphasized the issue of CEA, has
been to prepare for the first round of forest plan revisions. They argue that a revised
forest plan is supposed to consider the cumulative impacts of implementation of the first
forest plan, and therefore must rely upon some kind of long-term assessment of
cumulative impacts from management activities on a resource such as wildlife. After all,
they explain, NFMA suggests that forest plans are to be revised, not replaced, every 1015 years. This, according to environmental advocates, is the whole thrust of NFMA—
write a plan, implement it, learn from it, and revise the plan based on monitoring
information and an understanding of CEA. In other words, they see NFMA as
fundamentally an adaptive approach to management of National Forests. However, there
is by no means agreement on this topic—numerous personnel with the USFS argue that
there is no basis for such an understanding of NFMA and that a revised plan should
represent an entirely new and “forward-looking” vision.
This is a fundamental controversy about NFMA: Is planning supposed to involve
learning from past management actions or is it about considering current conditions,
looking towards desired conditions, and making a plan to get there? Can this latter
process be done effectively without adequate learning, monitoring data, and cumulative
effects analysis based on past actions? These questions are crucial as the USFS embarks
on subsequent rounds of forest planning. Fundamentally, the question mirrors the central
debate about CEA as to whether it is meant to paint a picture of how conditions have
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changed over time or whether it is meant to focus on the incremental impacts of the
decision at hand and whether any effects thresholds might be crossed. The fact is that
failing to paint a picture of how management actions have affected resources, or at least
how resource conditions have changed over time, misses the basic intention of both CEA
under NEPA and forest plan implementation and revision under NFMA. The USFS
simply cannot manage and work towards desired conditions effectively without
understanding the current conditions of resources and how they compare to conditions in
the past, factors that contributed to changes in resource conditions, and the effects of
management actions based on high quality monitoring data. The problem is that
developing this sort of perspective is daunting. In later sections of this and the next
chapter, however, I look at some possible ways forward.

Analysis of non-federal lands
A final issue of interest with regard to past actions that must be addressed in CEA
is how to include past or ongoing actions on private lands in the analysis. In the Northern
Rockies, vast amounts of National Forest land are checkboarded with parcels of private
land, much of which has been aggressively harvested and is slated for development in the
future. Notably, on the IPNF in their CEA, private lands are explicitly considered as part
of the analysis for various environmental resources.
In the case of the wildlife resource, private lands are not analyzed in detail but
generally are assumed not to contribute to habitat for most species. Several interviewees
suggested that this was a strength of the IPNF’s approach to wildlife analysis because it
takes a “worst-case scenario” stance towards private lands. In other words, by assuming
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no habitat is available on private lands the USFS is under a greater obligation to provide
that habitat on lands under its management. However, other interviewees, both from the
IPNF and outside of the agency, questioned whether this approach to CEA for wildlife is
ideal because it likely fails to paint an accurate picture of how activities on private lands
affect wildlife populations. Without a more complete analysis of the synergistic effects
of what is happening on both public and private land, the IPNF cannot accurately capture
effects on wildlife populations. Given that the current approach of the IPNF for most
species is to monitor habitat and ensure that minimum thresholds are not crossed (in the
cases where thresholds have been established), changes in wildlife populations might
well be missed if management on non-USFS lands is contributing to some cumulative
effect. An exclusive focus on the lack of habitat on private lands also may overlook
threats, such as invasive species, for example, from private lands and the possibility that
private lands may serve as population sinks for species.
The challenge of obtaining accurate information about private or other nonfederal lands is possibly even more salient for other resources. Several interviewees,
both with the IPNF and from environmental groups, emphasized this as a serious
challenge to CEA for water quality and hydrology. For those resources, the IPNF cannot
as easily take a worst-case scenario approach to understanding the effects of non-USFS
actions, because those actions may constrain how the USFS designs and implements a
project. Because of Idaho state water quality standards or total maximum daily load
restrictions under the Clean Water Act, activities on private or state lands must be taken
into consideration by the IPNF during project design and implementation. In modeling
how their own projects will affect water quality and whether thresholds will be crossed,

217

information on effects from other lands must be taken into account. Therefore, the USFS
must try to capture an accurate picture of how non-USFS activities will affect water
quality and incorporate these estimates into their models. IPNF personnel and
environmental advocates both emphasized in interviews the importance of doing this and
the challenges inherent in gaining the necessary information in order to do it well.
To date, courts have yet to consistently enforce the aspect of the CEA requirement
that emphasizes consideration of non-federal lands. Law student Laura Hartt, writes, "In
spite of NEPA’s mandate to consider the cumulative effects of both federal and
nonfederal activities, courts tend to excuse private land use from the analyses” (Hartt,
2002, p. 699). This aspect of CEA could prove enormously useful and powerful but has
yet to be enforced and emphasized by the courts and federal agencies. Notably, there are
some exceptions. In chapter two, I discussed two cases, Resources Limited, Inc. v.
Robertson (1993) and NRDC v. USFS (2005), in which the Ninth Circuit required the
agency to consider private land activities. In the latter case, the Tongass National Forest
was required to revise its forest plan and take into account actions on private land. In
another case, which involved a challenge to projects on the IPNF and Colville National
Forests to respond to bark beetle outbreaks, the district court required the agency to
include an analysis of logging projects on adjacent private and state lands.9 In this case,
the proposed logging on those lands was extensive (one project proposed to log nearly 6
bbf) and would affect important habitat for threatened species; the large size and number
of so many non-federal projects may have been what swayed the court in this case (Hartt,
2002). But in numerous other cases, both in the Ninth and other circuits, courts have

9

Kettle Range Conservation Group v. USFS, 148 F. Supp. 2d 1107 (E.D. Wash 2001).
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been more reticent to force analysis of private lands beyond a cursory look by the agency
(Hartt, 2002). Nonetheless, as private land divestment and development becomes more
common, particularly in the West, consideration of the effects of these activities on
public lands will only become more critical.

4.2 Issues with the Science Supporting Wildlife CEA
A major area of controversy over the IPNF’s approach to wildlife CEA revolves
around the scientific methods and analyses used in support of wildlife analysis by the
USFS. For instance, there are serious limitations and controversies associated with the
use of habitat-based analysis to assess species viability on National Forests.
Environmentalists interviewed for this research and members of the outside scientific
community agree that habitat-based analysis alone cannot suffice to meet the USFS’
obligations to protect biodiversity on its lands (Adelman et al., 2001; Cushman &
McKelvey, in press; Mills, 2007; Noon et al. 2003). Another issue that came up
repeatedly in this research was a concern about the lack of validity and reliability of some
of the science that the USFS uses to support their analyses. Scientists and other parties
both inside and outside of the USFS question the quality of some of these scientific
papers or meta-analyses and ask why the USFS does not utilize some form of peer-review
to gain additional perspective and lend credibility to the methods it uses to analyze effects
on wildlife species. Some observers also have concerns regarding the lack of a
conservation biology based approach to land-use planning on National Forests.
Environmental groups and many scientists emphasize the need for forest planning that
involves more consideration of corridors, linkages, and large patches of habitat in order
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to provide for species conservation (Alverson et al. 1994; Crumpacker, 1998; Noss, 2001;
Ruggiero et al., 1994). These issues are discussed in the following section, which
highlights a number of the problems and challenges associated with current approaches.
The next chapter looks more closely at recommendations for improving current practice
and considers some promising methods that will improve how species conservation
planning takes place on public lands.

Habitat as a Proxy for Assessing Population Viability
One of the most contentious aspects of the way the IPNF analyzes effects on
wildlife is the use of habitat as a way to assess species viability as opposed to the use of
some kind of population monitoring data. Although according to the law in the Ninth
Circuit the USFS does not have to monitor actual population trends, there are valid
questions as to whether monitoring habitat alone actually insures the maintenance of
viable populations on National Forests. Recall, that on the IPNF, the general approach to
species protection and effects analysis is to assess changes to suitable habitat, utilize
management protocols that are designed to guide management actions, and maintain the
quality of current available homeranges when possible so as not to cause any further
declines in population numbers. The primary methodologies used are habitat suitability
models and individual home range analyses (see Andelman et al., 2001 and Mills, 2007
for a comprehensive overview of options for assessing population viability). For some
species, management strategies, such as the Lynx Conservation and Assessment Strategy
(LCAS) or guidelines, such as those from Reynolds et al. (1992) for goshawks, are
available. These strategies focus on habitat or homerange analysis as well. For other
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species region-wide assessments of viability have been conducted (Samson, 2006a).
Recall that Samson’s work (2006a) finds that there are no threats to viability to several
avian species based on widespread availability of habitat and the lack of any scientific
information indicating species declines. In 2006, Samson also circulated a document he
prepared assessing minimum habitat requirements for some species by forest, in essence,
establishing a minimum habitat threshold to maintain population viability on individual
forests (Samson, 2006b).
Despite these measures, comments from environmental advocacy groups express
a fundamental frustration with the lack of population monitoring on forests in the region.
In their comments on the Hidden Cedar project, environmental groups complain that
Region-wide the USFS “has not monitored population trends in response to management
activities as required by Forest Plans and NFMA” (Hidden Cedar SFEIS, Appendix E, p.
19). Public comment on the Mission Brush EIS from the same groups also emphasizes
the need for population monitoring data and asserts, “The FS should firmly establish that
the species that exist, or historically are believed to have been present in the analysis
area, are still part of viable populations” (p. F-16). Comments in the Mission Brush EIS
express concern that the IPNF has not determined minimum viable populations for any
MIS species or specified the amount and distribution of habitat needed to maintain viable
populations.10 They therefore question whether the IPNF is actually insuring that viable
populations exist on the Forest.

10

The IPNF’s forest plan sets a viability standard of maintaining greater than 40% of the
maximum potential habitat for species. In no EIS was there an estimate of maximum potential
habitat or a discussion of the 40% standard (USFS, 1987).
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The IPNF’s response to these concerns is that the Forest is not required to directly
monitor populations. For example, in the Myrtle Creek EIS, in response to complaints
that it has no population trend data for flammulated owls, the IPNF responds:
The District has in the past—and will continue to—survey suitable habitat near
activity areas…. However, these surveys merely document presence, rather than
abundance. Attempting to estimate population numbers and trends would be
prohibitively expensive in that in would require intensive surveys over large
areas for a number of years. Instead, the IPNF uses habitat as a proxy for
population data of featured species. The Ninth Circuit Court has held that
quantitative population data is not required by 36 CFR 219.19, and clearly
sanctions the use of habitat analysis for those species for which population data
could not be obtained (p. F-35).

Indeed, as discussed in chapter two, the Ninth Circuit has ruled that the USFS can
use habitat as a proxy for population viability without measuring actual population
numbers, although the USFS’ habitat models and data must be reliable. However, despite
the fact that the IPNF is not out of compliance with the law by not directly monitoring
populations, the question remains as to whether a picture of habitat alone tells us
anything reliable about the actual status of populations on a forest. One might argue that
it is beyond the USFS’s responsibility to do anything more than insure the presence of
adequate habitat. USFS staff often explain that it is the agency’s job to provide the “hotel
space” for populations, but not its responsibility to make sure species are using that
space; tracking populations is left to the states, or to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service in
the case of species listed under the Endangered Species Act. Because of the Ninth
Circuit’s current position on this matter, the USFS, at least in this region, is able to focus
on habitat alone. However, it would be difficult to argue that the presence of suitable
habitat alone says much about the status of populations. As University of Montana
biologist Scott Mills once pointed out in a conversation, there is abundant passenger
pigeon habitat throughout the country, but, of course, not a single bird. Habitat
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measurements alone tell us very little about the viability and presence of populations,
especially for rare and declining species, and serve as a very weak proxy for ensuring that
the USFS is meeting its obligations to protect biodiversity on its lands.
This problem is compounded by questions about the validity and reliability of
USFS conservation assessments or forest plan standards, all of which are used in
conjunction with habitat evaluations for species viability. Take, for example, the
following statements, again from the coalition of several environmental groups’
comments on the Hidden Cedar DEIS:
Since there is no scientific basis for assuming that 10% old growth is enough for
species viability, and since there is no scientific basis to support the IPNF’s use
of its MIS as adequately ‘indicating’ for other species including the Sensitive
wolverine, black-backed woodpecker, fisher, flammulated owl, etc., the proof
would be in the monitoring. And nothing else shows that FS has completed or is
committed to the monitoring that would insure old-growth species’ viability
(Hidden Cedar SFEIS, Appendix E, p. 19).

In addition to relying upon a habitat-based assessment of population status, the
USFS’ current approach also depends on the efficacy of management guidelines used for
individual species or for structural components such as snag habitat, the utility of MISs to
act as surrogates for other species, and standards such as the IPNF forest plan’s 10%
standard for old-growth. If the validity and reliability of these tools, which form the basis
for proxy-on-proxy analysis of wildlife viability, are in question, the entire method of
providing for viable populations rests on a particularly shaky foundation. In light of
these concerns, the environmental groups make the excellent point that some degree of
population monitoring would be a way to insure that habitat modeling is accurate and
reliable.
The fact is that the scientific foundation of the proxy-on-proxy method is
extremely weak. Using vegetative mapping as a proxy for species presence is, as Noon et
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al. (2008) put it, “at least two steps removed from reality” (p. 57). The method of using
habitat as a proxy for populations depends on several key assumptions, including the
following: 1) habitat is a useful indicator of population status, 2) the way that habitat is
designated, for instance based on vegetative community types from TSMRS data, is an
accurate proxy for the habitat requirements of species, and 3) the habitat needs of species
are well known (Cushman and McKelvey, in press; Noon et al., 2008). Unfortunately,
the empirical support in this area is very limited. As Noon et al. (2008) write, “Given the
ubiquity of…these assumptions, it is surprising how few formal tests have been
conducted. Most of the widely used habitat relationship models, for example, are
heuristic rather than quantitative” (p. 57). The models that are in use by land use
planning agencies such as the USFS are rarely grounded in strong empirical data, such as
large samples of species occurrence coupled with environmental data at multiple scales,
which would give an indication of the habitat requirements of species. Because of these
serious gaps in the knowledge about wildlife-habitat relationships, in their discussion of
coarse-filter, habitat-based approaches to species conservation, Noon et al. (2008)
conclude, “[T]he efficacy of these approaches is entirely unknown” (p. 57, emphasis
added).11
To make matters worse, there is also very little empirical support that the use of
indicator species, such as MIS or other surrogates, is effective. The point of using

11

Various scientists distinguish between coarse-filter and fine-filter approaches to species
conservation. For example, as Cushman and McKelvey (in press) define it, coarse filter
approaches are those in which “a few macro-characteristics, such as some broadly defined
ecological community types, …provide sufficient information to infer the dynamics of the species
and processes that act within them.” Some authors consider the monitoring of surrogate species
as a fine-filter approach, and Noon et al. (2008) use that terminology to refer to any approach that
focuses on populations of individual species.
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surrogates is to save time and money—to somehow make the gigantic task of protecting
biodiversity manageable by tracking a few representative species. With regard to the
approach, however, Cushman and McKelvey (in press), both ecologists from the
research arm of the Forest Service, write, “Tests have been few, but when done, the
results are seldom encouraging.” They conclude that, based on the limited research that
has been done to test the approach, the concept of surrogacy is unlikely to hold true in
many cases and the utility of the approach “must be demonstrated rather than assumed”
(Cushman and McKelvey, in press). Noon et al. (2008) posit that some kind of surrogate
or at least focal species approach will be necessary in public lands conservation planning,
simply because the resources are not available to monitor all species directly. However,
because there have been so few studies evaluating the efficacy of this approach, any
management strategy will have to be coupled with a rigorous monitoring program to
evaluate outcomes.
The USFS’ current methodologies for approaching species conservation were
discussed in a 2001 report that was commissioned by the Forest Service to look at how to
improve biodiversity protection and wildlife viability analysis on National Forest lands
(Andelman et al., 2001). In that report, the authors note that habitat suitability modeling
allows for some quantitative assessment of the effects of management alternatives.
However, they also note that because such models are built upon a number of expertopinion based parameters, the role professional judgment and degree of scientific
uncertainty are often disguised by the quantitative and seemingly objective outputs of
models. Furthermore, these models are limited by the lack of detailed information on the
habitat requirements of species, inaccurate maps of the landscape, or limitations in the
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mapping of specific habitat attributes (Andelman et al., 2001). Similar challenges exist
with home-range analysis. The authors explain that one advantage is that home-range
analysis “allows evaluation of management alternatives in terms of expected responses in
population size” (p. 69). However, it is plagued by the same problems as habitat
suitability modeling and fails to capture effects at the landscape and population levels.
In a discussion regarding an early version of the most recent planning rules, which
emphasize increased reliance on coarse-filter strategies for wildlife conservation
planning, Noon et al. (2003) explain that “coarse-filter” approaches, such as maintaining
broad assemblages of vegetative communities, are inadequate for protecting biodiversity.
Such strategies, they write, assume that coarse-filter approaches can protect constituent
species and that more fine-filter species-level assessments are too difficult or costly to do.
They write, “These assumptions are not only counter to current understanding of the role
and dynamics of species in sustaining ecosystem processes, they also negate the nature
and appropriate role for population viability analyses in land-use planning” (Noon et al.,
2003, p. 1218, internal citations omitted). Noon et al. (2003) explain that when planning
efforts for species protection focus on broad assemblages of vegetative communities, as
opposed to a species-specific approach, commission errors are more frequent than
omission errors. In other words, “[C]oarse-filter assessments often overestimate the
presence and, presumably, the viability of species on the planning landscape” (Noon et
al., 2003, p. 1218). They conclude that what is needed for better wildlife conservation
planning on National Forest lands is the use of more fine-filter approaches; the authors
also point out that this is precisely what was recommended by the second Committee of
Scientists, convened in 1997 to provide guidance for rewriting the USFS’ planning
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regulations (see Committee of Scientists, 1999; this history is discussed in more detail in
the following chapter).
Given these questions from the scientific community as to whether habitat alone
can serve as an indicator of populations status, and the fact that this issue has been raised
by environmental groups in litigation and appeals repeatedly, I took up this matter with
numerous interviewees from the USFS to get a sense of how they perceive this issue.
Biologists indicated that internally in the agency there is constant debate over how to
meet the requirement to maintain viability of species. Despite what appears to be the
official policy, at least in this Region, that the USFS is only required to maintain habitat,
one biologist stated that there is ongoing internal disagreement over the question of
whether the agency is supposed to be managing for populations or just habitat. Several
interviewees felt that population monitoring was something to be left to the research
branch of the USFS or to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. For an anadromous fish
species, for example, one interviewee explained that the most the could be expected of
the USFS would be to protect and provide habitat on its lands; the challenge and
responsibility of assessing and ensuring population viability is a bigger responsibility
than the USFS alone can manage. In situations such as this, management guidelines that
have been developed as part of a broader assessment of viability and species are helpful
in guiding actions on USFS lands.
A number of biologists with the IPNF and at the Regional level expressed
concerns over the validity of using habitat alone to estimate species viability.
Interviewees repeatedly noted that what is most needed are clearer wildlife-habitat
relationship models so that at the very least the habitat-based approach is grounded in a
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good understanding of the habitat requirements of various species. Interviewees also
expressed concern as to whether current vegetation models serve as an accurate tool for
assessing habitat availability. When asked about the quality of the TSMRS database, one
biologist stated, “I have less trust in it because it was designed to be a timber stand model
and not a wildlife database…. It can be frustrating to use that exclusively, so now we try
to do more field work—to verify conditions.” Unfortunately, the time and personnel are
not often available to do the necessary field work. S/he went on to say that it would be
highly useful to have a database that was specifically designed to assess habitat
availability—such information would focus on different landscape characteristics
relevant for wildlife species. Some environmentalists I spoke with expressed the same
concern about the habitat modeling tools such as the TSMRS used for wildlife analysis
and considered this a critical institutional limitation of an agency originally designed to
focus on timber management. Despite the fact that the agency’s mandate has broadened
considerably, institutional factors such as the design and availability of databases can
limit their ability to effectively manage for resources such as biodiversity.
As discussed earlier, another primary concern I heard from environmental
advocates was that the USFS simply does not have a clear sense of how past actions have
affected population numbers of habitat availability, except through the coarse lens of
stand composition. Furthermore, they explained that for many species no clear threshold
has been established as to when a serious threat to viability might occur. On the IPNF the
only thresholds available are for changes to individual homeranges, which do not address
overall viability, minimum amounts of habitat necessary for a viable population
according to Samson’s work, the 10% old-growth standard from the IPNF’s forest plan,
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and the 40% standard from the forest plan, which does not seem to be currently guiding
management.
In summary, members of the scientific community have recommended that the
USFS employ more fine-filter assessments to meet its obligations to protect biodiversity
and species viability. The current planning rules, however, eliminate the viability
language and rely largely on a coarse-filter approach to species protection.12 If relied on
exclusively, habitat-based methods for assessing population viability have serious
limitations. Without monitoring population trends for at least some species, such as
indicator, focal, or at-risk species, it is difficult to know, based off of habitat suitability
models, the actual status of populations. Habitat suitability models themselves are
limited by knowledge and data gaps, although the extent of these data gaps and the role
of expert opinion in filling in the details are often disguised by what appears to be a clear
quantitative estimate of habitat availability. In the final chapter of this manuscript, I take
a closer look at what the USFS could and should be doing to effectively plan for
biodiversity conservation.

Validity and credibility of USFS management guidelines
One of the biggest challenges for the USFS is assessing viability at the landscape
or population scale. At present, this has either been handled as part of a large-scale
conservation and management assessments, as was done for lynx, has not been done at
all, in the case of species like fisher and marten, or has been addressed in recent work on
species viability for several avian species (Samson, 2006a). Samson (2006a) found that

12

36 C.F.R. §219 (2008).
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viability is not currently threatened for the species he analyzed. This work provides
something of a safety net for project-level analyses, in which biologists can assert that
there presently are no threats to the viability for several sensitive species. An important
question, however, is whether this work by Samson (2006a) is reliable. Tear et al. (2005)
explain that the data gaps with regard to our understanding of most species are extensive
and that establishing minimum thresholds for viability is hugely difficult. They write that
for the majority of species and ecosystems, there is not enough information available to
determine minimum thresholds. We could assume, based on these statements, that
Samson’s work may be based on a significant amount of scientific uncertainty and expert
judgment in identifying minimum habitat thresholds.
An important issue to consider then is whether work such as Samson (2006a,
2006b), which is being relied upon in part by the IPNF for wildlife CEA, is up to snuff,
as one interviewee put it. Environmental advocates and several USFS personnel I spoke
with argue that there are serious questions about whether Samson’s work is a reliable tool
for addressing viability issues. One of the primary complaints about Samson’s regional
viability assessment is, as an objection letter to the Myrtle Creek project states, “The
Samson [2006a] study is not peer-reviewed to validate its purported claims that species
such as black-backed woodpeckers and northern goshawks remain viable after a century
of major habitat alteration occurring post-European settlement” (Myrtle Creek FEIS,
Appendix A, p. 141). The objectors assert that reliance upon Samson is not utilizing best
available science and would like to see some review of the science therein to assess
whether the approaches used and the conclusions are valid and reliable.
In response to these criticisms, the IPNF points out:
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Samson [2006a] is a broad level analysis designed to aid in placing a species in
context at the larger population level and addressing NFMA requirements, and
was based on numerous peer-reviewed studies. The objectors have cited no
published studies (peer-reviewed or otherwise) that directly or specifically
dispute the findings in Samson [2006a]. As a result, the USFS considers this
paper the “best available science” with regard to Region-and Forest-wide
viability analyses of Northern goshawk, black-backed woodpecker, flammulated
owl and pileated woodpecker (Myrtle Creek FEIS, Appendix A, p. 141).

The USFS may not be incorrect that Samson’s work is the best assessment of
habitat-based viability available. However, the question of whether it deserves the
weight afforded to it in project level analyses is another matter. One interviewee
explained that there is serious internal debate among biologists about the models relied
upon by Samson. Another stated thar Samson’s work at best “is a very blunt tool”, in
part s/he explained because it relies entirely on assessments of habitat availability and
estimates minimum habitat thresholds based on a very generalized dispersal algorithm.
In other words, the environmental groups are not alone in questioning Samson’s work. A
number of biologists I interviewed with both the administrative and research arms of the
agency were skeptical that the work would survive any kind of peer-review from outside
scientists.
The obvious next question then, is whether the agency should seek out some kind
of peer-review on work such as Samson’s that provides a foundation for wildlife
analyses. As one interviewee with the USFS put it, there is no doubt that such work
should be peer-reviewed if it is going to be assigned so much weight in project-level
analyses, but there is nothing in the law that requires such action. In other words, in the
absence of quality scientific information on, say, the status of a species, the agency can
put together some sort of assessment that may have almost no scientific basis or validity,
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call it the best available science, and use that “science” to justify what is essentially highrisk behavior in the face of almost complete scientific uncertainty.
This said, before advocating for peer-review of agency science, it is critical to
step back for a moment to consider the body of academic literature on this topic. The
issue of peer-review in natural resource management is not uncomplicated. A number of
authors have explained that peer-review, as it is used in the scientific community to
review papers for publication, cannot simply be exported to the context of natural
resource or environmental decision-making (Doremus & Tarlock, 2005; Jasanoff, 1990;
Shapiro, 2006). Traditionally, peer-review serves to ensure that submitted scientific
papers are done according to accepted methods within a field of scientific study and to
assess whether the paper will make a valuable contribution to the field. However, peerreview in the natural resource management context can be used as a subtle but effective
political tool. As an example of this, consider recent efforts by the Bush Administration
to institute a peer-review process to evaluate the scientific basis of federal agency
decisions (Michaels, 2006; Shapiro, 2006). The proposed approach would have
controlled the type of scientific information reviewed and the membership of review
panels and was nothing less than a way to capitalize on the pervasive presence of
scientific uncertainty in policy decisions to promote more industry-friendly decisions in
the name of “sound-science” (Shapiro, 2006).
A classic example in the natural resource management context is the National
Research Council (NRC) review of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service’s decision
regarding water levels required to support two endangered fish in the Klamath Basin.
Rather than directly attack the science behind the Service’s controversial decision,
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Secretary of the Interior Gale Norton requested a scientific review by the NRC, which
concluded that there was not indisputable scientific support for the Service’s decision
regarding necessary water levels (Doremus & Tarlock, 2003). However, the NRC did not
conclude that the decision was unreasonable or without any support given the science, but
rather that the decision was precautious and not based on clear, irrefutable science (Ruhl,
2004; Doremus & Tarlock, 2003). The NRC review had the effect, however, of
undermining the Service’s position and credibility with the public, even though the
committee did not conclude that its actions were contrary to law or were unreasonable
given the level of scientific uncertainty involved.
The role of peer-review in natural resource management must be considered
carefully because of the potential for the process to be politicized. Most natural resource
decisions are made in cases where scientific uncertainty is a significant complicating
factor. Inevitably, as a result of the presence of uncertainty, management agencies when
making decisions operate in the spaces in between what are science-based and what are
political and value-based decisions. Wendy Wagner, an authority on the challenges of
decision-making at the science-policy interface, has written that agencies inevitably
zigzag between what are scientific and what are science-policy decisions (Wagner, 2003).
She writes, “Since the zigzag nature of science and science policy makes it easy to blur
the respective roles of science and policy in regulatory decisionmaking, [various]
political checks and balances can be lost or at least impeded by the complex interweaving
of technical and value decisions” (Wagner, 2003, p. 66). As a result of this zigzagging,
important political and value-based decisions may not be made transparently and may not

233

be overseen by the appropriate political institutions, such as the courts or Congress, for
handling such matters.
With these factors in mind, it is worth asking whether some of the management
strategies or scientific assessments that are utilized as part of wildlife viability analyses
for a number of sensitive species throughout Region 1, should have been peer-reviewed,
at the least by someone outside of the management arm of the USFS. Despite the reasons
to be careful about when to use peer-review, it would be useful to subject something like
Samson’s work out for some type of external review. This is precisely the type of
situation where peer-review could be used in a way that is analogous to how it has often
been used in the scientific community—to evaluate the methods utilized in a scientific
paper and to ensure that the methods are consistent with current scientific knowledge and
practice. I would not advocate that peer-review be used as a tool to evaluate natural
resource management decisions in all or even many cases. But a situation such as this,
where peer-review might lend credibility and suggest ways to improve the scientific basis
of analyses used to support wildlife viability analysis, would be an ideal situation for
some kind of outside review. As Doremus and Tarlock (2005) have argued, peer-review
of individual management decisions may not add much value, but review of larger
management programs and the scientific basis of decisions by some sort of committee
can increase transparency and accountability, spur learning and necessary research, and
help to identify areas where data or knowledge gaps could or need to be filled.
Particularly in this case, where analyses are being used as the basis for many decisions,
and where the issue at hand, wildlife protection, is highly controversial, peer-review
would be a useful next step.
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This issue is an important topic of discussion inside and outside of the agency.
One interviewee on the IPNF said that s/he agreed that a regional assessment is needed to
consider something like viability of a wide-ranging species but explained that such an
assessment clearly should have be done by someone outside of the USFS rather than
someone internal. Another agency biologist stated that s/he had been lobbying for peerreview of work like Samson’s by non-federal scientists. S/he explained that some
analyses are worked on or reviewed by a group of authors, but they are often still internal
to the management side of the agency. Outside review, s/he explained, would lend some
credibility to the work. I asked another interviewee at the Regional level, why not send
out work like Samson’s for some kind of peer-review, even from USFS research? Their
response was that such an action is not required by law. While this is true, an agency that
suffers from a lack of public trust and is belabored with appeals and litigation has good
reason to seek ways to lend credibility to their work and build trust with the public.
In comments on a recent project on the Kootenai National Forest, which
neighbors the IPNF, comments from the WildWest cite to an article from a scientist from
the agency’s research arm to emphasize their point that a number of the conservation
strategies and assessments in use by the IPNF would benefit from some kind of
independent review. They write:
The DEIS relies upon unpublished references such as those from Forest Service
biologists Samson and Johnson to claim that it is utilizing effective conservation
strategies that will maintain viable populations of wildlife…. However, none of
those methodologies have been subject to independent scientific peer review….
These sources…are not from the independent research arm of the agency (Juel,
Young Dodge comments p. 21).

They go on to cite comments by USFS research scientist Ruggiero (2007) who
writes, "Independence and objectivity are key ingredients of scientific credibility,
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especially in research organizations that are part of a natural resource management
agency like the Forest Service. Credibility, in turn, is essential to the utility of scientific
information in socio-political processes” (Ruggiero, 2007, p. 1). Ruggiero (2007) goes
on to explain that scientific processes should be kept separate from political process and
policy choices, which are inevitably made in USFS management. He writes, “Science
should not be influenced by managers, and scientists should not establish policy. This
logic keeps scientific research ‘independent’ while ensuring that policy makers are free to
consider factors other than scientific understanding” (Ruggiero, 2007, p. 2).
The management arm of the USFS is directly influenced by political pressure and
makes policy choices every day as it weighs the competing concerns of members of the
public and its obligations to manage the land for multiple uses with a limited budget.
Scientific assessments from the management arm of the agency are viewed with the
suspicion that those assessments might be influenced by political or administrative
factors that have little to do with science. Given the potential conflicts of interest
involved, it would lend a great deal of credibility to USFS scientific assessments and
reports if those reports were peer-reviewed by scientists who do not work with the
management arm of the USFS. It is difficult to fathom how the USFS justifies this lack
of review, given that they are free to use any scientific assessments as soon as they are
available, even while some sort of peer-review is underway. Their failure to do so makes
it appear as if the agency is trying shield itself from criticism and utilize assessments that
are not grounded in good science. Although it is hard to imagine how to justify a lack of
outside review if the agency is committed to resource stewardship, given the political
pressures on the agency it is not at all hard to understand why the USFS fails to seek out
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peer-review of management strategies for wildlife, a highly controversial management
issue, that allow them to continue with business as usual.
The issue of peer-review and reliability also are relevant in terms of the reliability
of BMPs, strategies like INFISH, and management protocols like the Northern Region’s
Snag Protocols. Regional snag retention guidelines are used, for example, in the Mission
Brush EIS as part of the effects analysis for fisher and pileated woodpeckers in order to
guarantee that sufficient snag habitat would remain under certain alternatives (Mission
Brush SFEIS, pp. 2-67 and 2-68). Comments on the West Gold EIS, which also relies in
part of the use of the Northern Region Snag protocol, express concerns that the protocol
“has not been subject to independent scientific peer review and validation from postimplementation monitoring” (p. J-58). The USFS’s response is that the protocol is an
optional strategy in use by the forest. However, the issue remains that without outside
review of some kind or post-implementation monitoring to verify both that the protocol
was implemented and that its assumptions are accurate, it is difficult to know how
reliable strategies such as this are for limiting project effects on species. The fact that the
protocol is an optional strategy may explain why it has not undergone NEPA review as a
formal plan amendment. However, the protocol is used in part to support effects
analyses, and therefore its validity as a habitat-protection strategy is a serious issue. The
uncertainties associated with these management strategies are again a primary reason
why the environmental community argues that project areas be surveyed for species
presence post-implementation in order to assess whether those species are using the area
as predicted.
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One area of the analysis in terms of data quality that seems to have improved in
recent years is the field verification of suitability estimates based on TSMRS data. Recall
from Lands Council (2004) that the court was dissatisfied with TSMRS data because it
was outdated and unable to model or account for particular habitat characteristics, such as
the amount of coarse woody debris.13 Since that decision, wildlife CEAs indicate that
some kind of field verification of suitable habitat is being done.14 However, the issue of
whether habitat suitability estimates based on TSRMS data are accurate has not been put
to rest. A comment in the Mission Brush SFEIS states, “The SDEIS does not indicate the
degree of accuracy of the databases discussed in the SDEIS and relied on for these
analysis” (p. F-23). The commenters cite the IPNF’s monitoring report from 2000, which
discussed the limitations of habitat models based on TSMRS data. That report states,
“The data are, on average, 15 years old,; canopy closure estimates are inaccurate; and
data do not exist for the abundance or distribution of snags or down woody material”
(USDA 2000, p. 39). This information was part of the reason the TSMRS data was
deemed unreliable by the court in Lands Council.
In their response to the comments on the Mission Brush EIS, the IPNF writes that
the TSMRS data is only a starting point for the analysis and that field reviews and aerial
photo interpretation are now used to update and verify the information. The Hidden
Cedar EIS also states that the existing conditions and suitable habitat estimates are field
reviewed in order to ensure their accuracy. Furthermore, explains the EIS, habitat

13

Over the course of several years, prior to the Iron Honey decision, the IPNF invested
approximately $300,000 to update its TSMRS data. Forest silviculturalist Art Zach explained
that the purpose of this investment was to update the database in light of possible changes due to
natural disturbance and also to update information on the presence of old-growth stands.
14
Field-verifications of habitat availability predictions also were done for projects before the Iron
Honey decision.
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suitability analysis and methodologies are based on parameters in the scientific literature,
with adjustments made according to the professional judgment of IPNF biologists to add
accuracy to the analyses. The question remains, however, of how accurate these
estimates are.

The role of conservation biology in forest planning
A final important issue with regard to the approach to wildlife viability analysis
involves what some commentators view as an increased need for a conservation biologybased approach to land use planning. The lack of application of principles from
conservation biology is an important and long-standing criticism of the USFS’ approach
to forest planning. One of the most well-known cases with regard to forest planning,
Sierra Club v. Marita (1995), involved a challenge by plaintiffs that the USFS should
have applied principles of conservation biology in their planning process on the
Chequamegon-Nicolet National Forest in Wisconsin and provides a useful starting point
for understanding this issue.
In the first forest plan for the Chequamegon-Nicolet, in planning for biodiversity
protection the Forest Service chose to classify habitat for patches of land based on timber
inventories. This process, according to the USFS, met the requirements under NFMA for
planning for and protecting biodiversity. The Sierra Club asserted that the fragmented
habitat that would result from the Forest Service's approach would not adequately protect
biodiversity, and that instead, the USFS should have applied principles of conservation
biology, particularly island biogeography, which emphasizes the size of habitat patches
and their interconnectedness. In their book Wild Forests, a group of conservation
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biologists who were involved in the case explain that conservation biology was the better
method for protecting old-growth species, which require large habitat patches and would
be left unprotected by the USFS's planning methodology (Alverson et al., 1994).
Although the court agreed with plaintiffs that the principles of conservation
biology represented sound ecological theory, it found that the USFS is entitled to utilize
its preferred scientific methodologies, unless those methodologies have no scientific
basis. The court argued that it was not their role under NFMA to assess the quality of the
scientific basis of the USFS' decision, except to ensure that it did not violate the arbitrary
and capricious standard under the Administrative Procedures Act of 1946. Despite the
fact that the USFS did not utilize principles of conservation biology in any alternative in
its planning process, and also did not disclose the significant disagreements over the issue
in their EIS, the court ruled in favor of the agency. The case has been cited as an
example of considerable deference to the agency’s choice of scientific methodologies in
light of requirements under both NFMA and NEPA (see Schultz, 2008, for more in-depth
analysis; see also Clarke, 2006; Kleiss, 2002/2003; King, 1995).
There is little in the way of legal requirements that would force the USFS to take
a particular approach to land-use planning. Although forest planning regulations require
the agency to “consider” the best available science and NEPA requires the use of “high
quality” science, the USFS still has the discretion to choose which methodologies to
apply as long as those methodologies have some basis in science.15 Even if another
approach represented the best current scientific thinking, the USFS would not be required
to utilize that science. Despite this, some members of the public and of the scientific
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36 C.F.R. §219.11 (2008); 40 C.F.R. §1500.1 (2008).
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community continue to advocate for more of a conservation biology-based approach to
land use planning. Supporters of this approach argue that edge effects, patch size,
connectivity, and forest fragmentation must be considered on the landscape scale as part
of planning for biodiversity protection.
The primary area in which this concern is raised in comments on the IPNF’s
projects is with regard to old-growth habitat. For example, in comments on the Hidden
Cedar draft EIS, representatives of the environmental groups write that the USFS must
somehow account for the effects of forest fragmentation, road building, and past logging
on old-growth habitat as part of their CEA. They explain, “Cumulative effects on oldgrowth habitat and on old-growth associated species include increased fragmentation,
reduced older forest patch sizes, increased high-contrast edge, reduced availability of
interior habitat, and decreased forested connectivity” (Hidden Cedar SFEIS, Appendix E,
p. 21). In essence, the commenters suggest that a picture of long-term and cumulative
effects to species with regard to several landscape characteristics emphasized by
conservation biologists be addressed as part of the CEA. In response, the IPNF notes that
its analysis of the effects of private land harvest on old-growth does include a discussion
of edge effects. Patch size is also analyzed for some species, such as the pileated
woodpecker, for which patch size of habitat is used as part of the home range analysis. It
also notes that the current project will not increase edge effects or decrease patch sizes in
old-growth habitat.
It is also worth noting that the Hidden Cedar SFEIS analyzes some general habitat
characteristics as part of its wildlife analysis. For example, unlike the other EISs
reviewed, the Hidden Cedar SFEIS includes a section on “Connectivity” in its wildlife
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analysis chapter. That section explains that maintaining connectivity was one factor that
influenced the design of the project. The section notes that proposed actions should not
affect any likely movement corridors for species. Road construction and the location of
harvest units were chosen to minimize effects to saddles, ridges, and riparian areas. The
section does explain, however, as part of its CEA, that “harvest on non-NFS land would
continue to impact the potential for movement in and through the wildlife analysis area.
The magnitude and extent of this impact would vary depending on the harvest method
and prescription” (p. 323). The analysis concludes that the current project and
foreseeable activities on non-USFS lands should not create any additional impediments to
wildlife movement. The IPNF explains, “Given the relatively limited scope of the
proposed actions in the alternatives, design features of all alternatives and the conscious
desire to minimize impacts through alternative design, it is unlikely that any alternative
would have unacceptable, irreversible and irrevocable adverse impacts on connectivity”
(p. 324). Although it is admirable that in this EIS the IPNF is trying to address the issue
of connectivity, the analysis is not particularly useful for understanding actual effects to
species and does little to present a picture of how connectivity has changed over time as a
result of multiple actions or long-term management on both USFS and non-USFS lands.
In this way, this type of analysis is not unlike the IPNF’s general approach for CEA. The
existing condition is used to represent the cumulative effects of past actions.
In their response to comments in the Hidden Cedar SFEIS on the issue of past
harvest-related fragmentation, the IPNF says, “Past logging has been considered and is a
part of the existing condition and its effects are at the very least implied when displaying
the amount of seed/sapling structure and/or the amount of suitable habitat for any given
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species” (Appendix E, p. 29). The CEA for the project focuses almost entirely on the
incremental effect of the planned action, which should have minimal impacts because of
project design. The incremental impact of this project is added to past effects in the sense
that it is the added impact to the existing condition. But without some clear reference
point to compare to, it is difficult to understand how something like connectivity or
fragmentation has changed over time or what this might mean for species viability. In
other words, a long-term picture of change to something like connectivity, particularly on
a landscape level, remains elusive in this type of analysis.
At the least, however, the IPNF can claim that any additional impacts have been
minimized. It is also important to note that in this analysis, the IPNF has gone beyond
obvious legal requirements to try to address a broad characteristic of habitat such as
connectivity. Such a characteristic is no doubt difficult to analyze, given the varied needs
of different species. It also is not difficult to understand why providing a long-term
picture of changes to habitat connectivity would be a challenging task. At the least, the
IPNF is taking a stab at addressing a few large-scale habitat characteristics, despite the
lack of any clear legal obligation to do so.
An interesting question is how conservation biology might play more of a role in
future public land planning efforts. Suggestions that lessons from conservation biology
be applied to forest planning have been heard from the scientific community for many
years. For example, in their article on viability planning on USFS lands, Ruggiero et al.
(1994) offer some general rules of thumb for land-use planning: maintain corridors,
insure that suitable habitat patches are within the dispersal capabilities of target species,
and maintain relatively large patches of habitat, particular for the benefit of interior forest
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species. In a similar vein, Crumpacker (1998) writes, “[C]ompelling scientific evidence
from conservation biology argues that failure to apply some sort of ecosystem
management-type of approach to the remaining natural and seminatural parts of the U.S.
landscape will result in the continued loss of natural biodiversity” (p. 66). He advocates
for the application of conservation biology principles from Noss and Cooperrider (1994),
including the design of “regional reserve networks”, of land-management patterns that
consist of core areas from wildlife, surrounded by buffer zones, and connected by
corridors. Noss (2001) also has argued that a conservation biology approach to land-use
planning will be an important aspect of forest management for protecting biodiversity
especially during a time of rapid climate change.
It is clear that, according to the most widely accepted current scientific thinking,
the use of principles of conservation biology as part of land-use planning is one key part
of an effective strategy for biodiversity protection on public lands (for more on the legal
and policy challenges of doing this, see Keiter, 2001/2002). The most obvious place to
look for the incorporation of some of these principles in forest management would be in
forest or regional plans. An interesting area for future study would be to consider how
principles from conservation biology have been incorporated into more recently revised
forest plans or into large-scale planning efforts by the USFS, including the recently
revised Tongass National Forest plan, the Sierra Nevada Framework, or the Northwest
Forest Plan. Land-management planning on this scale would have to be coupled with
more fine-filter viability analysis but would be an important way at the forest planning
level to address biodiversity protection.
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In terms of CEA, it is still unclear when a forest such as the IPNF provides a
picture of changes over time to factors such as patch size and connectivity. It is not clear
that such an analysis is legally required, but it would provide considerable insight into the
changes to habitat for a number of species. This kind of analysis could be particularly
important for species that require interior, old-growth habitat and that are especially
affected by edge effects (Alverson et al., 1994). Furthermore, current estimates of oldgrowth on the IPNF are given in terms of percentages of old-growth forest-wide, and not
in terms of old-growth forest types or patch sizes. Significant cumulative changes in oldgrowth habitat types for specific species availability may be masked by general estimates
of old-growth habitat availability. A picture of changes to the quality and quantity of
habitat availability could shed some light on possible threats to viability, especially for
species for which population trends are unknown. At present, as with many other aspects
of CEA, the IPNF’s approach appears to be to prevent further degradation to habitat
characteristics. However, the challenges of presenting a picture of how landscapes have
changed over time, in terms of broad-scale habitat connectivity and fragmentation, or
planning with these factors in mind, have yet to be met.

4.3 CEA: A Window into the Challenges of NEPA Implementation
Several of the emergent themes and lessons learned from this research relate to
some broader issues associated with NEPA and synoptic planning in general. The most
prevalent issues are the limitations of predictive analysis and planning and the role of
NEPA as a limited venue for resolving conflict around persistent challenges in forest
management, including many issues already discussed with regard to how CEA is
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practiced. As we have seen, challenges to agency CEAs are a constant critique in current
comment letters, appeals, and litigation directed at the IPNF. One reason for this is that
CEA is a very broad requirement and serves as a sort of umbrella for some of the most
persistent challenges in forest management and environmental analysis. The NEPA
process, and discussions about CEA as a part of that process, serve as the most readily
available venue for raising these issues. This section revisits the general approach of
NEPA and the role of the NEPA process as a venue for conflict resolution in forest
management.
It then turns to a consistent critique of NEPA: the limitations of ex ante analysis
and prediction, especially when they are not accompanied by consistent monitoring,
mitigation, and some form of adaptive management. When asked about the challenges of
implementing the CEA requirement, many interviewees discussed the need for increased
monitoring and learning in order to effectively analyze long-term effects. These
shortcomings in terms of CEA reflect some of the most critical and often-discussed issues
regarding the current state of NEPA implementation. In this way, looking at how these
issues are relevant to CEA provides an opportunity to look at some of the most important
issues germane to a discussion on how to improve NEPA implementation overall.

NEPA as an Imperfect Venue for Conflict Resolution
Through its public involvement mechanisms NEPA provides a venue for conflict
resolution in natural resource management. However, the precise role of public
participation under NEPA and in forest management in general is not entirely clear.
Those familiar with forest policy and history will recall that the NFMA was passed
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largely as a result of two high profile conflicts. The first was the controversial nature of
forest management on the Bitterroot National Forest and the other involved the issue of
clearcutting, which came to a head when a federal appellate court deemed the practice
illegal in a case involving the Monongahela National Forest.16 In both the Monongahela
and the Bitterroot controversies, the public wanted more say in forest management and in
how the agency’s multiple-use mandate was implemented. In a report on the state of
forest management prepared by the University of Montana’s College of Forestry Dean
Arnold Bolle, who was commissioned by Congress to investigate the situation on the
Bitterroot, Bolle concluded that multiple-use as a principle was not a reality on the
Bitterroot and that more opportunities were needed for public participation in National
Forest management (Bolle et al., 1970).
The solution to this problem was NFMA. Although the USFS had been
completing forest planning less formally before the passage of NFMA, the Act made
forest planning a formal and legally-binding activity. However, some argued that a lack
of planning was not the real issue in forest management and that the NFMA planning
process was a solution to a non-existent problem (Behan, 1990). Instead, the persistent
challenge in forest management seemed to have much more to do with lack of clarity
from Congress as to how to prioritize multiple uses on National Forest lands and a lack of
opportunities for the public to have a say in forest management. However, aside from the
inclusion of increased substantive management standards, the NFMA’s main thrust was
to emphasize a synoptic planning process for National Forest lands with a less-than-clear
role for the public in that process.
16

West Virginia Division of Izaak Walton League of America, Inc. v. Butz, 522 F.2d 945 (4th Cir.
1975).
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The NFMA does call for public participation in forest planning, and thus far that
has occurred primarily through NEPA compliance during the forest planning process.17
Unfortunately, NEPA is also an imperfect vehicle for public participation in forest
management. Recall from chapter one that there is no single intent or paradigm that
alone adequately characterizes NEPA. The act is often portrayed as having the twin aims
of 1) leading agencies towards more informed decisions with regard to the environmental
effects of actions, and 2) informing and involving the public in those decisions.18 These
two aims are not necessarily compatible, and, in fact, according to law professor Jonathon
Poisner, give NEPA a sort of split personality (Poisner, 1996). The first goal is primarily
expert-driven, while the second focuses more on the public and its social and value-based
preferences.
Also important to note is the act’s emphasis on expert-driven planning according
to a synoptic planning model, whereby decision-makers identify a goal for an action,
alternative means of reaching the goal, and the effectiveness of each alternative, and then
choose the most ideal course of action. As Poisner (1996) explains, the first step of the
synoptic model, specifying the goal, is problematic with regard to environmental
management under a multiple-use mandate. Goal-setting in such a situation is
necessarily a social process of balancing various competing values, such as the derivation
of utilitarian and economic benefits from natural resources and the protection of
environmental values and amenities. Poisner (1996) argues that goal-setting in a
democratic society should not be controlled by natural resource specialists, who are not
experts in choosing among values or representing the public interest, but by Congress,
17
18

See 16 U.S.C. §1604(d) (2000).
See 42 U.S.C. §4331-4332 (2000).
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which is the appropriate institution for making value-based choices about societal
interests. However, Congress has never done the hard work of explicitly defining goals
for multiple-use lands such as National Forests and has left those decisions to the agency.
One way to handle the tough questions that Congress has left unanswered would
be to provide for an effective means of involving the public in forest management.
However, in the public participation process under NEPA, which has been one of the
primary mechanisms for public involvement in forest management, the agency is only
required to substantively respond to comments that raise specific issues with the content
and quality of the analysis in NEPA documents. Assertions of value-based preferences
are noted but do not require a response or any particular action by the agency. There is
also no methodology used for tabulating or incorporating public preferences into agency
decision-making. The end result is that the public participation aspects of NEPA do not
mesh in an obvious way with the synoptic approach of NEPA or NFMA, although there
is certainly a role for the public in assuring that the agency has considered all of the
relevant information. Still, as Poisner (1996) explains, the result with NEPA is a
“confusing hybrid of pluralism and synopticism” that leaves unaddressed the complicated
tension between expertise, science, and political preference in public land management.
The result of this in forest management is that in many cases participating in scoping and
public comment during the NEPA process sometimes seems like the sole, but imperfect,
venue for addressing major concerns and potentially resolving conflicts and
disagreements.19

19

There is also an appeals process in National Forest management. However, the appeals process
takes place after participation in management decisions through the NEPA process. Additionally,
it is important to recognize that there is nothing that precludes a forest from undertaking an
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As a result of this situation there is a considerable amount of frustration regarding
the role of the public, both from the point of view of the agency and of members of the
public wanting more involvement in the direction of public land management. Members
of the public often write highly technical comments in order to force consideration of
scientific information that supports their interests. USFS personnel I interviewed stated
on the one hand that this is sometimes a beneficial process, bringing to the agency’s
attention important scientific information. Indeed, this can be one of the most ideal and
useful roles the public can play in informing agency analyses. However, another
consequence of this situation is that the agency and members of the public often end up
arguing over science when the real issues are more value-based than technical. As one
interviewee put it, “Everyone can find some science to support their position.”
Another result of the nature of public participation under NEPA is that a broader
range of people are often discouraged from participating in agency decisions because
they do not have the technical expertise to bring a comment that would warrant a
response from the agency (Poisner, 1996). Because NEPA analyses are highly complex
and technical and the role of public preference is unclear, much of the public is left out of
the process, with only a few groups of highly organized participants commenting on most
agency decisions. In turn, the agency is left with a limited sense of how the broader
public actually views their actions and may lend less weight to the comments of groups
who seems to represent only a small subsection of interests. This seems to be the case
regarding some of the environmental watch-dogs on the IPNF, who are sometimes
portrayed by the agency as a small and radical group of highly vocal interests.
innovative approach to including the public in its planning process. However, the primary,
established means for public involvement is generally through the NEPA process.
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Agency personnel interviewed for this research also explained that they often see
the same comments over and over, regarding significant and highly controversial issues,
such as landscape level planning or USFS fire management strategies. Topics such as
these almost always are considered to be beyond the scope of a project level analysis, but
at the same time it is not clear what other venue members of the public have for
addressing such broad-scale concerns about forest management.
To get a sense of some of these larger-scale concerns and how they are relevant
for the IPNF, take, for instance, questions from environmental groups in nearly every
comment letter asking why the IPNF assumes, as it does in its forest plan, that preserving
10% old-growth is sufficient for species protection? The IPNF consistently responds that
addressing this issue is beyond the scope of project level analysis. But it is unclear at
what point a forest would address this question except during the plan revision process,
which on the IPNF has taken now over 20 years. Wildlife advocates for obvious reasons
want to see a more timely evaluation of such as standard and whether it is adequate for
protecting old-growth species. Other concerns such as whether the forest should have a
forest-wide analysis of species viability or a long-term assessment of changes to habitat
over the life of the forest plan, whether there is a need for a conservation biology
approach to landscape planning for wildlife protection, or whether the conservation
strategy for a particular species is adequate are also broad issues related to CEA that are
beyond the scope of project-level analysis. These issues are raised repeatedly in public
comment letters and the agency repeatedly references the reader back to the EIS, which
presumably has already been read and did not address the question in a way that satisfied
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the commenter. The agency also consistently explains that such issues cannot be handled
adequately at the project level.
Several other key issues that are central in debates over the nature of forest
management and planning also are raised in project-level EISs. For instance, one oftenmentioned concern is the lack of a long-term plan for a particular area. In comments on
the Mission Brush SFEIS, for example, environmentalists note that the project is
proposed as a way to begin restoring forest health in the area but ask how much more
logging and prescribed burning will have to occur in the future to meet restoration goals.
Or consider the Myrtle Creek project on the IPNF, which includes prescribed burning,
thinning, and some timber harvest to restore a heavily burned area. One USFS staff
member told me that restoring the area would require multiple projects spread out over
many years to come. The FEIS itself, however, does little to explain what would be
required long-term to restore the area, how that might be funded and implemented, and
whether an alternatives analysis might look different in light of such long-term
considerations. Indeed, most project level analyses include almost no picture of a longerterm plan for restoration of an area, what would be required in the long-run to establish
desired conditions, and whether such a long-term plan is in place.
This question regarding the need for a long-term plan for a particular area has
been raised in other regions and by long-time observers of National Forest management,
such as Ray Vaughan of WildLaw in Alabama, an organization actively involved in
forest management in the southeastern U.S. Vaughan has suggested that forests create
plans by watershed so that project analyses do not stand alone as a snapshot of the
ongoing project of restoring a landscape (Oversight Hearing, 2007). In his written
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testimony to the House Natural Resources Committee in a 2007 oversight hearing
regarding forest management, Vaughan writes, “The Forest Service must stop managing
merely by compartment and individual project. Instead, step back and assess at a
landscape or watershed level what it is that the forests need and what can be done to meet
those needs over a longer timer, at least five years. Fifty years would be better. This is
not planning but how to implement plans with a broad vision instead of a microscope” (p.
89). This kind of approach might make for a very different kind of CEA that could have
the potential to give a clearer sense of the long-term condition and management plan for a
portion of a landscape.
This issue cuts right to the heart of forest planning and how it needs to happen,
and comments on this topic are seen in nearly every project-level EIS on the IPNF.
However, resolution of this important question requires a much more expansive
discussion regarding the nature of forest planning than can possibly be handled by a
resource specialist responding to comments on a project-level EIS. The critical question,
however, is what venue is available, other than NEPA analyses for raising such issues
with the Forest Service? Pushing the agency to deal with this issue by raising it in
project-level comments is one of the only places a member of the public might raise a
critical concern such as this. In other words, the NEPA process becomes one of the only
places where members of the public can address their concerns about broader issues in
public lands management. Aside from NEPA analyses, these issues might only be aired
during the infrequent forest planning process or in a venue such as the oversight hearing
where Vaughan broached the topic.
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As a final example of this issue, consider the ongoing debate over whether the
USFS can restore forests through the use of mechanical treatments as opposed to
allowing natural processes to occur. Environmental groups on the IPNF criticize the
forest for using prescribed burning and thinning as a means to address the effects of fire
suppression and argue that salvage and thinning operations cannot replace natural fire
regimes as a process that affects ecosystem function and structure. They also state that
the IPNF has “no empirical evidence to indicate its ‘treatments’ for ‘forest health’
decrease, rather than increase, the incidence of insects and diseases in the forest” and that
“[the] ‘forest health’ discussion [is] unscientific and biased toward logging as a
‘solution’” (Mission Brush SFEIS, F-11-12).
The cumulative effects, especially of old-growth treatments, are of serious
concern to members of the public concerned with the preservation of old-growth
dependent species. One might recall that this issue was central to the Ecology Center v.
Austin (2005) case, discussed in chapter two, in which plaintiff environmental groups
questioned whether the USFS had any evidence that its old-growth treatment processes
led to desired conditions for wildlife species. The plaintiffs argued that the whole notion
of working towards achieving “historic conditions” was flawed and that process such as
thinning and prescribed burning are “qualitatively different from the ‘natural’ or
‘historic’ processes [they are] intended to mimic” (Ecology Center v. Austin (2005), p.
1063). In that case, which was later overruled, that the court stated the agency ought to
have at least some proof that its treatments benefit species in the way intended.
What is interesting is to consider the broader issues at hand in this case, which
include questions as to how the agency ought to manage post-fire landscapes and how
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and whether it should prevent future fires in areas where fire has been excluded. Also at
issue is the question of how much uncertainty about management practices should be
tolerated by the public or in the courts and whether the agency has adequate monitoring
data (or any useful monitoring data) regarding the efficacy of forest management
practices that have been used for years and continue to be proposed in order to achieve
certain conditions.
A significant result of the fact that there are limited venues available for
addressing such high-level conflicts in forest policy is that members of the public use
NEPA and litigation as tools to challenge agency practices. These, along with the
appeals process, which sits somewhere in-between participation in the NEPA process and
litigation, are the only consistently available venues for the public to raise concerns over
forest management. 20 However, neither the NEPA, as traditionally implemented, nor the
appeals process creates a venue for dialogue about significant, broad-scale forest
management issues. Very little dialogue occurs regarding such issues in the NEPA
process, leaving the agency frustrated at receiving and responding to the same comments
over and over again and with an inability to address these issues at the project level.
Members of the public are also frustrated. Agency responses can seem as if the agency is
simply repeating itself in some sort of tired and automatic fashion rather than
communicating with the public about valid and serious concerns.

20

This is not always the case, however, and much of this dynamic depends on forest leadership.
For example, the IPNF, as discussed more below, is increasingly working to engage
environmental groups in planning efforts (note, for example, efforts on the Myrtle Creek and Blue
Alder HFRA projects). Interviewees for this research also noted collaborative efforts and
increased opportunities for dialogue with the Colville National Forest and the Lolo National
Forest regarding restoration objectives and forest plan design.
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It also can seem as if the agency is playing the aforementioned “shell game”,
promising that certain analyses will occur at some unknown or future level of planning.
Indeed, in some cases, such as that of species viability the “shell game” critique may be
valid—the agency seems to be avoiding the question of a forest-wide viability analysis at
multiple levels of planning. But in the case of questions over processes versus
treatments, or the need for watershed level planning, it would be too simplistic to say the
agency is playing a shell game when they suggest such questions are beyond the scope of
a project level analysis. The truth is, those questions are beyond the scope of project
level analysis, and the agency is not promising to handle those questions at some future
point in time or at some other scale of analysis. The fact is no one seems to know what
venue is available for handling such large-scale questions about forest management,
particularly in a way that involves the interested public.
The resulting situation and frustration on the part of both the public and the
agency is the inevitable result of the fact that NEPA public comment and agency
response is often the primary vehicle for any kind of conflict resolution outside of the
courts. Perhaps the forest planning process might be a more constructive venue, but there
is no reason to expect that forest planning will necessarily occur in a way that is any more
satisfactory for members of the public, especially when some of the most pertinent issues
involve regional or national-level policies. Presumably, the USFS deals with these
questions at the highest levels of management and in a dialogue with other branches of
government, such as Congress. But on an ongoing basis, the opportunities for dialogue
between the public and the agency can be limited.
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An important consequence of this situation is that groups use litigation to stop or
slow projects that they do not like. While agencies often accuse environmental groups of
using litigation to stall projects, the lack of a strategy for incorporating public preferences
into project planning leaves interested members of the public with few other options for
pursuing their preferences in public land management. One environmentalist
characterized the consistent use of litigation to stall projects as a “war of attrition”—
obviously a less-than-ideal way to be involved in public lands management. But while
litigation is certainly used to slow down agency projects, it is also important to note that
environmental plaintiffs meet with considerable success bringing NEPA complaints.
They are more successful at winning NEPA cases than other categories of plaintiffs, and
their success rate in federal courts indicates that “federal agency compliance with NEPA
still requires significant policing” (Austin et al., 2004). In other words, environmental
groups use litigation to stall projects, but they also have valid claims. Their success rate
in court belies the fact that they often play an important role in ensuring agencies are in
compliance with the law.
These issues are relevant to any discussion about CEA, because some of the
concerns as to how the agency does CEA are just the type of issue that cannot be dealt
with at the project level. Critiques as to how the IPNF deals with past actions, whether
past actions and monitoring information adequately inform current actions, or how the
agency analyzes cumulative impacts to species at a forest-wide scale are all the sort of
important question that gets raised in project-level comments by members of the public
and cannot be handled in any satisfactory way be the agency at that scale of planning. It
is for this reason we see so much discussion of CEA in project-level comments, appeals,
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and litigation. CEA is a sort of grab-bag requirement—an opportunity for members of
the public to somehow get at some of their broader-scale concerns over the entire
approach to forest planning. It is likely for this reason too that the courts give such
muddled direction on CEA—because the question of when and where large-scale issues
are handled in the forest planning process, when plans take 20 years to revise and are
outdated by the time they are completed, has not been settled.
Because of the role NEPA plays as a venue for conflict resolution, and the breadth
of the CEA requirement, to some extent CEA serves as a surrogate or proxy for larger
concerns. Members of the public with concerns about the empirical foundations of
wildlife planning or the level of uncertainty in forest service management practices use
CEA as a way to take issue with the potential long-term and large-scale repercussions of
activities. If there are limited opportunities to deal with conflicts over such issues as
roadless area conservation or old-growth protection, then the opportunity to raise
challenges during the NEPA process and through concerns over cumulative effects on
resources might be the most effective tool for addressing what are essentially much
broader concerns over the nature of forest management. This may explain, in part, why
CEA is raised so often in court and in public comments—because it is a requirement that
allows for discussion of some of the most intractable and broad-scale debates in forest
management today.

Monitoring, Mitigation, and Adaptive Management
A slightly different but equally important area of discussion regarding NEPA
implementation revolves around the limits of predictive analysis, particularly in the realm
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of environmental impact analysis. Earlier assessments of NEPA found that the majority
of analyses lacked any quantitative information and that more than 85% of EISs failed at
least one test of prediction; in general, the predictive capacity exhibited in NEPA
analyses was low (Culhane, 1990; Karkkainen, 2002). In terms of environmental
variables, the limits of prediction have been increasingly emphasized in the academic
literature (Sarewitz et al., 2000). One legal observer explains that when NEPA was
passed, ecologists were beginning to move away from an equilibrium view of ecosystems
to more of a non-equilibrium view that emphasizes stochasticity, complexity, and the
limited predictability of ecosystem responses (Thrower, 2006). Thrower (2006)
concludes, because NEPA was not designed with this paradigm of ecological change in
mind, “[T]he future of the EIS as an effective instrument for environmental protection
may depend on its ability to incorporate modern ecological concepts of uncertainty and
change” (p. 883).
Law professor and NEPA expert Bradley Karkkainen (2002) has argued that
NEPA focuses too much on “comprehensiveness and clairvoyance” but provides no
mechanisms to determine whether predictions are accurate or whether mitigation
measures are effective (p. 902). He writes:
An agency that does not monitor the actual environmental consequences of its
activities will have little capacity to develop useful performance benchmarks
against which to measure present and proposed activities—for example, by
comparing actual results against baseline conditions, performance targets
(including those predicted in the EIS), or other projects. Consequently, it will
have an underdeveloped capacity to evaluate and learn from its own experience
and to improve its performance over time (Karkkainen, 2002, p. 931).

At present, agencies fail to assess whether their predictions are accurate and
whether promised mitigation measures actually take place or are effective. Dinah Bear,
who formerly served as general counsel for the CEQ, argues that the current lack of post259

decisional monitoring and mitigation has stripped NEPA of its potential utility (Bear,
2003). She writes that it is this failure to monitor and assess "that has made NEPA
documents the one-shot deals that they usually are, rather than the living libraries that
they could become" (Bear, 2003, p. 945).
The problems with a lack of monitoring are highly relevant to effectively
conducting CEA. Without a systematic approach to monitoring, it is difficult for an
agency to know how resource conditions have changed over time or what the effects of
current and past projects are. This poses a serious impediment to conducting a
comprehensive CEA in terms of understanding past effects and their causes, or the
potential impacts of the proposed project.
In terms of the wildlife resource, Murphy and Noon (1991) explain, that at its
most basic, "Monitoring…is used to test the implicit biological assumptions underlying
our management plans.” Monitoring will be perhaps the most important challenge and
essential component to successfully managing for resources on public lands in the future;
however, it is no easy task. Managers need to know what monitoring information is
useful and how to apply that information in their development of management plans.
Expertise, money, and man-power will be required in order to design systems, collect
information, and interpret data usefully (Corbin, 1999).
Despite its potential utility, monitoring, or the lack thereof, has been a persistent
challenge in natural resource management. It is difficult to maintain the political and
fiscal will to support long-term monitoring efforts, even though such efforts are critical
for understanding both baseline conditions of resources and the effects of management
actions (Doremus, 2008). Monitoring data are collected infrequently, in part, Doremus
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(2008) explains, because, “Monitoring drains scarce agency resources without providing
the political benefits of action. It may even threaten to scuttle delicate political
compromises if it highlights problems with existing management efforts” (Doremus,
2008, p. 429). She goes on to say, “As a result, post-decision monitoring of management
steps is the exception rather than the rule, and opportunities for learning are regularly
squandered” (p. 429). Several examples illustrate her point, the most striking of which is
that is there is no federal agency that uses a systematic approach to monitor whether
predictions in NEPA documents are accurate (Doremus, 2008).
For an agency such as the USFS, where past and present resource extraction
might have detrimental effects on resources such as soil, water, and wildlife, there
probably a disincentive to monitor. More information could be used against the agency
by those who oppose their actions and could reveal that management practices are having
or have had detrimental or unintended effects. The fact is that increased information can
lead to increased regulation of activities that might degrade natural resources. It is
difficult to imagine what incentives the agency does have to monitor, unless those
incentives come from the courts or from Congress. Increased information could limit the
agency’s ability to manage for resource extraction and in general would limit the
agency’s discretion. In order to avoid tying its own hands in any way, an agency like the
USFS, which has a multiple-use mandate, is subject to considerable political pressure,
and has a history of relying upon its own expert judgment, may prefer to avoid intensive
knowledge generation unless it is compelled to do otherwise.
The lack of emphasis on monitoring also may be the result of agencies' desire to
"check-off" the NEPA box, as Bear (2003) puts it. Monitoring and adaptive management
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by agencies would require re-entering the NEPA process and possibly involve amending
EISs and reinvolving the public. Agencies are almost certainly not interested in this
added procedural burden and will be unlikely to undertake such action unless explicitly
compelled to do so. Acknowledging uncertainty only opens up decisions to increased
scrutiny before implementation and when decisions are revisited down the road. If
instead decision-makers can make decisions at the outset and face no requirement to
reassess them, this likely will be their preferred option.
Courts might be one place to look for increased incentives to monitor. For
instance, some observers were delighted by the ruling in Ecology Center v. Austin (2005),
in which the court seemed to require the agency to provide some information in support
of its assertions that old-growth treatments would benefit sensitive species, particularly
given the fact that the agency had had the opportunity to collect such data in the past.
However, that case was overruled, with the court taking a step back towards its traditional
approach to judicial review under the APA. By those standards, the agency is entitled to
use whatever science is available, even if it is not consistent with the most widelyaccepted science or is internally generated, and the agency also is not required to cease
management actions because of a lack of data. In Inland Empire Public Lands Council v.
USFS (1995), for example, the court explained that the agency could proceed with
management actions even in light of considerable uncertainty as to how those actions
might harm a species. CEQ regulations instruct agencies to acknowledge and make
predictions in light of scientific uncertainties, when those uncertainties are central to the
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decision being made, but do not require agencies to actively generate information.21
Under NEPA, agencies are required only to gather and analyze the information available.
In order to discuss monitoring in specific terms that are useful for this research it
is helpful to parse out the different types of monitoring that are relevant in forest
management. A Wilderness Society report that provides an overview of monitoring and
its role in forest restoration explains that there are two primary types of monitoring: 1)
implementation monitoring, which provides an assessment of whether a management
action was carried out as planned, and 2) effectiveness monitoring, which determines
whether management actions are achieving the desired objectives (DeLuca et al, 2008,
citing Block et al., 2001). Both types of monitoring are important to understanding some
of the current impediments to effectively doing CEA on the IPNF.
Environmental groups constantly draw attention to the need for increased
monitoring on the IPNF, both in terms of implementation and effectiveness monitoring.
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, they argue that in order to determine the efficacy of
wildlife management strategies, including the use of MIS, old-growth standards, and snag
protocols, population responses must be monitored. They also regularly request
monitoring information regarding the effectiveness of mitigation measures in terms of
soil quality and also request validation monitoring that soil quality guidelines are being
met. As we saw with Ecology Center (2005), members of the same environmental
groups also would like to see increased effectiveness monitoring in terms of the effects of
old-growth treatments, thinning, and salvage logging operations. They also raise the issue
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40 C.F.R. §1502.22(b) (2004). This section replaced the original requirement at §1502.22(b),
which required a "worst case analysis" in cases of uncertainty. The regulation still requires an
analysis of low-risk but potentially serious harms (see Farber (2003/2004) for more discussion).
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that EISs do not disclose how much snag loss or large-diameter tree removal is expected
due to safety concerns, compliance with Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) regulations, or the use of skid trails and other methods of log removal.
Implementation monitoring of these factors would provide some indication of how
closely projects are implemented as planned.
In terms of understanding cumulative impacts, the lack of monitoring information
is cited as one of the primary impediments to effectively understanding the effects of
multiple management actions on a landscape scale. In their comments on nearly every
EIS analyzed, environmentalists suggest that in order to comply with the court’s decision
in Lands Council v. Powell (2004) the IPNF must disclose not only the details of past
actions, but also the goals and assumptions of past projects, and whether those were met
based on post-project monitoring data.
What is interesting is that, based on the interviews conducted, USFS personnel
and environmental groups see this issue very similarly; in fact, most USFS personnel
interviewed share the same concerns as do environmental advocates. In the interviews
for this project, I asked USFS personnel what factors would help them do a better job at
CEA. Almost every respondent emphasized monitoring as one of the primary areas
necessary for improving analysis of cumulative impacts and indicated that post-project
monitoring would be extremely helpful to understanding the effects of projects. This
would help them do a more complete job with CEA and also would lend some support to
predictions in future analyses.
Some biologists explained that not only is post-project effectiveness monitoring
necessary, but that post-project implementation monitoring is also crucial. Because
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predicted effects to species, for example, depend on a project being implemented as
planned, implementation monitoring would be highly relevant for a biologist in knowing
whether predicted effects will likely occur. Others emphasized the need for broad
inventory monitoring. In other words, in addition to project-related monitoring,
monitoring data is needed on baseline conditions and the status of resources.
Most of the personnel I spoke with at the USFS were as aware of the need for
monitoring as any outside observer. The problem is that the incentives, funding, and staff
are not there to complete it. Over and over again people said “the money just isn’t there”
or “there’s really almost no budget for monitoring”. But the issue appears to be more
complicated. One interviewee explained that strong leadership and a commitment to
monitoring at the district level could improve the current situation despite limited
funding. The problem is also more than a straightforward lack of data. Instead, some of
the lack of monitoring data, according to interviewees with the USFS, is the result of it
being collected in an inconsistent manner or not being coordinated and made available to
USFS staff in a useful way. In this way, the problems with monitoring data appear to be
one of Doremus’ (2008) “leaks along the pipeline.” The problem goes beyond a lack of
data collection and is one of coordination, communication, and refinement of the
information that is available. USFS staff stated that they knew of data that was out there
but just had not been gathered, analyzed, or communicated to others in a useful way.
One staff member said that the district had four years of soil monitoring data but no one
to consolidate or interpret it. Others pointed to the fact that forest monitoring occurs
every year, but as of the summer of 2007, monitoring reports for the previous three years
had not been released for the IPNF.
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A sort of companion issue to implementation monitoring is the issue of whether
mitigation measures are implemented as planned. NEPA regulations require an agency to
discuss in an EIS possible mitigation measures that may be undertaken but do not require
that such mitigation measures actually be implemented (Karkkainen, 2002). Some have
suggested that NEPA would be strengthened if mitigation measures analyzed as part of
an EIS were not optional. For instance, one of the recommendations that arose out of the
findings of the 2005 House Natural Resource Committee’s Task Force on NEPA was that
CEQ issue regulations make proposed mitigation measures binding on agencies.22
One IPNF interviewee stated that mitigation measures, monitoring, and activities
such as road decommissioning are often promised in EISs but are contingent upon
securing future funding. When such activities are part of the analysis in an EIS but in
fact are never implemented, the predictions and portrayals of future conditions in EISs
are inaccurate. That interviewee explained that an unfortunate consequence of this is the
loss of trust with the public. Some public comment letters ask that the IPNF be more
transparent about the uncertain nature of some of these yet-to-be funded activities. They
also request that the IPNF provide an indication as to the priority for implementation of
such measures if and when the funding becomes available and additionally want to see
some evaluation of how often similar measures promised in the past actually were
implemented. Furthermore, just as members of environmental groups express concerns
about how safety measures might change implementation as it was designed and
presented in an EIS, USFS personnel also suggested that such on-site changes to
22

The task force report is no longer available on the House Resource Committee website, but it
can be found at:
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/gelpi/research_archive/nepa/NEPATaskForce_FinalRecommend
ations.pdf (last accessed Dec. 28, 2008).
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implementation could significantly affect project implementation compared to project
design. Post-project implementation monitoring would be a useful way to have some
sense of whether a project went off as planned and whether measures that required future
funding ever actually were implemented.
On the IPNF approaches to monitoring are evolving. Annual forest plan
monitoring does occur, and monitoring reports are typically issued annually. In fact, a
recent USDA report indicated that the IPNF had one of the best-funded monitoring
programs of any forest nationwide (Holthausen et al., 2005). One interviewee also
explained that while forest plan monitoring is ongoing, the forest is trying to determine
how to do more useful and targeted post-project monitoring. There does not appear to be
any increased budget for monitoring, so the trick will be to find a way to monitor
meaningful indicators by coordinating and using resources more effectively.
An innovative monitoring approach will be used in the Healthy Forests
Restoration Act Myrtle Creek project, reviewed as part of this research, which includes a
two-tiered approach to implementation that will depend in part on the results of thirdparty monitoring after the first stage of the project is complete. For instance, the Idaho
Conservation League will work with the USFS in that area to determine effects to water
quality. Third-party monitoring has the potential to increase the overall monitoring
capacity on USFS lands. Some interviewees on the IPNF suggested that ideally there
would be a regional approach to monitoring that would be supplemented by monitoring
by forests, at the district level, and would include some third-party monitoring, both to
increase capacity and to develop trust with members of the public. As one
environmentalist pointed out, however, third parties will have to be funded, well-trained,
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and well-informed in order to do monitoring well. One of the trickiest issues with
monitoring is knowing what parameters to monitor and how to evaluate and analyze
results in a meaningful way. Designing effective monitoring strategies with enough
statistical power to detect effects and with enough consistency so that data can be
aggregated will take thoughtful design and require expert input.
DeLuca et al. (2008) make a number of suggestions as to how more broad-scale
monitoring could be tackled that would combine site-specific and larger scale data
collection efforts. However, they offer several cautions. For one, they note that
historically monitoring has been used to find fault with management actions, creating a
disincentive to monitor. Future efforts will need to build in some kind of incentive,
perhaps through performance-review, in order to support increased monitoring. They
also point to the mandated monitoring that has occurred under the Stewardship
Contracting Pilot Program projects in the Northern Rockies. Stewardship contracts are
an approach to forest management whereby contractors take profitable timber off of a site
in exchange for service and restoration work on the site. Under the pilot program,
Congress required and appropriated funding for monitoring. DeLuca et al. (2008) note,
however, that for a majority of stewardship contracts they reviewed no monitoring
reports were on file. For those projects where monitoring did occur the information was
not gathered in a strategic or consistent manner, although a side benefit was the
involvement of a diverse set of stakeholders in evaluating forestry projects.
Unfortunately, rather than improve on this pilot effort at monitoring, Congress later
dropped the requirements for project-level monitoring and instead emphasized
programmatic monitoring. Programmatic monitoring is already undertaken by National
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Forests, and as we have seen suffers from limited funding and emphasis and needs to be
coupled with increased project-level monitoring.
It is useful to step back and consider what sort of monitoring approach would be
useful and feasible for the USFS, especially given that monitoring, at least under NEPA,
is not mandated and that there does not appear to be any significant increase in the budget
or staff available for monitoring. Holthausen et al. (2005) note that the current planning
regulations for the USFS include increased flexibility in designing monitoring programs
for wildlife species. An ideal monitoring approach for species, they write, would include
targeted monitoring of the status and response to management actions of species of
interest, cause-and-effect monitoring of the effects of management actions, and context
monitoring, or broad-scale monitoring of various ecosystem variables (some of these
suggestions are discussed in more detail in the final chapter of this manuscript). In order
to undertake an effective approach to monitoring, Holthausen et al. (2005) make several
key recommendations: 1) regions should take a larger role in coordinating monitoring
efforts; 2) new funding needs to be made available and dedicated to multi-forest efforts;
and 3) increased collaboration between the administrative and research arms of the
USFS, and between multiple agencies will be necessary. For useful monitoring to take
place, a coordinated initiative overseen by a higher level of management, such as the
Regional offices, will be necessary. This should allow for an intensive and statistically
valid sampling approach that looks at data at multiple scales.
Both Region 1 and the USFS as a whole are moving towards increasing
monitoring in general. The Washington D.C. office has directed the Regional offices to
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develop region-wide monitoring protocols.23 Region 1 is in the process of designing
these protocols and in fact, is going beyond the Washington office’s guidance by
attempting to monitor for the effects of climate change.24 A specialist at the Regional
office indicated that the region has eight forest plans under revision and that the
monitoring approaches are different in nearly every single one. The Regional office is
working with forests, however, to coordinate monitoring strategies, something that will
be needed for the sake of generating sufficiently useful data that can be analyzed and
shared across the region. Regional biologists are also working with the research arm of
the USFS to develop a more targeted and prioritized approach to monitoring the status of
terrestrial wildlife species (for some discussion of this see Holthausen et al., 2005).
Other interviewees at the Regional office indicated that the terrestrial wildlife program is
working with individual forests, the states, and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to
coordinate on species monitoring.
Beyond the specific needs for monitoring in forest management, there is a general
need under NEPA for increased incentives and strategies for monitoring, evaluating the
effectiveness of mitigation measures and management actions, and learning from
previous activities. One aforementioned strategy would be to make monitoring and
mitigation commitments in EISs binding. Karkkainen (2004) has made a number of
suggestions, one of which is “simply that we require follow-up monitoring to verify the
accuracy of any predictions we can identify at the pre-project analytical stage as resting
on uncertain foundations” (p. 350). This would lead to better baseline knowledge, better
23

See http://www.fs.fed.us/emc/met/index.shtml for more information of this monitoring and
evaluation framework.
24
Staff at the Region 1 office are willing to make working copies of this document available, but
as of February, 2009 there was not yet a public website where the document could be found.
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mitigation measures, and more accountability for actual, as opposed to predicted,
environmental performance. Some kind of mandated follow-up monitoring sounds like a
good idea, but figuring out how to implement the concept will be a challenge. Funding
and staff are limited, and follow-up monitoring on every project and every uncertain
prediction is unrealistic.
Monitoring also is a central component to adaptive management, which is often
put forth as a potential solution to the limitations of predictive analysis (see for example,
Karkkainen, 2003; Langston, 2000; Lee, 2003, Sarewitz et al. 2000; Stankey et al. 2003;
Stewart et al. 2004).25 In terms of improving wildlife analyses and CEA for various
species, increased monitoring and adaptive management could be the keys to better
stewardship. Wildlife biologists Murphy and Noon (1991) emphasize the strategy as an
essential response to uncertainty, particularly in forest and wildlife management. They
write, "Adaptive management can provide a reliable assessment of management
programs, provide new ecological information in the process of assessment, and, if
warranted, use the new information to modify existing plans." In this way, an adaptive
management approach could be key to addressing the challenges of understanding
cumulative impacts on wildlife species in terms of both learning from past actions and
cautiously planning new actions.

25

The following is provided by Karkkainen (2003) as a working definition of the concept:
"[A]daptive management proceeds directly to advance competing hypotheses in an area of
scientific uncertainty, and then devises replicable policy experiments to test these various
hypotheses, treating pre-experiment conditions as the control” (p. 951). However, others define
adaptive management more loosely. For example, Bormann et al. (2007) define it as “a
systematic and iterative approach for improving resource management by emphasizing learning
from management outcomes” (p. 187). The latter definition emphasizes a structured approach but
not necessarily an experimental one.
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In terms of the broader issues of NEPA implementation, Karkkainen (2003, 2004)
has consistently advocated for incorporating some kind of adaptive management
approach into the NEPA process. However, some scientists have argued that adaptive
management may be incompatible with NEPA because NEPA requires decisions be made
before any action takes place, whereas, in an adaptive management approach, many
decisions are made after some experimentation (Prato, 2005). Others have argued that
NEPA and adaptive management are essentially two very different paradigmatic
responses to decision-making and uncertainty (Karkkainen, 2003). The former takes into
account the available information and then makes a decision about the best course of
action. Adaptive management, in contrast to making a "best guess" in a one-time
evaluation, relies on an iterative and long-term decision-making framework that is guided
by the level of uncertainty involved (Karkkainen, 2003). Therefore, NEPA, at least as it
is usually applied, may not be very compatible with a more adaptive approach. Dinah
Bear argues that there is room for creativity within NEPA and emphatically explains that
it does not preclude the use of adaptive management (Bear, 2003). In fact, she says, CEQ
encourages an adaptive management approach, but, "NEPA implementation for land
management practices will not change until both the executive and legislative branches of
government not only endorse the value of post-decisional NEPA but fund its
implementation as well."
Over the last decade, CEQ has increasingly emphasized adaptive management. In
a 1997 report on the first 25 years of NEPA implementation, CEQ find that many study
participants advocate for more monitoring, both to evaluate prediction and to determine
the effectiveness of mitigation measures, and for the evaluation and adaptation of projects
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(CEQ, 1997b). They emphasize the need to shift towards a new paradigm of
environmental management that includes more monitoring and adaptation and write,
“[A]n adaptive environmental management approach may be the best means of attaining
both NEPA’s goals and an agency’s mission” (CEQ, 1997b, p. 33).
Despite the optimism about adaptive management as a potential way to improve
NEPA analysis and natural resource management, there are several critical concerns
associated with the coupling of NEPA and adaptive management. In a second CEQ Task
Force report from 2003 on “Modernizing NEPA Implementation”, which deals with
adaptive management in more detail, the Task Force highlights some of the major
challenges associated with the approach (CEQ, 2003). For one, they note that adaptive
management could be used as a smokescreen for increasing agency flexibility in light of
uncertainty. Agencies could approve activities that may cause harm with they promise
that activities will be adapted in light of new information. But without binding
commitments to generate that information and adapt activities accordingly, the approach
could just be a way to evade responsibility in light of uncertainty (see Doremus, 2001;
Karkkainen, 2004).
The Task Force also raises the crucial issue that for adaptive management to
work, funding would have to be available to support monitoring and for any additional
decisions that would have to be made in light of new information. Questions regarding
the timing of judicial review and the triggering of NEPA requirements are also key. If
adaptive management were undertaken as a way to improve decision-making, how would
NEPA documents be written to include an adaptive management plan, when would
supplemental EISs be required, and at what stages in the process would there be
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opportunities for public oversight and judicial review? In order to deal with these
complicated questions, the Task Force recommends that a pilot study be funded to look at
specifically how adaptive management can work in the NEPA context and how CEQ
could write regulations to support that process (CEQ, 2003).
Adaptive management has been tried by the USFS in some areas. Elsewhere, I
have written in more detail about the success of adaptive management efforts to date
under the USFS’ Northwest Forest Plan (Schultz, 2008). While adaptive management
has occurred to some extent in areas known as adaptive management areas or AMAs, it
has not taken place to the extent that was envisioned (Gray, 2000; Noon & Blakesley,
2006; Stankey et al., 2003). In some areas, managers are experimenting with different
disturbance regimes, and in a few cases replication and controls have been included
(Gray, 2000; Stankey et al. 2003). For example, in the North Coast Range AMA,
"[S]everal replicated, stand-level research studies are in place across the region to
examine alternative riparian management approaches" (Gray, 2000) However, in other
areas it appears that adaptive management has become a "buzzword" for an unstructured
trial-and-error learning (Stankey et al., 2003).
Studies of impediments to effectively implementing adaptive management on the
AMAs found that a lack of training, leadership, and funding have precluded the effective
implementation of adaptive management to date (Stankey et al., 2003; Gray, 2000).
There are also a number of institutional and legal disincentives for adaptive management.
It does not seem that at present there are many professional incentives for USFS
personnel to pursue monitoring or adaptive management. Stankey et al. (2003) conclude
that for adaptive management to succeed, something of a sea-change will be necessary
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within the USFS, including leadership, training, and organizational change to support
experimentation, learning, and risk-taking. However, in their assessment of adaptive
management under the Northwest Forest Plan to date, Borrman et al. (2007) have a
slightly more optimistic view. They write that the first cycle of adaptive management has
yielded useful information and that learning to effectively implement an adaptive
management approach will itself be a learning process.
These issues were some of the most prominently discussed topics in the
interviews conducted for this research. Monitoring and adaptive management are
relevant to a discussion about CEA because so much of the ability to determine the
effects of past actions and how to limit potentially detrimental cumulative impacts from
present and future actions depends on monitoring data that incorporates the effects of and
learns from past actions. Almost all USFS interviewees emphasized the need for more
monitoring information to learn from actions and to improve their capacity to
understanding cumulative impacts. Environmental advocates echoed this need for
monitoring information but also emphasized the need for more of an adaptive
management approach to understand the most effective ways to plan for resource
conservation on landscape scales.
This discussion reflects some of the primary challenges not only with CEA but
with NEPA implementation overall. Increasing the monitoring capacity and activity of
public land agencies is one of the most important steps needed in modernizing and
improving NEPA implementation and public lands management. It will be critical for the
agency and CEQ to focus on how to support increased monitoring and learning.
Mandating monitoring, appropriating money for it, and supporting more adaptive
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management strategies will be key. CEQ will have a role to play in providing guidance
and possibly regulations regarding the implementation of adaptive management, and
agencies will have a role to play in increasing their emphasis on monitoring and creating
incentives for managers to monitor, learn, and adapt practices. Pilot projects that include
monitoring and adaptive management strategies will serve to help agencies understand
how to move forward into what will certainly be a challenging but worthwhile next
iteration of public land management. Indeed, the USFS in its announcement of its most
recent planning rule emphasized that forest management in the future will need to be
more flexible and based on an adaptive management approach; the form this takes
remains to be seen.26

4.4 Institutional Impediments to CEA
Throughout this chapter I have alluded to some of the institutional impediments to
implementing CEA effectively. For instance, I discussed interviewees’ concerns that
USFS databases were designed to inventory timber stands and are not ideal as tools for
tracking the availability of habitat for wildlife species. A number of other institutional
issues arose over the course of this research, primarily through the interviews, as relevant
to understanding current CEA implementation. Nearly every USFS staff member I
interviewed brought up time and money as factors that limit their ability to do a more
complete CEA. Agency staff consistently explained that they are underfunded and
understaffed, especially in light of their legal obligations. For instance, more money is
sorely needed particularly for monitoring. Staff on the IPNF said they struggle to find the

26

73 Fed. Reg. 21468 (April 21, 2008).
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time to meet all of their responsibilities. At the time of this research, the IPNF had lost
their forest-wide biologist and hydrologist due to a lack of funding, and those
responsibilities had been shunted to other staff members.27 In general, some positions
such as the presence of a NEPA writer/editor, have become a luxury on some Region 1
forests, according to personnel at the Regional office.
Even where positions have not been cut, staff on the IPNF explained that they
continually have more work to do because legal requirements are constantly changing,
and courts require more analysis and up-to-date information from the field. As one
interviewee explained it, the USFS takes a risk-management approach to NEPA
documents, and the risk is litigation. In their efforts to bullet-proof EISs, resource
specialists have less time in the field, to field-verify and monitor conditions, even though
courts have also asked for “more boots on the ground.” While most interviewees felt that
litigation in general has led to improved practices by the USFS, and even that increased
documentation requirements have led to better analysis in some cases, they also noted
that the courts over time have asked for additional information to a point where there may
be diminishing returns. Aside from specialists having less time in the field, EISs become
more encyclopedic, and some question whether the additional information always
improves decision-making and communication with the public.
Aside from increasing the burden on an underfunded agency, this direction from
the courts may have another important consequence. Policy observers have noted in the
academic literature that courts over time have imposed greater synoptic burdens on
agencies, while failing to require agencies to be transparent about the political or value27

These were the positions of forest-wide biologist and hydrologist at the supervisor’s office;
district level biologists and hydrologists were still on staff.
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based motivations behind their decisions (Doremus, 2005; Shapiro, 1988). When it
comes to scientific uncertainty, this trend is troubling. Often what is needed is more
transparency about why certain choices are made in light of uncertainty, rather than the
inclusion of more information that may not actually add anything useful to the analysis.
As one staff member on the IPNF put it, rather than admit they do not have the
monitoring data to answer some questions clearly, “We fool around and say a lot of stuff
without answering the question. We don’t like to admit we just don’t know, as
professionals.” The result is that some analyses seem to provide a mass of information
but never clearly provide any clear conclusions or straight-forward assessments of the
issue at hand. USFS personnel raised a similar issue, asking when enough is enough in
terms of information, and when the agency has the opportunity to step back and ask what
kind of information is actually useful to making better decisions.
A potentially positive effect of litigation on the IPNF is that it has led to an
increased level of collaborative planning, or at least an involvement of environmental
groups in pre-project design and analysis. For instance, a collaborative planning
approach was taken to the recent Blue Alder project on the Coeur d’Alene district, with
individuals from some of the local environmental groups, such as The Lands Council,
present for meetings regarding project design. When I asked what prompted this
involvement, an IPNF staffer said it was prior successful litigation that had motivated the
agency to try to work with environmental groups in more constructive manner. Some
observers have drawn attention to the important relationship between collaboration and
litigation, which, when successful at stalling or enjoining projects, serves as a motivation
for pursuing more collaborative approaches (Nie, 2008). On the IPNF the success of the
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approach is still unclear. USFS staff explained that the process for the Blue Alder project
took a huge amount of extra time and money, and they were not entirely sure it was
useful for resolving disagreements between the agency and environmental groups.
Environmentalists I spoke with also were so far disappointed by the outcomes from
collaborative efforts on the IPNF, explaining that they did not feel those efforts had had
enough of an effect in the end on project design and implementation.
Interestingly, some environmental groups, such as The Lands Council have been
involved in collaborative efforts on the nearby Colville National Forest in Washington as
well as the Kootenai National Forest in Montana. Until recently, they appealed almost
every timber sale on the Colville but have more recently taking a different approach. As
one Lands Council staff member put it, litigation and more collaborative approaches go
together as a sort of carrot-and-stick strategy for influencing forest management. Staff at
The Lands Council felt that efforts on the Colville have been more successful than they
have been on the IPNF, in part because environmental and industry groups in that case
began meeting on their own before approaching the agency. In other words, on the
Colville it appears that a more organic coalition formed, which then approached the
agency with proposals and suggestions.
The independence of the coalition along with what they perceive as more
receptive leadership on the Colville were both cited as reasons why collaborative
planning has so far been more successful on the Colville, at least in the eyes of the
environmental groups. It was also suggested that the IPNF has faced more pressure from
a more powerful and diverse local timber industry and culture, along with pressure from
the Regional office and from powerful Congressional members, such as Larry Craig, who

279

until recently was a senator from Idaho and was notorious for pushing timber production
in Region 1. Importantly, environmentalists noted that although litigation is the tool that
motivates the agency to work with them, collaborative efforts have more potential for
making some of the gains, such as protection of roadless or wilderness areas, that are
important to those groups.
Another institutional challenge that came up repeatedly in the interviews and
which was discussed in the section on monitoring, was the issue of data gaps and
information supply. USFS interviewees were aware of monitoring data that had been
collected, on soils, old-growth habitat, or on project effectiveness, but that was never
consolidated or analyzed in a way that was useful for or available to managers.
Interviewees explained that the USFS has put a good deal of time and money into
surveying and data collection and has a considerable amount of data. However, the
problem is that the data has not always been collected in a consistent or scientific manner
or put into some kind of useful final product for managers. Another issue is the challenge
of operationalizing information so that it is useful to managers on the project level. For
instance, an agency scientist noted that Region 1 is working on a framework for
ecological sustainability that looks at connectivity, fragmentation, and landscape patterns,
but it remains unclear how that information will be operationalized in a way that is useful
for project managers in designing and analyzing site-specific actions. Other interviewees
stated that they are constantly bombarded by new science from appellants, and that it
would be useful to have staff members, perhaps at the Regional level, who could
synthesize that information and help the districts understand its implications.
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Biologists at the district level explained that it is nearly impossible for them to
stay up-to-date on the literature relevant for wildlife species and also meet their other
obligations, such as getting into the field and completing NEPA analyses and specialists
reports. When asked if they organized their efforts to save time and share information,
biologists indicated that only a minimal amount of coordination has occurred. Until
recently, the IPNF went several years without a forest-wide biologist. It seems that
without this leadership there was no one to coordinate efforts to stay current on the
literature or effectively share information and expertise. In fact, biologists on the IPNF
had not met as a team for many years (one person estimated it had been 15 years). It
appears that is has been difficult to find the time and leadership to facilitate
communication between biologists just on the IPNF, much less across multiple forests or
the region as a whole.
Another issue USFS staff raised was the question of whether scientists are
consistently supported and adequately trained to do high quality work. Wildlife issues
have garnered a significant amount of attention from the public and have been a highly
effective tool for stopping agency projects through litigation. As one biologist put it,
wildlife has a disproportionate amount of the public interests; as a result, biologists on
project teams can have a lot of power and input. Some interviewees indicated that there
is a disincentive in the agency for biologists to have too much say or for the agency to
hire specialists who are highly trained because they might derail projects. One
interviewee estimated that the majority of USFS district biologists have only a bachelor’s
degree and felt strongly that the agency needs to focus on hiring more graduate-level
trained biologists. In fact, s/he noted, Montana Fish, Wildlife, and Parks requires their
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biologists to have a graduate degree, while the USFS does not.28 Hiring better-trained
biologists would likely improve CEA and the quality of wildlife analysis in general.
In terms of training needs, Region 1 provides a variety of NEPA-related trainings,
including a specific multi-day workshop on CEA. Although no one suggested a need for
more NEPA training, a number of interviewees emphasized writing skills as a major
impediment to how CEA is presented and to the maintenance of consistency from one
document to the next. Many interviewees felt there is a need to improve the writing,
logic, and integration of information in NEPA documents, and some suggested that
training in this area might be helpful.
Many individuals who become project leaders and oversee a significant portion of
the NEPA process are relatively new to the agency and have limited experience with
NEPA analysis. Interviewees, some of whom were new to NEPA analysis themselves,
emphasized the importance of having mentors available to assist new project leaders
when needed. The USFS is also now utilizing dedicated NEPA teams: groups of USFS
personnel who specialize in NEPA, travel to different forests, and write the NEPA
analysis for various projects.29 Although a number of people raised the issue of NEPA
burnout and the fact that almost no one comes to the agency with the intention of doing
NEPA analyses, one person who works with a dedicated NEPA team said s/he
appreciated and enjoyed the ability to focus on NEPA and develop expertise in that area
of practice.

28

Montana Fish, Wildlife, and Parks department of human resources confirmed that both fish and
wildlife biologists are required to have at least master’s level training.
29
See http://www.fs.fed.us/teams/ for more on the USFS’ dedicated NEPA teams (called
TEAMS).
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In addition, the role of the Regional office in overseeing NEPA analysis is
evolving. As one interviewee put it, the Regional office has to strike a balance between
oversight and service in an agency that has historically been decentralized. One
interviewee referred to ranger districts as individual fiefdoms and explained that the
Regional office has to be careful not to intrude too much into management on individual
forests. People at the Regional office struggle with how much they should provide
oversight and quality control as opposed to more of a service role in answering questions
when they arise. Several people at the Regional office explained that over the last couple
of years they have begun soliciting one NEPA document a year from each forest for
formal review before the decision. Although there was resistance from the forests that
this would slow them down, Regional staff explained that they were soon overwhelmed
with requests to review NEPA documents. Based on this experience, it seems the
Regional office may take more of an oversight role in the future.
Another key point that emerged from this research is that both environmental
groups and USFS personnel cited the nature of project funding and the presence of timber
targets as impediments to effective management.30 For instance, in a discussion on the
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The concept of “timber targets” has different meanings in various contexts. In this case,
personnel on the IPNF were referring to annual targets that come down to line officers from the
USFS Washington Office and Congress. The process is not entirely transparent, in that timber
targets are not published as part of any kind of public information for a National Forest. The
IPNF’s 1987 forest plan sets the allowable sale quantity (ASQ), which is the maximum amount of
timber that can be sold from a National Forest in a year, at 287 million board feet. In some cases
people refer to a forest’s ASQ as a timber target, although here I am referring to annual targets
that are internally communicated. Williamson (2005) explains that some USFS timber targets are
set as part of the planning process undertaken under the Rangeland Renewable Resources
Planning Act of 1974 (RPA) and that budgets and intra-agency success of managers are tied to
meeting timber targets, giving managers an incentive to prioritize timber production.
Nonetheless, the exact process of how annual timber targets are set is murky. Such targets are
referred to frequently by USFS staff and sometimes by other academics (see for example
discussion in Morton, 1999, and in a 1995 Congressional Research Service report). Several IPNF
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possibility of involving outside groups in project planning, one USFS staff member
explained that the IPNF is still under considerable pressure from the Regional office and
more distantly from the USFS Washington Office and Congress to meet its timber
targets. This, s/he explained, limits their ability to slow down and involve a broader set
of interests in planning. It also limits the IPNF’s ability to take a completely restoration
or forest health oriented approach to project planning. S/he explained that timber funding
comes down based on timber targets and that the timber budget is by far the largest part
of the forest’s budget.31 If the forest wants to accomplish restoration it often has to
couple it with a timber project in order to fund it, because the budget for restoration-only
projects is limited. S/he also noted that some areas might need treatment but would
provide less timber volume than another area. Therefore, the agency has an incentive to
find opportunities for restoration specifically in areas that will yield a higher volume of
timber.
Several USFS staff stated that they would prefer their targets came down based on
acres treated rather than timber targets. This would allow the agency to take more of an
ecosystem management approach and treat the acres that need it most first. As one
environmentalist explained, the agency cannot really take an approach that starts with the
concept of ecosystem management when its funding mechanisms are still based on timber

staff themselves did not know exactly how timber targets are set and communicated, but
explained that targets are hard numbers communicated to line officers. For the IPNF, it seems
that current annual targets are around 55 mmbf, with less timber actually coming off of the forest
in a year.
31
This is aside from the amount of the USFS budget spent on fire, which now accounts for nearly
50% of the USFS’ spending. See for example, commentary by Pat Williams, former
Congressman from Montana and Director of the Center for Western Progress, detailing the
current state of USFS spending on fire fighting, in a High Country News article entitled “Don’t
starve the Forest Service” (July 16, 2008). Online at: http://www.hcn.org/wotr/17564.
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targets. In a similar vein, the IPNF’s new forest plan will focus on restoration goals, but
the ability to implement that plan and focus on the acres where restoration will be needed
most will be compromised by the fact that the forest will also be under pressure to meet
timber targets.
What is interesting is that this is an area where many IPNF managers and
environmentalists have some common ground. Environmentalists in the region often ask
why timber targets are not openly discussed in project EISs as one of the primary factors
that drives site selection and project design. Most environmentalists cite the presence of
timber targets as one of the primary reasons they do not trust the agency and its analyses.
They explain that because of the presence of timber targets, timber harvest is always the
answer to the question of how to reach desired conditions. Environmentalists simply do
not trust that timber harvest, when it is proposed, is actually the best method for
achieving certain for conditions or that projects are implemented in the areas most in
need of restoration. Indeed, it is as if timber targets are the elephant in the room—the
agency does not openly acknowledge their role in project design but everyone is aware
that forest are under significant pressure to meet the targets, in part because those targets
are linked to a forest’s budget allocations. As one project manager on the IPNF put it,
groups simply do not trust that the agency is not still just “getting the cut out.” S/he
explained that there is still plenty of restoration to be done in areas that will yield
merchantable timber, but a move towards a target based on acres restored would do a lot
to increase the credibility of the agency with members of the public who are skeptical
about their actions.
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This issue of timber targets is linked to suggestions that the agency plan by
watershed, consider what is needed over the long-term in a particular area, and place
projects into some sort of broader context of management goals. Statements from Ray
Vaughan, whose perspectives on this issue were discussed earlier in this chapter, provide
one of the best explanations of the logic behind this position. He explains that planning
on a landscape scale would be a kind of planning with a “broad vision rather than a
microscope.” Rather than timber quotas, which he suggests have never worked well for
the forests or for the agency, he writes:
It would be far better to focus on acres restored, watershed healed, rivers and
streams restored, wild places protected, visitor experiences enhanced, conflicts
resolved, new workforces created, and the like. Do what the land needs, use the
right tools to do the right job, and there will be products and services provided in
their own due course. Focus on the work, the land and the people; the rest will
take care of itself and be much better than artificial targets (Oversight Hearing,
2007, p. 88-89).

A number of USFS staff also felt the agency should move towards targets based
on acres treated, but making this change would require a sea-change in how the agency is
funded. At present, Congressional members work with the Washington Office, which
works with the Regional office, in a murky negotiation process that results in timber
targets and funding allocations for individual forests. IPNF staff said they feel a
considerable amount of pressure to meet those targets, both in terms of maintaining their
funding as in terms of more general pressure from the higher levels of the agency.
Congressional pressure on the USFS to meet targets comes from Congress members with
a vested interest in maintaining timber-related industries in their districts and states.
As a final important point with regard to budgets, it will be key to figure out how
exactly to fund a high-quality monitoring program. Several staff explained that often
budgets are tied to individual projects and not to overarching issues such as a broad-scale
286

monitoring program. If the agency is serious about moving into a more adaptive
management approach to planning, questions will have to be answered as to how large
scale monitoring efforts will be funded and whether post-project monitoring funds will be
made available.
These types of institutional limitations present a variety of interesting lessons,
some of which are daunting. The question of how to restructure the way the agency plans
and funds monitoring efforts is a huge challenge that turns on both institutional
constraints of the agency and the broader political context of National Forest
management. However, other lessons about impediments to effectively conducting CEA
would be relatively easy to respond to. Providing NEPA mentors, offering writing
assistance and training, and improving the coordination of agency biologists so that they
can share information and avoid duplicating each other’s efforts are some areas where the
agency could remove impediments to the implementation of complex regulatory
requirements like CEA.

4.5 Conclusions
Since the late 1990s there has been almost nothing written in the academic
literature on the current state of CEA practice and presentation in NEPA documents. One
contribution of this research is the provision of an in-depth look at how CEA is currently
practiced by the USFS. From that investigation several key areas emerge as some of the
most important implications of this research.
With regard to CEA practice, the issue of how to incorporate an analysis of the
effects of past actions into CEA remains as one of the most confusing and contentious

287

aspects of the practice. The current approach to CEA, which focuses on a project-level
scale of analysis for wildlife and a picture of current conditions as an indicator of
cumulative effects, fails to provide an analysis of how conditions have changed over time
and what factors led to those changes. However, at present the law does not clearly
require a different approach to CEA.
Under NFMA it is clear that to effectively maintain biodiversity and to comply
with the old planning regulations from 1982, some kind of forest-wide analysis of the
status of species is necessary. The scientific evidence indicates that a coarse-filter
approach to biodiversity conservation will not suffice; however, the new NFMA planning
regulations rely even more heavily on a coarse-filter approach, eliminating the viability
language and emphasizing ecosystem diversity as a proxy for wildlife diversity. The
USFS can choose to augment the ecosystem diversity approach by choosing species of
interest or concern to emphasize as a management concern on National Forests. It
remains to be seen if this flexibility will be used as a way to improve upon current and
past practice with regard to species planning, or will allow for even less accountability
and the failure to improve forest-wide or regional wildlife analyses so that they
incorporate fine-filter approaches to assessing the status of populations and diversity.
This investigation into CEA implementation reveals several lessons that are
reflective of broader issues regarding NEPA implementation. In forest management, the
NEPA process is the primary venue for dealing with the public’s concerns or questions
about the USFS management direction. Because CEA is supposed to provide a broadscale analysis based on learning from past actions, it becomes a proxy for addressing
serious concerns about the USFS’ approach to planning, wildlife analysis, old-growth
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assessments and treatments, and long-term analysis of the effects of management actions.
Because NEPA is one of the only venues for conflict resolution, many of these CEA
concerns are seen over and over again at the project level and go unresolved. Limited
opportunities for dialogue are available for dealing with questions on this scale regarding
the nature of U.S. forest management.
Several impediments emerged as key areas where USFS personnel feel limited in
terms of their ability to conduct CEA. One of the most recurrent themes from the
interviews is the need for monitoring, including both implementation and cause-effect
monitoring. This issue reflects one of the most common challenges raised with regard to
NEPA and synoptic planning in general: the need for more post-project monitoring and
an adaptive approach to planning that builds upon data collection in order to learn from
previous activities. The lack of monitoring on numerous levels, according to USFS
personnel, is one of the primary impediments to improved CEA practice on the IPNF.
Related to this issue are problems with data supply. Numerous interviewees noted a need
for more coordination of data that has been collected, refinement of that data so that it is
understandable, and communication of findings to staff in a way that is useful in project
level analyses. Biologists in particular also noted a need for more communication among
specialists in order to standardize approaches and communicate effectively about new
data or research relevant to their work.
Institutional impediments to effective CEA practice are many. The most obvious
are the lack of money for monitoring and the fact that staff nearly unanimously noted that
the agency is understaffed and underfunded relative to its legal obligations and the
amount of public interest in its activities. The nature of project planning and budgeting
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also were raised as factors that limit the approach to CEA. Environmentalists argue that
providing a picture of the long-term plan for an area would give a better sense of the
management intentions of the agency and potential cumulative impacts. Both outside
observers and USFS personnel also raise the issue of funding. The continued use of
timber targets leads to a lack of trust from members of the public, who note that the
agency has strong incentives to pursue timber harvest even when it may not be the most
effective management strategy. Many USFS personnel want to see the agency move
towards targets based on acres treated, in part to build trust with the public, but also to
emphasize a more restoration-oriented mission. A need for more funding that is not tied
to project-level activities also would help the agency approach CEA at a scale that would
allow for more of a meta-analysis of the effects of many projects and environmental
changes.
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS AND WAYS FORWARD

The primary objectives of this research have been to 1) provide an overview of
the administrative and legal history of the CEA regulation and how it has been applied by
the federal circuit courts, 2) understand how the USFS performs CEA for wildlife and
presents the analysis in its NEPA documents, 3) identify factors that affect
implementation of the CEA requirement, and 4) consider how to improve CEA in the
future. Several general themes guided the research and were relevant to the findings.
These included the challenges of synoptic planning, the difficulties of decision-making in
light of data/knowledge gaps and scientific uncertainty, the variety of political factors
that affect regulatory implementation, and the challenge of determining how CEA fits
into National Forest decision making and planning. This chapter revisits the most salient
findings of this research in terms of these objectives and themes and then turns to the
question of how to improve both CEA and wildlife analysis as it is done by the USFS.
The last section provides recommendations based on the findings of this research.

5.1 Major Research Findings
Lessons from the Case Law Analysis
The case law analysis and regulatory history of the CEA requirement leave little
doubt that the regulation is a logical outgrowth of NEPA and a fundamental component
of NEPA analysis. Courts have enforced the requirement since the 1970s. The first CEA
case decided by a circuit court was Natural Resource Defense Council v. Callaway
(1975) in which the Second Circuit required the Army Corps of Engineers to analyze the
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cumulative impacts of a proposal to dump waste off of the coast of Connecticut in light of
other current and foreseeable dumping activities by both state and private parties. The
requirement to analyze cumulative impacts of past, present, and reasonably foreseeable
(even those that have not been formally proposed) was upheld in numerous court cases in
the decades that followed, with courts requiring analysis of, for example, the impacts of
multiple projects in the same watershed or multiple activities that might cumulatively
affect a species of interest (see LaFlamme v. FERC (1988) and NRDC v. Interior
Department (1988)). Other cases established that some degree of CEA is required at both
the plan and project levels of analysis in National Forest management (see Tenakee
Spring v. Clough (1989), Resources Ltd. v. Robertson (1993), and NRDC v. USFS
(2005)). Courts have also enforced requirements to analyze connected and cumulative
actions in a single EIS (see Thomas v. Peterson (1985) and Blue Mountains Biodiversity
Project v. Blackwood (1998)). While these latter two requirements differ from the CEA
requirement, they also involve across-project analysis of cumulative impacts.
The late 1990s saw a rise in successful challenges, particularly in the Ninth
Circuit, against federal agencies for failure to analyze cumulative impacts. The U.S.
Forest Service (USFS) in recent years has lost a number of cases in the Ninth Circuit
regarding the sufficiency of its CEA, although the agency has been more successful in the
Tenth Circuit. In general, recent cases on CEA have required the agency to better
document its rationale for choosing the scope and scale of a CEA and the rationale and
empirical basis for conclusions regarding potential cumulative impacts. The courts have
also ruled that data used to support a CEA cannot be significantly out-of-date or
incomplete, particularly without acknowledgement on the part of the agency as to the
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limitations of its data (see Lands Council v. Powell (2004)). The USFS also cannot
postpone NEPA analysis until after a project has been implemented, nor can it tier
analysis either to a non-NEPA document or a programmatic document that is too general
to suffice for project-level analyses. Choices that contradict decisions or statements
made in other agency analyses or reports also get the agency into trouble in court.
Otherwise, as long as the agency provides some documentation and rationale for its
choices, beyond relying on unsupported claims of expertise, courts generally have ruled
favorably and afforded the agency deference in terms of its chosen approaches and
methodologies for doing CEA.
There are several areas, however, in terms of the case law where the requirements
of CEA are less clear. These issues reflect in large part the fact that the CEA requirement
is huge in scope and difficult to implement. For instance, questions remain as to how
much CEA should be done at the plan level or whether the CEA in project level analysis
can adequately capture large-scale and long-term effects. For this reason, the courts have
ruled differently on this issue depending on the context. For example, in some cases,
such as Resources Ltd. v. Robertson (1993), courts have allowed the agency to postpone
analysis of private land activities until project level analysis. However, in NRDC v.
USFS (2005) the Ninth Circuit required the Tongass National Forest to include an
analysis of state and private land activities in its forest plan EIS, largely because, as the
court saw it, that analysis would significantly affect choices about how to allocate uses on
federal lands in the forest plan. Thus, it has not been entirely clear what degree of CEA
has been required in plan level analyses, although this may be less of an issue in the
future as plans will now be categorically excluded from NEPA analysis. Also, courts

293

have required some degree of analysis of private lands, but the extent to which courts
have looked for this has varied from one context to the next. Although it is to be
expected that legal decisions will vary depending the facts of the case, legal scholars have
argued that consideration of private lands as part of a CEA is one aspect of the
requirement that has yet to be enforced fully by the federal courts (Hartt, 2002).
The issue of how to include an analysis of past actions is also a facet of the CEA
requirement that has yet to be settled. Two of the most recent published court cases on
CEA in the Ninth Circuit, Lands Council v. Powell (2004) (hereinafter Lands Council)
and NRDC v. USFS (2005), required the agency to catalog or list all past actions relevant
to the CEA along with the effects of those actions. The Council on Environmental
Quality (CEQ), however, issued guidance that such a cataloging of past actions and
effects was not necessary to comply with the CEA requirement (CEQ, 2005). The Idaho
Panhandle National Forest (IPNF), which served as the focal forest for this research, was
involved in the challenge in Lands Council (2004). Subsequent to that decision the IPNF
made the case that past actions can be listed, but that providing details on the effects of
those individual actions is not useful to a CEA. Instead, and in accordance with the CEQ
guidance, the IPNF states that a portrayal of current or existing conditions represents the
cumulative impacts of past actions. This issue is one of the most contentious and
problematic aspects of CEA, and there is at present no agreement among the courts, the
public, CEQ, or even internally among USFS staff as to what exactly the CEA
requirement necessitates in terms of an analysis of past actions.
A final unresolved issue in terms of the legal requirements of CEA is where such
an analysis fits in with the increased use of categorical exclusions (CatExes) of projects
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from NEPA analysis (see GAO, 2006 for details on this trend in terms of vegetative
management projects). The Ninth Circuit in Sierra Club v. Bosworth (2007) enjoined
one of the USFS’ CatEx categories for fuels treatments in large part based on the lack of
a CEA during the creation of the category. The Tenth Circuit has been more reluctant to
rule against the agency in terms of a CEA either for individually CatExed projects or for
CatEx categories. However, the case law and general logic behind how CEA is dealt
with for CatExed projects, particularly those that fall under some of the current categories
for vegetative management by the USFS, leave unanswered the question of exactly how
and when cumulative effects will be accounted for. According to the Tenth Circuit,
potential effects from CatExed projects will be accounted for through project scoping and
the consideration of “extraordinary circumstances” that may lead to cumulative impacts.
However, neither of those processes requires the agency to initiate a formal analysis of
cumulative impacts. It is not entirely clear how the agency will account for cumulative
impacts from multiple CatExed projects, which individually may have effects beyond
project area boundaries and cumulatively may have significant effects on resources such
as wildlife habitat.

General Findings from the IPNF Case Study
One of the primary findings of this research is that there are serious challenges
associated with determining the appropriate scale of analysis for CEA. This is a
particularly tricky aspect of the requirement and is a conundrum in terms of
environmental effects analysis that has yet to be solved. In the case of forest
management, with the USFS categorically excluding both forest plans and numerous
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smaller projects from in-depth NEPA analysis, the bulk of CEA will now fall to those
projects for which environmental assessments (EAs) or environmental impact statements
(EISs) are completed.
Aside from a broad-scale assessment that might accompany a forest plan, there is
no obvious place where an analysis of the cumulative impacts of multiple projects,
particularly those that are categorically excluded, would occur. Without some kind of
programmatic or forest-wide assessment of the status of resources, cumulative losses may
be overlooked. As we saw in the preceding chapters, even for projects that are
accompanied by an EIS, a number of aspects of CEA might be missed in project-level
analyses. Recall that the IPNF’s EISs indicate just this in terms of potential effects to
wildlife species. The forest acknowledges that to truly assess population viability would
require looking at species on the forest or regional scale and that such an analysis is
beyond the scope of project level analyses. Given that the assessments that accompany
forest plans will occur as infrequently as forest plan revisions occur, and that forest plans
themselves will no longer be accompanied by a NEPA analysis such as an EIS, it is
unclear where and when this broad scale cumulative impacts analysis will ever take
place, particularly for wildlife species.
The USFS has acknowledged this fundamental challenge with regard to CEA, and
a discussion of this matter mirrors some of the major controversies in forest management,
including questions as to the purposes of forest planning, whether forest plans must build
upon lessons learned from previous plan implementation, how to make planning more
adaptable and responsive to changing conditions, and how and when to account for
cumulative impacts. Speaking to this last point in its most recent record of decision
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regarding its new planning regulations, the USFS writes, “Throughout 28 years of land
management planning, the Agency has learned that tiering to the cumulative effects
analysis in a plan EIS did not provide nearly as much useful information at the project or
activity level as the Agency had expected.”1 This is one of the primary reasons given for
why the agency will no longer require an EIS in conjunction with a forest plan. The
agency goes on to explain, “Meaningful cumulative effects analyses cannot be conducted
until project design and location are known or at least reasonably foreseeable.”2
Therefore, CEA will be shunted to the project scale. Commenters on the rule noted,
however, “[W]ithout a plan EIS, cumulative effects and impacts to forest-wide resources
would now have to be evaluated in each project decision.”3 To this the USFS responds
that it is a misconception that forest-plan EIS provided useful cumulative impacts
information; on the contrary, such plan EISs were usually “speculative and quickly out of
date.”4 For this reason, such impacts will be better handled at the project level.
However, as we have seen, forest-wide analysis at the project level is unrealistic.
Specialists must have something to tier to or some broader scale analysis that can inform
analysis at the project level. Numerous USFS interviewees explained that the burden of
analyzing CEA under the new planning rules will increase at the project level, but no one
provided a clear answer of how this burden might be met.
The 2008 rule provides some indication, however, of how the agency plans to
handle this problem. The record of decision explains that in order to make forest plans

1

73 Fed. Reg. 21468, 21473, Apr. 21, 2008.
Id. at 21473.
3
Id. at 21484.
4
Id. at 21484.
2
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more adaptable, a comprehensive evaluation report (CER) will accompany every forest
plan and will be updated at least every five years. The USFS explains,
This evaluation, along with information from annual evaluations and other
sources, would be part of the continually updated plan documents or set of
documents that would be considered in project analysis. These up-to-date plan
documents or set of documents would provide a better context for project
cumulative effects disclosures than previously provided by programmatic plan
EISs under the 1982 rule; therefore, the Forest Service would make better
informed management decisions at the time it decides to propose projects under
the plan. However, the comprehensive evaluation report will not have a
cumulative effects disclosure like the EISs under the 1982 rule had…. Those
cumulative effects will be analyzed and disclosed at the time the projects and
activities are proposed….5

In other words, the agency is acknowledging that some kind of broader scale
analysis is necessary to inform CEA at the project level, and some of this information
will be provided in the CER. And yet, no CEA will be done in the CER or for the forest
plan, and a forest-wide CEA for any resource will almost certainly still be beyond the
scope of project-level analysis. The most optimistic scenario would be that project-level
analyses will include a kind of broad-scale CEA, in part based on the CER, unlike that
which we have ever seen in a project-level analysis, but the truth there is no reason to
expect this. Unfortunately, the approach put forth by the USFS is not obviously different
than what is already in place. Five-year monitoring reports and annual monitoring
summaries, both of which were required under the 1982 planning rules, are currently
meant to inform project-level analyses.6 Despite these monitoring reports, project-level
analyses fail to address large-scale cumulative impacts, which also are not meaningfully
dealt with at the plan level.

5
6

Id. at 21483.
This provision was found at 36 C.F.R. 219.10 (g, h) in the 1982 rules.
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The truth is that the new approach is just more of the shell game with regard to
CEA as necessary for forest-wide resources, and several factors make the new approach
worse than the old one. For one, the standards for maintaining wildlife populations have
been weakened, as is discussed in more detail below. Furthermore, while no additional
analysis has been added, one level of analysis, the EIS accompanying the forest plan has
been lost. At least that EIS would have required some kind of CEA, something we
should not expect to see in the CERs. Forest-wide CEA remains as elusive under the new
planning rules as it has been in the past. And, the fact is that until the USFS implements a
scientifically defensible, frequent, broad-scale, and iterative monitoring strategy, only
limited CEA will be possible. Monitoring, along with meaningful definitions of desired
conditions that are specific and defined in terms of measurable objectives, will be
necessary if there is to be any real analysis of changes to resources over time and
consideration of whether the USFS is achieving its management goals.
Also related to the challenge of scale is the matter of how to account for past
actions. The analysis in this research of recent IPNF NEPA documents reveals that
cumulative impacts are most often presented through a portrayal of the environmental
baseline or current conditions. No additional analysis of the specific effects of individual
past actions has been added as a result of the Lands Council (2004) decision, and in fact
the IPNF has argued that this is not necessarily or useful. Unfortunately, the IPNF’s
approach, which relies on a portrayal of the environmental baseline as an indicator of
cumulative impacts, is insufficient for understanding long-term cumulative impacts. A
CEA should tell us how resources have changed over time in specific terms and over the
course of management cycles such as forest plan implementation. There is no doubt that
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it would be difficult to tease out what impacts resulted from management activities.
Establishing clear causal relationships would require controls in both space and time with
which to compare areas that have been treated and measure effects. Nonetheless, one
might imagine that at the least the USFS could say something like, “In the last 20 years, x
amount of habitat for this species has been lost due to management activities.” This is
precisely what the requirement asks for: a portrayal of cumulative impacts over time as a
result of the actions of both public and private entities. However, at present the only
portrayal of cumulative impacts available for some resources is a comparison of the
environmental baseline (or current conditions) compared to some broad estimate of what
conditions may have looked like at some distant point in the past. This gives us no sense
of how resource conditions have changed in more specific terms or over the course of
forest plan implementation, nor does it provide any indication of how we arrived at
current conditions.
For wildlife species the approach is especially problematic. Currently the IPNF
analyzes effects to wildlife based on changes to habitat availability. Forest-wide viability
analyses are not available for any species, although some regional viability analyses have
been done and minimum habitat thresholds have been established for a few species
(Samson, 2006a, 2006b). Cumulative impacts to species are said to be embedded in
environmental baseline conditions, or conditions at the time of the analysis. No specific
information is ever provided by the IPNF as to how much habitat for a species has been
lost over say the last 20, 50, or 100 years; one would have to piece together a very rough
sense of this based on changes in vegetative communities.
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The IPNF has little to no information on the status of populations on the forest
and uses habitat as a proxy for estimating whether species may be present. The methods
for estimating habitat availability suffer from a number of problems, such as the use of
vegetative communities as a proxy for habitat. Compounding this problem is the fact that
the species-habitat relationships for many species are not well known. However, even if
we accept that these rough estimates of habitat availability are useful as indicators of
population status, still at no point in any EIS reviewed for this research was a useful
indication of cumulative impacts to habitat availability given.
If we step back for a moment, we can ask, at its most basic, what should a CEA
tell us for wildlife? Fundamentally we would want to know how and why population
numbers have changed on a forest (or some other meaningful landscape scale) over time.
For instance, we might ask what is the current status of resources compared to various
points in the past. This might provide some indication of whether a forest is meeting its
desired conditions for a species and how the species may have been affected over time by
management actions. Because the IPNF currently has limited direct monitoring
information on the status of populations, at the very least it would be useful to know how
much habitat has been lost. This would serve as some indication of whether populations
might be in decline and would be fundamental to complying with the requirement to
disclose cumulative impacts, which involve changes in resource conditions over time.
Some kind of threshold is also necessary for providing a sense of whether
significant cumulative impacts have occurred. Tear et al. (2005) explain that the data
gaps with regard to our understanding of most species are extensive and that establishing
minimum thresholds for viability is hugely difficult. They write that for the majority of
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species and ecosystems, there is not enough information available to determine minimum
thresholds. Given this, it might be most useful to think of thresholds as pre-established
trigger points that raise the red-flag of potentially significant effects. Thresholds could
also be given as a range of conditions that likely reflect significant threats to resources.
Once thresholds are reached, this might then trigger reconsideration of management
strategies for particular areas, habitat types, or assemblages or species.
At present none of this information is available. Some sort of threshold for longterm cumulative impacts is provided through estimates of minimum habitat needs for
wildlife species by Samson (2006b). However, this work suffers from a serious lack of
credibility, according to numerous people I interviewed, both inside and outside of the
USFS. More broadly, there is significant debate as to whether habitat is a useful
indicator of population status, whether species-habitat relationships are known in enough
detail to justify the habitat-based approach, if methods for estimating habitat are accurate,
and also whether the analyses used to justify findings of no significant effects to species
are reliable. The bottom line is that in the case of the wildlife resource, the agency must
move towards providing an accounting of how habitat availability has changed over time,
obtaining more information on species-habitat relationships so that its estimates of habitat
availability are more accurate, and doing some degree of monitoring in order to better
understand the effects of management actions on populations as well as the current status
of populations. The scientific bases for analyses also must be valid and credible if the
USFS is serious about meeting its stewardship mandates with regard to resources like
wildlife and building trust with members of the public who are actively involved in forest
management decisions.

302

Another issue that emerged repeatedly over the course of this research involved
the limitations of synoptic planning. Many interviewees suggested that post-project
cause-effect and implementation monitoring are both necessary for improving NEPA
analysis and management activities in general. Without high-quality monitoring
information, understanding and learning from the cumulative impacts of numerous
management actions is impossible. The uncertainty of whether mitigation measures
discussed in EISs are actually undertaken also is a serious concern.
Beyond this is the problem that the synoptic approach of NEPA sometimes
clashes with the act’s public participation requirements; the NEPA process ends up
serving as a limited venue for discussing some of the most enduring conflicts in forest
management. For this reason, CEA is raised repeatedly in public comment letters as a
way to get at many contentious broad-scale issues in forest management, such as the
efficacy of fuels treatments, the loss of old-growth forests and habitat connectivity, and
the scientific uncertainty around the status of populations. Project-level NEPA analyses
serve as an imperfect venue for addressing such issues, and USFS staff are frustrated at
receiving and responding to the same comments repeatedly. However, it is not always
clear where else members of the interested public might more effectively raise such
issues.
In summary, there are several significant factors that limit the agency’s ability to
perform CEA. The lack of post-implementation and broad-scale monitoring is one of the
biggest impediments to improving how CEA is done. But, while scientific uncertainty
certainly poses serious challenges, there are some manageable data and knowledge gaps
that might be effectively addressed through increased or improved leadership.
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Coordination of monitoring strategies and information that is already available, as well as
improved communication among resource specialists, all could improve CEA and
wildlife analysis in general.
Disagreement over the thrust of the requirement, how to handle problems of scale,
and how to incorporate analysis of past actions also are serious impediments.
Additionally, limited funding and staff were also cited as impediments to improving
monitoring and learning. The nature of funding, which is still largely tied to individual
projects and to timber targets, was also cited as an impediment to improving CEA in that
it limits the agency’s ability to undertake broad-scale monitoring and evaluation. The
presence of timber targets undermines trust with the public and creates an incentive to cut
timber first and foremost despite the fact that the agency is ostensibly increasingly
focused on ecosystem management and restoration. Reconsideration of how the USFS
should be funded is more than can be tackled in this analysis, but is an area that might be
looked at to improve the way that monitoring is funded and the way in which restoration
is approached by the USFS.

5.2 Ways Forward
Throughout this work I have highlighted a number of areas for improvement with
regard to NEPA implementation, wildlife planning, monitoring, and other factors. I have
made a number of suggestions for improvement of CEA implementation, but two areas in
particular merit a bit more discussion than was provided in the previous chapters. There
is ample discussion in the academic literature about how to improve the way the USFS
and other land management agencies approach wildlife planning and analysis and also
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some useful ideas on how to better integrate science into the planning process in a way
that is credible and transparent. These suggestions provide some insight into how the
USFS could move forward, particularly in terms of how it approaches planning for
wildlife conservation.
There are currently limitations to how the USFS does wildlife planning, and
members of the scientific community and agency-commissioned task forces have devoted
a significant amount of attention to the question of how to improve wildlife planning on
National Forest lands. Addressing this challenge is no small task. Noon et al. (2008)
write, “Despite the importance of multispecies conservation planning from both a legal
and practical perspective, we believe that current scientific understandings and methods
provide only limited guidance to land managers. Studying multiple species and the range
of spatial and temporal scales that they span has been identified as one of the key
challenges in conservation biology” (Noon et al. 2008, p. 51).
A group of population biologists, including Barry Noon, a wildlife biologist with
a long history of involvement in National Forest management, devoted a 2003 article in
Bioscience to the question of how best to conduct conservation planning and biodiversity
protection on Forest Service lands. They suggest that a combination of coarse-filter
(landscape level assessment of broad assemblages of habitat types and vegetative
communities), fine-filter (assessments of the status of individual species), and population
viability analysis (species-specific models based on demographic data) be used together
for effective biodiversity conservation on National Forests. They conclude that none of
these approaches alone will serve to adequately protect biodiversity on public lands but
could be effective if used in combination. Particularly, they recommend that formal
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population viability analysis (PVA) be undertaken for species in decline or at high risk or
for focal species, which they define as species with high functional significance in an
ecosystem.
As Noon et al. (2003) note, their recommendations echo those of the second
Committee of Scientists, which was convened in 1997 to make recommendations for
revision of the USFS planning regulations. Those recommendations suggest maintaining
the viability requirement for wildlife species and utilizing fine-filter approaches for focal
and indicator species as well as species-at-risk, such as those listed under the Endangered
Species Act (Committee of Scientists, 1999). In other words, Noon et al. (2003) and the
Committee of Scientists both recommend that an increased level of fine-filter and
species-specific analysis be undertaken by National Forests in order to protect
biodiversity.
Increased use of fine-filter approaches and PVA would augment the USFS’
current approaches to species planning. As we have seen, some assessments of species
viability based on habitat availability are conducted for individual species but the efficacy
of those approaches is essentially unknown without some kind of direct population
measurements. To date in National Forest management, formal PVA for forest species is
a rarity. A 2001 panel of scientists in a review of several of the most high profile broadscale assessments in forest planning, including the Sierra Nevada Forest Plan, Northwest
Forest Plan, Tongass Forest Plan, and others, found that demographic analysis was rare
and had only been employed for one species (the northern spotted owl) (Andelman et al.
2001). One other species, an orchid, was analyzed using metapopulation analysis
(Andelman et al., 2001). Although scientists have recommended some incorporation of
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PVA into forest planning, so far this level of analysis is uncommon, and the IPNF is not
unusual by any means in its lack of analysis of population trends for wildlife species.
Demographic models of population viability could give us more information on
the actual status of populations but are information intensive. Because of the scientific
uncertainty that necessarily is involved with PVA, Tear et al. (2005) suggest that in the
context of alternatives analysis, “PVA is more appropriately used…for comparing the
relative effects of differing management actions on population growth and persistence
than for determining a specific minimum population size or extinction probability” (p.
840, internal citations omitted).
However, despite the challenges of conducting PVA for various species, it is
apparent that much of the scientific community recommends that in order to meet its
obligations to protect biodiversity, the USFS undertake more fine-filter analysis and
develop PVA models for some species. These recommendations were reflected in the
2000 planning rule, based on the Committee of Scientist’s recommendations, but that rule
was quickly suspended.7 The 2000 rule was replaced with a series of planning rules that
culminated in the 2008 rule that currently guides forest planning. In that rule, the
viability requirement has been removed and more emphasis has been placed on the use of
coarse-filter approaches to maintaining diversity. In the 2008 rule, the USFS explains,
“Ecosystem diversity is the primary means by which a plan contributes to sustaining
ecological systems.”8 In other words, the coarse-filter approach to species conservation,
which focuses on maintaining broad habitat types and conditions, is the primary
methodology that will be used to protect biodiversity. The rule goes on to say that if the
7
8

The 2000 rule was published at 65 Fed. Reg. 67514 (November 9, 2000).
36 C.F.R. §219.10(b)(1) (2008).

307

responsible official deems it necessary, s/he can also make additional provisions for
protection threatened and endangered species, species-of-interest, and species-ofconcern.9
The USFS’ move in this direction towards focusing on ecosystem diversity as an
adequate approach for protecting wildlife is contrary to recommendations from the
scientific community, the Committee of Scientists, and an additional expert panel on
biodiversity conservation that was convened at the request of the USFS (see Andelman et
al. 2000) as to what is needed to strengthen protection for wildlife species on National
Forest lands. Of great concern is the fact that the new planning rules include no detail as
to what level of ecosystem diversity will be deemed sufficient. In terms of wildlife
conservation, Noon et al. (2008) write that, as a result of the new rules, the USFS no
longer has to apply any fine-filter analysis for species or do any direct monitoring of
species and their responses to management actions. What is perhaps most alarming is
that the efficacy of the new biodiversity conservation approach has not been established.
Noon et al. (2008) explain:
While maintaining a diversity of vegetation types is far easier to implement and
monitor than is the maintenance of viable populations of multiple species, there

9

36 C.F.R. §219.10(b)(2) (2008). To get a sense of this approach, consider the Draft
Comprehensive Evaluation Report (CER) for the Kootenai/Idaho Panhandle Zone forest plan
revision, which lists terrestrial mollusks and the American Peregrine Falcon as its species of
concern. For these species some direct monitoring and protection of occupied sites will take
place. Species of interest include many of the previous management indicator or regional forester
sensitive species. Management for these species is not obviously different from the broad
direction to manage for ecosystem diversity. For example, fisher are listed as part of the
“aquatic/riparian group,” and the CER explains for this group, “Habitat components for each of
these species will be maintained or restored through the Proposed Land Management Plan
components for watershed and aquatics. Plan components for ecosystem diversity will provide
for the upland portion of fisher habitat requirements” (Draft CER at p. 2-87). The draft CER is
available online at: http://www.fs.fed.us/kipz/documents/plmp/index.php (last accessed April 1,
2009). USFS personnel involved in forest plan revision indicated that the forthcoming CER will
have more detailed information as to what kind of analysis will be required for species of interest.
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is little guidance concerning how vegetation diversity alone can be used to infer
the conservation status of unmeasured species. The reality is that the
composition and configuration of vegetation types and successional states needed
to sustain multiple species over the long term is unknown (Noon et al. 2008, p.
74, internal citations omitted).

The approach is further weakened by the limited amount of detail with regard to
habitat characteristics available through reliance upon broad-scale forest vegetation data
such as Forest Inventory and Analysis (FIA) data (Noon et al. 2008). Given these multilayered problems with coarse-filter analysis, there is reason to be concerned about the
future of wildlife conservation on USFS lands. Particularly for threatened, endangered,
keystone, endemic, or other indicator species, Groves et al. (2000) write, “Because of
their rarity, habitat specificity, or area needs, the majority of species in these categories
are unlikely to be conserved by a focus on either community or ecosystem or abiotic
targets” (p. 503).
Without direct monitoring of the species there is almost nothing that provides the
USFS with empirical evidence of the status of populations, the accuracy of coarse-filter
approaches for estimating population status, or the effects of management actions on
populations. As one USFS staff member put it, the way the USFS currently approaches
wildlife conservation is essentially through a “data-free analysis,” and the proposed
approach under the 2008 rule will be even less rigorous than what is done now. It may be
a little much to say the approach is based on no data whatsoever, but the empirical
foundations of how the IPNF currently manages for wildlife are weak. Beyond general
information on vegetative stands and estimates of how those stands may constitute habitat
for species, there is limited quantitative evidence of species presence, species-habitat
relationships for most species, the accuracy of vegetation data for approximating habitat,
or the long-term cumulative impacts of management actions on species. By removing the
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viability requirement and requirements to monitor the status of management indicator
species, the USFS will now be required to be even less rigorous in its approach to species
conservation. This is not to say necessarily that the USFS’ methods will not improve, but
it is clear that the legal requirements for species conservation have been weakened.
What could the agency be doing to better understand impacts to species?
One promising avenue is the potential to use genetic sampling to estimate species
abundances, movement patterns, and distribution (Cushman et al., 2006; Noon et al.
2008). Non-invasive sampling and even the use of older samples from previous research
could be used to understand a number of factors regarding changes in species distribution
and abundance. This approach is still being developed but in the future will provide a
much more cost-effective way to understand that status of populations, in part because
representative and large samples are relatively less important for the methodology to be
effective (Noon et al., 2008). Researchers at the Rocky Mountain Research Station
indicated in interviews for this research that monitoring through genetic sampling is one
of the most promising ways that wildlife monitoring will improve in the future.10
However, while genetic monitoring may be able to provide some indication of abundance
and distribution of species, it also will not replace monitoring methods that are designed
to determine how populations respond to management actions or other factors in the short
term.
Another factor that is discussed frequently is the fact that not all species can be
monitored directly and therefore some will have to be prioritized. Nearly all the
10

This topic also was the subject of a recent New York Times article by Jim Robbins entitled
“Tools That Leave Wildlife Unbothered Widen Research Horizons” (March 9, 2009). The article
discusses the uses of genetic monitoring and its advantage over traditional capture-markrecapture methods for estimating wildlife population abundances.
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scientific literature on wildlife planning offers suggestions as to how to choose priority
species for monitoring. Most suggest the direct monitoring of species-at-risk, such as
those that are listed as threatened or endangered, as well as species that are expected to
respond to management actions or those that play a significant functional role in an
ecosystem (referred to by some as focal or keystone species); much more detailed
recommendations can be found throughout the literature on how to appropriately
prioritize species for monitoring (Andelman et al., 2001; Committee of Scientists, 1999;
Holthausen et al., 2005; Noon et al., 2003; Noon et al., 2008).
Prioritizing wildlife conservation areas and habitat is also an option for improving
how they agency goes about planning for wildlife conservation. As noted previously,
coarse-filter approaches will have to be coupled with fine-filter approaches, and one way
to improve coarse-filter strategies will be to identify areas to target for wildlife
conservation. Measuring and protecting habitat alone is not likely an effective way to go
about species conservation, but identifying priority habitats for conservation is one piece
of the complicated puzzle of landscape level planning to protect biodiversity. The
Nature Conservancy has taken some unique approaches to prioritizing habitat, often by
considering priority watersheds for biodiversity conservation. Groves et al. (2002)
describe a step-by-step process where biotic, abiotic, and socioeconomic factors, along
with patterns of land use ownership, are identified for a landscape; then, a variety of
algorithms can be run to identify conservation priority areas. Planners can input
minimum size requirements or stipulations that prioritize public lands or connectivity if
desired. Groves et al. (2002) provide an example of a process to prioritize conservation
areas along watersheds (6th code hydrological unit codes) for the Middle Rockies-Blue
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Mountains Ecoregion and suggest that these methodologies might help planners identify
areas to emphasize for conservation.
A similar process has been undertaken by Alaska Audubon and the Nature
Conservancy for the Coastal Forests and Mountains Ecoregion, which is made up largely
of the Tongass National Forest. The process has provided an inventory, analysis, and
assessment of conservation value for the region and was designed to support decisionmaking by the National Forest by helping to identify conservation priority watersheds.
The Conservation Assessment for the ecoregion emphasizes the importance of planning
and conservation on the watershed scale, which the authors explain will prevent
fragmentation, the removal of key habitat components, and increased use by humans that
threatens ecological values. The authors of the Conservation Assessment note that
ecological research has indicated that, at least in that region, watersheds are the most
appropriate scale for planning, conservation action, and evaluating cumulative impacts.
They explain, “[B]ecause watersheds define an appropriate ecological unit where human
impacts tend to accumulate and can be measured and because of their value for key
ecological processes and the global rarity of intact watersheds, identifying and
representing a range of intact watersheds should be included as part of any credible,
systematic, science-based conservation analysis.”11
While it may seem that advocating for some prioritization of habitat by
watersheds contradicts the notion that coarse-filter approaches are relatively untested as a
means to protect biodiversity, it is key to recognize that both coarse- and fine-filter
approaches have their utility. As Groves et al. (2000) acknowledge, planning on this
11

From Chapter 10, p. 4 of the Conservation Assessment, which can be found at:
http://home.gci.net/~tnc/HTML/Consv_assessment.html.
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scale in part rests on “assumptions that remain inadequately tested (e.g., surrogate
measures for biodiversity) and methods that are not yet fully developed…” (p. 510).
However, given ongoing losses to biodiversity, they write, “[T]he urgency of the
conservation mission demands that conservation plans based on the best available
scientific information and methods be implemented now, while explicitly acknowledging
their limitations and working toward their improvement” (Groves et al., p. 510).
The key to incorporating such approaches will be monitoring. As Noon et al.
(2008) write, with regard to several landscape level planning efforts, “[T]here is too little
empirical support at the temporal and spatial scales required for comprehensive
conservation planning to support the use of any of these conceptual tools without close
monitoring of the desired outcomes” (p. 62). Essentially what is needed is an adaptive
management strategy, with monitoring, implementation of various conservation or landuse approaches, and repeated periodic monitoring to verify conditions and adapt activities
accordingly. Two Rocky Mountain Research Station Scientists offer suggestions for
precisely how to improve monitoring strategies so that they serve as a solid foundation
for adaptive management and understanding the effects of planning and management
activities. Cushman and McKelvey (in press) begin with the basic premise that “[c]ost
effective, timely, representative, and broad-scale monitoring of multiple resources is the
foundation upon which adaptive management depends.” The key to their monitoring
strategy is that it include large-sample, multi-scale, and georeferrenced data on multiple
ecosystem attributes. Rather than averaging across the vast spatial and temporal
complexity present in landscapes, that complexity must be incorporated into monitoring
data for understanding ecosystems. Furthermore, they write, “Given the spatial, temporal
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and contextual nature of ecological systems, frequent remeasurement across large spatial
sampling networks is fundamentally important.” One of their key recommendations is
also the direct monitoring of resources, given the uncertainties associated with the use of
proxies or surrogates. They also emphasize the need for large samples that provide
statistically powerful inferences regarding conditions, and data collection at least every
five years.
If we applied this vision to monitoring for species, that monitoring would be
based on multiple points of detection, coupled with ecological data from multiple scales,
in order to build a more solid understanding of species-habitat relationships. This kind of
data could then provide a basis for understanding potential cumulative impacts to species
based on changes to habitat, but predictions would have to be verified with iterative,
long-term direct monitoring of populations themselves in order to evaluate and improve
models. The key here is the need to utilize monitoring in order to test proposed
relationships between coarse-filter ecosystem attributes and population responses. As
Cushman and McKelvey (in press) explain, if we only ever monitor proxies, such as
vegetation structure and type as a measure of habitat availability, our assumptions about
species-habitat relationships will remain perpetually untested and uncertain.
Although the approach sounds like it might be prohibitively expensive, Cushman
and McKelvey (in press) envision a network of sampling plots and the use of biotic and
abiotic data that is already available to create more useful and multi-layered databases.
The challenge is also to make ongoing monitoring efforts, and the associated money that
is already being spent, more useful. Cushman and McKelvey (in press) write, “[M]ost
ecological monitoring to guide natural resources management is severely limited by
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failure to adequately consider spatial sampling design, often failure to even establish
spatially referenced sampling networks, and inconsistencies across space and through
time on what variables are measured, at what scale, and with what methods.” Therefore,
some improvements could be made by improving and coordinating current monitoring
efforts.
Unfortunately there is no reason to think that an increased budget or
organizational emphasis will be directed at improving monitoring. However, there is
little doubt that developing a comprehensive, long-term, and iterative monitoring
program is what is necessary if the agency is serious about pursuing adaptive
management and, in general, better-informed management with regard to desired
conditions. Noon et al. (2008) suggest that at the least the improved resolution and
availability of remote sensing data will make coarse-filter approaches more useful over
time. Incorporation of fine-filter approaches and direct monitoring will likely come
along more slowly, and in the meantime it will be key to undertake strategic efforts to
prioritize a small cadre of species for monitoring.
Also important will be ensuring adequate communication between scientists and
managers. At present there is often a serious gap between the research and management
arms of the USFS and in public lands management in general (Noon et al., 2008).
Scientific advancements and information may not always be available or readily
understandable to practitioners, and more communication between these communities has
the potential to improve management strategies. This recommendation could couple
nicely with the need for increased credibility of the approaches and tools used by the
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management side of the USFS. The need to facilitate more involvement from the
scientific community is one area where USFS practice could and should improve.
Some of the Committee of Scientists’ recommendations dealt with the need for
increased communication and credibility with regard to scientific information used for
planning (Committee of Scientists, 1999). In the response to comments for the final rule
issued in 2000, the USFS explained that the scientific information used for planning
should be subject to peer-review where appropriate and that other scientific checks
should be used in order “to ensure that the best science is available to decision makers, is
properly analyzed and interpreted, and can be applied with scientific credibility.”12
Under the 2000 rule, broad scientific analyses such as Samson’s work would have likely
been subject to some peer review. The rule also called specifically for “science
consistency checks” and “science advisory boards” to ensure that the relevant scientific
information is used in planning and decision-making, that uncertainty is acknowledged,
and that scientific disagreements are acknowledged and documented.13 Scientific
advisory boards were also to be convened at the national and regional levels, overseen by
the Deputy Chief of the research arm of the agency, and would have advised the Chief of
the Forest Service on issues of national scope.
These regulations would have provided for more of a collaborative relationship
between the research arm of the USFS and management and in general would have
ensured more of a solid scientific foundation for planning and decision-making. Given
the problems identified in this research regarding the validity of some of the assessments
used by the USFS and general issues of the scientific credibility of its approaches,
12
13

65 Fed. Reg. 67514 (Nov. 9, 2000) at 67553.
These provisions were included in the 2000 rule at 36 C.F.R. §§219.24-219.25.
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increased use of peer-review and science consistency checks would be a positive step
forward. Scientific advisory boards at national and regional levels would also provide a
forum for increased discussion within the agency on controversial management
questions. This would provide an additional venue within the agency for discussion
broad-scale issues that often are central to conflicts over forest management but are too
large in scope to deal with at the local or regional level.
Despite the fact that these regulations no longer stand, the use of science
consistency checks is something the agency could be doing anyway. In fact, a similar
process was undertaken by the Tongass National Forest during its forest plan revision
process. In that case managers from the Alaska Region and researchers from the Pacific
Northwest Research Station teamed up during the forest plan revision, and both played a
strong role in the process. The scientists gathered and synthesized the available data and
identified key gaps in the knowledge base for the plan. Those gaps were then addressed
through a 5-year research program, funded jointly by the regional office and the research
station. That effort resulted in scientific information that was used to inform the next
cycle of planning, and some of the research was published in peer-reviewed journals as
well (Everest, 2005).14 Everest (2005) explains that the scientists has a separate role from
that of the planners and were charged with developing “credible, value-neutral, scientific
information without reference to management decisions” (p. 21). They also assessed the
levels of risk associated with different management approaches and conducted
consistency checks to evaluate whether “all relevant information was used to reach

14

The Landscape and Urban Planning (Vol. 72) issue in which this article was published
contains several other pieces describing the process used on the Tongass to incorporate science
into planning.

317

management decisions, if the information was understood and correctly interpreted, and
if managers had acknowledged and documented the risks inherent in the decisions they
had made” (Everest, 2005, p. 21). Everest (2005) concludes that the science audits on the
Tongass were positive for research and management in that they led to an increased role
for scientists and better management decisions. The positive results of the approach were
also a primary reason that the notion of science consistency checks were written into the
planning regulations issued several years later.
The Tongass science audits serve as an example of how collaboration between
USFS research and management could lead to improved scientific bases for decisionmaking and increased credibility of the science underlying management decisions. It
would be exciting to see the Northern Region and the Rocky Mountain Research Station
engage is a similar type of collaboration, whether it was to guide forest planning or to
support the development of tools, such as management standards or scientific
evaluations, used to support decision-making, or to help develop a broad-scale
monitoring strategy for the region. This is not to imply that there is no collaboration at
present; however, increasing the frequency, transparency, and formality of collaboration
with USFS research and other scientists could be a positive step forward for the agency.

5.3 Recommendations
The topic of CEA is broad and encompasses a wide variety of different issues in
forest management. The challenges of conducting CEA mirror some of the most pressing
issues in U.S. forest management, including design and implementation of a monitoring
program to support adaptive management and understand cumulative impacts,

318

development of scientifically sound and credible analyses to support project
implementation, and landscape level planning and analyses for biodiversity conservation.
Throughout this manuscript recommendations and options for improvement have been
included in the analysis, and I revisit some of those here. Several recommendations can
be distilled from this research as the most important avenues for improving CEA
practice:

1. Despite CEQ’s guidance and the convenience of using the environmental baseline
as an indicator of cumulative impacts, the current approach to understanding
cumulative impacts from past actions is unsatisfactory. CEQ and the USFS both
must reconsider how to handle this challenge and how to improve implementation
of this aspect of the CEA requirement in the future. The environmental baseline
does not adequately capture how resource conditions have changed over time and
does not provide any sense of what the causes of those changes may have been.
Changes that have been the result of small, incremental actions, significant
changes to resource conditions, and the crossing of thresholds all need to be
captured in CEA.

2. Measurable objectives and meaningful descriptions of desired conditions must be
established so that cumulative impacts to resources can be put into some context.
Some kind of threshold, trigger point, or target objective must be identified in
order to guide a cumulative impacts analysis. Without a clearly defined desired
condition or threshold, it is easier to dismiss impacts as non-significant.
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Thresholds for wildlife could reflect a goal, such as maintaining viability, or aim
for a more ambitious target, such as maintaining or improving current status of
populations. Tear et al. (2005) state that effective conservation of biodiversity
will require the setting of measurable conservation objectives and provide
guidelines and useful examples of how this can be done.

3. The USFS must emphasize the development of a comprehensive monitoring
program that can be used to understand cumulative impacts. Implementation and
effectiveness monitoring will both be necessary. A consistent, iterative, and
broad-scale monitoring strategy will provide the foundation for adaptive
management, which itself rests upon an agency’s ability to understand impacts to
resources and the factors that are likely causing those impacts. In terms of
wildlife species, increased monitoring is necessary in order to understand
population status, conduct broad-scale assessments, and better understand
species/habitat relationships.

4. The scientific foundations of forest management could be improved by ensuring
that scientific information and methods are made available and understandable to
managers. Collaboration between USFS research and management should be
increasingly utilized to provide peer-review of programmatic scientific analyses
and input on programmatic processes such as forest planning. The approaches
from the 2000 regulations are possible ways forward. Those recommendations
called for increased use of science advisory boards overseen by USFS research,
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peer-review of agency documents when appropriate, open acknowledge of
uncertainty in planning, and the use of science consistency checks for processes
such as forest planning.

5. The agency could improve the coordination, communication, and dissemination
of existing information. Consistent coordination of monitoring efforts, refinement
of monitoring data, and communication of the implications and potential uses of
data and scientific studies are necessary to maximize the efficacy of efforts that
are already taking place. Increased coordination and communication among
resource specialists could help to ensure that analyses are conducted in a
consistent manner and that specialists are not needlessly duplicating each other’s
work. The regional offices could play a role in coordinating communication
about important new scientific findings, practical methodologies for conducting
analysis, and species-specific information to guide management strategies.

6. Effects from private land activities on resources such as wildlife need to be more
meaningfully analyzed. Anecdotally, several scientists with the USFS indicated
that a more accurate picture of impacts from private land is possible and that
cumulative impacts analyses completed for consultation with the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service, as required by the Endangered Species Act of 1973, include
more detail than what is included in project analyses. In other words, there is
room for improvement in terms of how private lands are analyzed in project-level
analyses, and a more complete picture of the effects of private land activities
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could be provided. Improving the analysis of private land issues in project and
plan level analyses will only become more crucial in the West, as population and
private land development both increase. This also is an area where the courts
could embrace a more probing analysis than what has been required in the past.

7. To improve wildlife analyses, the USFS should continue to work on developing
priority lists of species for monitoring and priority wildlife habitat areas, while
recognizing that the use of wildlife surrogates and coarse-filter approaches are
essentially untested hypotheses. In light of this, direct monitoring of populations
will be necessary to some extent. Ideally, rather than move in the direction
currently taken in the 2008 rules, the USFS should implement more of a fine-filter
analysis in line with the recommendations of numerous ecologists and the
agency’s own Committee of Scientists convened in 1997 to inform the revision of
forest planning regulations. Furthermore, the agency must assess effects to
wildlife populations at a scale that is appropriate for that resource. Analyses that
consider effects to species at larger landscape and population scales must be
undertaken. These assessments also must provide useful guidance for projectlevel analyses in order to facilitate a meaningful analysis of project-level effects
within the broader context.
Several other avenues for improving CEA also should be considered as possible
options for moving forward. Environmental advocates and a number of USFS staff
recommend that the agency move away from timber targets and use targets based on
acres-treated instead. This would increase trust with the public and would assist the
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agency in focusing on its restoration priorities. Others have suggested that the agency
begin to contemplate altering its planning and budgeting approaches to move towards
watershed planning, rather than project-by-project planning. Scientists have argued that
in some cases watershed-level planning is more effective for addressing cumulative
impacts and for protecting resources. Environmentalists have suggested that watershedlevel planning would be more appropriate given the agency’s current emphasis on land
stewardship and restoration and would provide a clearer picture of the long-term changes
and management strategy for an area, which might reduce conflict over long-term
planning and effects. Watershed-level planning would have to be coupled with the forest
planning process, and it is an interesting possibility to consider for future planning
efforts.
If the USFS is serious about implementing an adaptive management strategy, it
should consider convening an adaptive management task force to concertedly address
questions of how to embark upon what is essentially a new and novel planning paradigm.
The task force would have to address questions of monitoring strategies, how to couple
adaptive management with requirements for accountability and judicial review, how to
write meaningful objectives and decision points into plans so that adaptive management
does not become a buzzword for unstructured planning, and how to facilitate the
approach institutionally. This task force would ideally involve interagency
communication, particularly with CEQ, which has identified a need for an adaptive
management task force to look at how the approach would work with the NEPA process.
Potentially, a set of pilot projects could be implemented, and future efforts could learn
from those pilot projects and from adaptive management efforts that have been
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undertaken by other land management agencies. If the USFS is serious that it wants to
embrace adaptive management, as it says in its new planning regulations, the challenges
of the approach suggest that a thoughtful and concerted effort will be necessary to move
in this direction.
These recommendations and options for moving forward reflect the lessons
learned from this research based on the legal review, case study, and interviews with
numerous knowledgeable individuals who deal with these issues daily. Addressing these
issues could improve how CEA is done, especially for wildlife, and also could improve
National Forest management and planning in general. A major finding of this research is
that the challenges of CEA essentially mirror some of the major challenges of forest
management. In order to effectively manage National Forests, the USFS needs to
implement planning and monitoring on scales that are more consistent with the relevant
scales of analysis for various resources. If effects are more visible or meaningful at
watershed or forest-wide scales, then somehow the USFS must find ways to analyze
effects on those scales and make those analyses useful for project level planning. These
steps also are necessary to effectively understand cumulative impacts. More effective
monitoring of resources themselves, coupled with increased knowledge coordination, will
serve to improve cumulative effects analyses and also will be necessary if the USFS is to
understand the effects of its actions and improve its strategies in light of that
understanding. Similarly, strengthening the scientific foundations of its work will
improve CEA and will serve to improve the quality of management as well as credibility
with public with regard to National Forest management.
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Appendix A: Interview Guides
Interview Guide for USFS personnel
How they do/present CEA
1. How has the way you do CEA changed over the last ten years or so?
2. How do you do a CEA for wildlife species?
3. What are some of the strengths/weaknesses of the scientific basis for CEA? How
do you respond to criticisms that some analyses are not peer-reviewed or reliable?
4. At what point in the planning process do you begin to analyze CEA? Have you
seen cases where it has affected the development or implementation of a project?
Factors that affect how CEA is done
1. How have litigation/public attention affected how CEA is done?
2. How have litigation and public involvement affected the quality of the analysis?
3. With regard to past actions, how are you now analyzing cumulative effects? Does
a description of the environmental baseline capture cumulative impacts? Is there
a difference between cumulative impacts and reaching a threshold?
4. What are some other factors that affect how you/your forest does a CEA (support,
training, guidelines, leadership)?
5. What are some factors that prevent you from doing a better job (data, budgets,
time, threat of litigation)?
What is a good CEA and how might it improve in the future
1. Where do you see the agency currently succeeding in their implementation of the
requirement? Where could the agency be doing better?
2. How would you characterize the criticisms from the public with regard to the way
the forest does CEA?
3. How do you see the process evolving in the future? (Will it be a more important
aspect of environmental impact analysis in this region? Will there be more tools
and data for doing it? Will it change in light of the new planning regulations?
Will it be done more at the project or plan level?)
4. How would CEA ideally be done in the future? What would a good/complete
CEA look like? At what level of planning would it take place?
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Interview Guide for Non-Profit Personnel/Other Interested Parties
Perspectives on how the agency does CEA/Problems with the analysis
1. Why is the CEA requirement an important issue for your organization? Has it
become a more important aspect of EIA in this region?
2. Has the way the agency does CEA changed much over the last 10 years or so?
What role did public attention litigation play in affecting how the agency does
CEA?
3. In cases where you’ve raised complaints about CEA in the past, how would you
characterize the primary deficiencies in the analysis?
4. What did you hope to gain in terms of how the agency plans or analyzes
cumulative impacts? Were those gains realized?
6. How have litigation and public involvement affected the quality of the analysis?
5. Where do you see the agency currently succeeding and failing in their
implementation of the requirement?
6. What are some of the current strengths/weaknesses of the science used as part of
CEA?
7. Can you discuss how the agency deals with the issue of past actions and any
strengths/weaknesses of the approach?
8. What factors do you think affect the agency’s ability to do an adequate CEA
(time, money, data)?
9. Have you seen any cases where a CEA affected project implementation?
What is a good CEA and how might it improve in the future
1. How do you see the process evolving in the future? Are the tools or data
available changing in any way? Will it change in light of the new planning
regulations? Will it be done more at the project or plan level?
2. What would a good CEA look like? How would CEA ideally be done in the
future? At what level of planning would it take place?
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Appendix B: EIS Evaluation Form
CEA Evaluation and Checklist
Project Name:
Location:
Project Summary:
Documentation
Are cumulative impacts listed in the index, table of contents, and/or executive summary?
Where are they found?
Are they done for each resource?
Does the scale of analysis vary by resource?
Are past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions discussed for each resource?
Is there a summary of cumulative impacts?
Is there a definition of cumulative impacts?
Are cumulative impacts mentioned in scoping section?
Is there a separate CEA section?
Are procedures and guidelines for conducting a CEA explained?

Wildlife Analysis
What species is it done for?
Is the scale defined? Does it vary by species?
Is the temporal/geographic scale justified?
Are past, present, and reasonably foreseeable actions included in the analysis? How?
Are they listed?
Are actions of non-federal lands considered?
What other kinds of documents and information support the CEA?
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What kind of data is used to support the CEA?
What are the effects variables?
How are cumulative impacts presented?
Is there evidence for findings? Is the rationale for findings explained?
Is there analysis as opposed to description of activities?
Are transboundary or global issues addressed?
If cumulative impacts are found to be non-significant for a resource, is this mentioned
and explained?
Is there anything notable about the scientific foundation of the CEA or the treatment
uncertainty?

Notes from the public comment and USFS response:
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